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Abstract   
 
The ethics of economic sanctions is an issue that has been curiously neglected 
by philosophers and political theorists.  Only a handful of philosophical journal 
articles and book chapters have ever been published on the subject; yet economic 
sanctions, as I will show, are significantly morally problematic and their use stands 
in need of moral justification.  The aim of this thesis then is to consider how 
economic sanctions might be morally justified. 
Of the few writers who have considered this issue, the majority point to the 
analogies between economic sanctions and war and use the just war principles (just 
cause, proportionality etc.) as a framework within which to assess their moral 
permissibility.  I argue that this is a mistake.  The just war principles are derived 
from a set of complex and detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of 
war.  These arguments contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of 
war, do not always hold true in the case of economic sanctions.   
Nevertheless, the rich just war tradition does offer a valuable starting point 
for theorising about economic sanctions and in the thesis I consider how the wider 
just war tradition might be brought to bear on the case of economic sanctions, 
beginning, not with the just war principles, but with the underlying arguments for 
those principles.   
In particular, I consider whether economic sanctions can be justified on the 
grounds that they are a form of self- or other-defence, that they are the ‘lesser evil’ 
and that they are a form of punishment.  I argue that certain types of economic 
sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other-
defence and that, in extreme circumstances, certain types of economic sanctions can 
be justified as the ‘lesser evil’.  However, I argue that economic sanctions cannot be 
justified on the grounds of punishment. 
I also develop a ‘clean hands’ argument for economic sanctions that is 
unavailable to the just war theorist; I argue that where the goods and services to be 
supplied would contribute to human rights violations or other wrongful acts, there is 
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Economic sanctions have long been a feature of international relations.  One 
of the earliest recorded instances of economic sanctions dates back to 432BC; the 
‘Megarian Decree’ limited the sale of Megarian products in Athenian markets in 
retaliation for Megara’s failed attempt to seize Athenian territory and the kidnapping 
of three women.   
However, these historic instances of sanctions often foreshadowed or 
accompanied war.1  It was only after the First World War that economic sanctions 
began to be employed outside of a war situation.  Speaking in 1919, Woodrow 
Wilson recommended that economic sanctions should be the primary strategy of the 
League of Nations and that they should be used as an alternative to war, asserting 
that: 
 
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.  
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be 
no need for force.  It is a terrible remedy.  It does not cost a life outside 
the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure upon the nation which, in 
my judgment, no modern nation could resist.2 
 
Economic sanctions, however, never took off in the way Wilson envisaged.  
In fact, the League of Nations sanctions imposed on Italy following its invasion of 
Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 were widely perceived as a disastrous failure and, many 
argue, led to the disintegration of the League of Nations.3 
After the Second World War, the United Nations used economic sanctions 
infrequently, the only notable instances being the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia and 
South Africa.  However, the 1990s saw a proliferation of economic sanctions; most 
notably those imposed on Haiti, the former Yugoslav republics and, of course, Iraq.  
The end of the Cold War had had made concerted international action possible where 
previously any action by the West was countered by the U.S.S.R and vice-versa.4  
This meant that for the first time the United Nations Security Council could impose 
                                               
1 Hufbauer et al., 39. 
2 Quoted in Winkler, 136. 
3 Lang, 85. 
4 Christiansen & Powers, viii. 
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economic sanctions that, in theory at least, all member states were required to take 
part in.  With this came the possibility to inflict serious damage.  The harms caused 
to Haiti and the former Yugoslav republics were severe but the harms suffered by 
Iraq were the worst ever caused by the use of economic sanctions outside of a war 
situation.  UNICEF estimated that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq from 
1990 until the introduction of the Oil for Food Programme in 1996, led to the deaths 
of 500,000 children aged under five from malnutrition and disease.5  As Woodrow 
Wilson asserted, sanctions can indeed be both ‘peaceful’ and ‘deadly’: peaceful for 
the sanctioning state but possibly deadly for the target state.   
Following the obvious devastation caused by economic sanctions in Iraq, a 
wide variety of governmental and non-governmental organisations - including the 
United Nations and economic sanctions theorists - began to seriously investigate the 
possibility of alternative forms of economic sanctions; sanctions not targeted against 
‘ordinary people’ but rather targeted against those considered to be morally 
responsible for the objectionable policies of the state.  The results – ‘targeted’ 
economic sanctions - became the UN’s economic sanctions tool of choice throughout 
the 2000s.  Targeted economic sanctions include measures such as imposing 
financial sanctions on top government officials or those suspected of financing 
terrorism, arms embargoes, nuclear sanctions (which ban the export of materials 
necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons) and bans on ‘items intended for 
internal repression’ such as torture equipment.  The harms inflicted by targeted 
sanctions are for the most part much less extensive than those inflicted by previous 
episodes of economic sanctions which targeted entire populations; nevertheless they 
are not harmless and may still be morally problematic.  For example, the arms 
embargo imposed during the break up of the former Yugoslavia was widely criticised 
as it did not permit the Bosnian Muslims to acquire the weapons they needed to 
defend themselves from the genocidal attacks of the Serbian army.6  Further, many 
individuals have tried to appeal the decision to freeze their foreign held assets (on the 
grounds that they have been incorrectly designated terrorists) only to find there is no 
process to do so.7  Nevertheless, targeted economic sanctions seem on the whole to 
                                               
5 As quoted in Winkler, 139. 
6 Gordon, 2011, 315. 
7 Tridimas and Gutierrez-Fons, 2008-2009. 
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be morally preferable to the type of sanctions imposed on Iraq, the former 
Yugoslavia and Haiti; sanctions not targeted at specific individuals but rather at the 
entire economy.  (For the purposes of this thesis I refer to such sanctions as 
‘collective’ sanctions)  Morally speaking, the shift away from collective sanctions 
and towards targeted sanctions has been a great improvement. 
However, in recent months, there is evidence that states are returning to a 
policy of collective sanctions.  Specifically, the comprehensive financial sanctions 
imposed on Iran by the United States, European Union  and others (though not the 
United Nations) as a consequence of Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, are 
targeted at damaging the entire economy of the country and appear to be harming the 
ordinary population.  The value of the local currency, the rial, has fallen by 80% 
since the start of the year and inflation is running at an estimated 24%.8   
The situation in Iran is nowhere close to the devastation that occurred in Iraq 
but, with the US and EU seemingly committed to tough sanctions, the future does not 
look good for the Iranian people.  In the face of the pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, collective sanctions appear to be making a return. 
Given this it would appear that the question of the ethics of economic 
sanctions is becoming increasingly urgent.  However, with the notable exception of 
Joy Gordon (whose recent work has predominantly been empirical), it is not a 
question that philosophers are addressing.  The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, 
Haiti and Yugoslavia in the 1990s generated a small flurry of papers on the ethics of 
economic sanctions which remains, to date, pretty much the extent of the 
philosophical literature on the subject.  There are certainly no book-length treatments 
on the ethics of economic sanctions.  This thesis therefore is an attempt to address 
the question of the ethics of economic sanctions in a comprehensive manner.  In it I 
ask the question, can the use of collective and targeted economic sanctions be 
morally justified and, if so, on what grounds? 
I begin in chapter one by stipulating and defending a definition of economic 
sanctions for use in the thesis.  Chapter one also further explores the nature of 
economic sanctions; in particular, the range of objectives they may aim at and their 
possible operational mechanisms.  It is important to note that there is no consensus 
                                               
8 BBC News, http://bbc.co.uk/news/business-19786662.  Last accessed 30 October 2012. 
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among economic sanctions theorists about what the objectives and operational 
mechanisms of economic sanctions actually are and equally no consensus about what 
they should be.  It is clear that those imposing economic sanctions often have a 
variety of objectives in mind and are sometimes unsure how (or if) the sanctions will 
work.  They also have incentives to be vague or to lie about the nature of the 
economic sanctions they have imposed.  Thus economic sanctions theorists 
examining the same episode of economic sanctions may draw very different 
conclusions as to what the objectives of the sanctions were, how they were supposed 
to work and, especially, whether they actually did work.  I deal with this issue by 
assuming economic sanctions can have any kind of political objective at all and can 
operate with any of the mechanisms identified by economic sanctions theorists.  
Whether a particular economic sanctions episode is justified will of course depend on 
what objectives it seeks and how it expects to achieve them. 
In chapter two I go on to consider the question: what’s wrong with economic 
sanctions?  What is it about economic sanctions that renders them in need of moral 
justification?  This chapter is motivated by a concern that the lack of philosophical 
attention to the issue of the ethics of economic sanctions might be driven by an 
assumption that economic sanctions are morally unproblematic.  I argue that 
economic sanctions have several morally problematic features.  In particular, they 
inflict harm on individuals – many of whom one would consider to be morally 
innocent.  Further, as a means of international coercion (or compulsion) they 
undermine the self-determination of target states.   
Chapter three, as the title suggests, is a ground clearing effort.  As I 
mentioned above there is little in the way of philosophical work on the ethics of 
economic sanctions and, further, what there is is overwhelmingly critical.  There is, 
however, a public debate on the issue and several justifications for economic 
sanctions have been put forward in this debate.  Furthermore, in working on this 
topic and presenting my work at philosophy conferences and work in progress 
seminars, I have been presented with several more philosophical justifications for 
economic sanctions.  In this chapter my aim is to reconstruct these justifications into 
their strongest form and then assess their plausibility.  Following this assessment, I 
conclude that none of the justifications offered are plausible. 
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Thus, in chapter four, I turn to consider the approaches taken by the existing 
philosophical literature on the subject.  Of the few writers who have considered the 
ethics of economic sanctions, the majority point to the analogies between economic 
sanctions and war and use the just war principles (just cause, proportionality, non-
combatant immunity etc.) as a framework within which to assess their moral 
permissibility.  I argue that this is a mistake.  The just war principles are derived 
from a set of complex and detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of 
war.  These arguments contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of 
war, do not always hold true in the case of economic sanctions.  Nevertheless, the 
rich just war tradition does offer a valuable starting point for theorising about 
economic sanctions and, in the four chapters that follow, I attempt to systematically 
consider how the wider just war tradition might be brought to bear on the case of 
economic sanctions, beginning, not with the just war principles, but with the 
underlying arguments for those principles.   
Chapter five considers whether economic sanctions can be justified on the 
grounds of an individual right to self- or other-defence.  Economic sanctions are 
often imposed for reasons that can broadly be construed as defensive.  Some 
examples are the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations following its 
invasion of Kuwait and the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Argentina 
following its invasion of the Falkland Islands.  Much of contemporary just war 
theory is concerned with justifying defensive war on the grounds of an individual 
right to self- or other-defence and my objective here is to investigate how far these 
arguments can be applied to the case of economic sanctions.  I conclude that targeted 
economic sanctions can be justified on these grounds as long as certain conditions 
are met.  However, collective economic sanctions are very unlikely to be justified.   
Chapter six considers whether economic sanctions can be justified on the 
grounds of humanitarian intervention.  There is considerable debate about the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention: when, if ever, is it morally permissible (or 
required) to intervene in another state to end human rights violations perpetrated by a 
government against its own citizens?  To date the debate has focussed almost 
exclusively on military intervention and the use of other means of intervention – such 
as economic sanctions – has largely been neglected.  This is despite the fact that 
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economic sanctions are actually used much more frequently than military force in 
cases of humanitarian intervention.  After developing a positive argument for the use 
of economic sanctions as humanitarian intervention, I show that the arguments 
commonly employed against humanitarian intervention, which mostly assume a 
context of military intervention, either do not apply at all to the case of economic 
sanctions or apply with significantly less force and are thus more easily overcome. 
Chapter seven considers whether economic sanctions could ever be justified 
as the ‘lesser evil’.  Inspiration for this chapter is taken from Michael Walzer’s 
‘supreme emergency exception’.  Walzer argues that in dire emergencies during war 
it is morally justified to intentionally target innocent civilians in order to further just 
war aims.  In this chapter I argue that collective economic sanctions, which target 
innocent people, might be justified in rare and extreme circumstances as the lesser 
evil.   
Chapter eight considers whether economic sanctions can be justified on the 
grounds that they are just punishment for violations of international law or 
international moral norms.  I argue that for economic sanctions to be justified on the 
grounds of just punishment requires an executive authority that could judge and 
execute its judgments impartially.  Currently, there is no such impartial executive 
authority.  Hence, currently, a practice of international punishment by means of 
economic sanctions cannot be morally justified.   
I conclude with chapter nine, which departs from the just war tradition, to 
develop an argument originally put forward by Noam Zohar.  Zohar argues that we 
have a duty to sanction where sanctioning is necessary to avoid complicity in 
wrongdoing.  For example, we have a duty to impose arms embargoes on states 
which would use those weapons to pursue aggressive war or attack their own 
citizens; we have a duty to ‘keep clean hands’.  Zohar’s idea is interesting because to 
date the moral analysis of economic sanctions has almost exclusively assumed that 
economic sanctions are a prima facie wrong (for the reasons given in chapter two) 
and morally justified in any given case only if certain conditions are met.  However, 
under a clean hands conception of economic sanctions the imposition of sanctions is, 
by contrast, a moral duty - a duty derived from the duty not to be complicit in human 
rights violations or other wrongdoing.  Employing the clean hands conception of 
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economic sanctions thus shifts the burden of moral justification from those who 
would impose sanctions to those who would not.  The clean hands conception 
therefore appears to be a valuable tool for those who would impose economic 
sanctions in response to international wrongdoing.  I argue that the clean hands 
argument does successfully ground a duty to sanction in certain cases. 
 At this point it is worth clarifying my normative approach to the above 
issues.  In order to draw reasonably determinate conclusions about the ethics of 
economic sanctions it is necessary to adopt a fairly substantive moral theory.  For 
example, it is necessary to take a stand on questions such as whether consequences 
alone determine the rightness or wrongness of actions (as in consequentialism) or 
whether moral rights act as constraints on the pursuit of good consequences (as in 
deontology).  In this thesis I adopt a general moral theory with the following 
features.  My moral theory is fundamentally a deontological theory where moral 
rights act as side constraints on the pursuit of good consequences.  However, it 
allows for moral rights to be overridden where it is necessary to avoid terrible 
consequences.  I believe that a theory along these lines is the most plausible, but 
arguing for this view is beyond the scope of the thesis.  It is an interesting question 
in itself, and one worth investigating, what a moral theory like this has to say about 
the ethics of economic sanctions. 
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Chapter 1: What are Economic Sanctions? 
 
For the purposes of this thesis I stipulate the following definition of economic 
sanctions:  
 
Economic sanctions are the deliberate withdrawal of customary trade 
or financial relations9 ordered by a state, supra-national or 
international organisation (the ‘sender’) from any state, sub-state 
group, organisation or individual (the ‘target’) in response to the 
political behaviour of that target. 
 
The specific elements of this definition merit some discussion. 
First, economic sanctions may comprise the withdrawal of customary trade 
and/or financial relations in whole or in part.  Trade may be restricted by refusing all 
or only some imports and exports.  If all imports and exports are refused then the 
sanctions are ‘comprehensive’.  (Though note that even in the case of comprehensive 
sanctions humanitarian exemptions are usually made, e.g. for food and medicine).  In 
other cases only trade in certain goods is refused – usually commodities like oil or 
timber - such sanctions are ‘partial’.10   Financial sanctions include measures such as 
asset freezes, the denial of credit, the denial of banking services, the withdrawal of 
aid and so on.  Again, withdrawal of financial relations may be comprehensive or 
partial. 
Second, economic sanctions may be ordered (or ‘imposed’) by a variety of 
actors.  Sanctions can be ‘multi-lateral’, ordered by the United Nations or regional 
organisations such as the European Union or they can be ‘unilateral’, ordered by one 
state acting alone.  The actor ordering economic sanctions is typically known as the 
‘sender’ of the sanctions.   
In practical terms, contemporary economic sanctions are imposed by 
following a legal process.  Economic sanctions mandated by the United Nations 
Security Council are required to be adopted by all member states under chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter.  States then pass legislation prohibiting their citizens 
from entering into trading and/or financial relationships with the target and setting 
                                               
9 This part of the definition is taken from Hufbauer et al., 3. 
10 The term ‘comprehensive’ is widely used in the literature.  The term ‘partial’ is my own.  I’m not 
aware of any particular alternative widely used in the literature.   
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penalties for sanctions-breaking.  European Union economic sanctions are brought 
into law slightly differently but the exact details are not important here.  Suffice to 
say the conclusion is the same, the citizens of EU member states are prohibited by 
law from entering into trading and/or financial relationships with the target.  
Similarly, states imposing unilateral economic sanctions will follow their own legal 
processes.  So although we often talk of sanctions being ‘imposed’ on the target, a 
usage I shall continue, it should be clear that economic sanctions are actually legal 
measures imposed by a sender against its own members.  It is a sender’s own citizens 
who are prohibited from trading, the citizens of the target state face no such legal 
restriction.   
Finally, note that I exclude from my definition of economic sanctions 
measures undertaken by non-state actors, e.g. consumer boycotts or boycotts 
undertaken by companies or religious organisations.  Such measures are undeniably 
worthy of ethical enquiry; however, the ethical concerns they present are sufficiently 
distinctive to make it sensible to treat them as a separate issue.  
Third, states are not the only targets of economic sanctions.  Economic 
sanctions can be, and often are, imposed on sub-state groups.  Well known examples 
from the recent past are the sanctions imposed on Serb-controlled areas of the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s or the ban on trade in conflict diamonds that targeted sub-
state rebel groups in parts of Africa.  Economic sanctions can also be imposed on 
companies, organisations and individuals.  For example, the UK regularly freezes the 
UK-held assets of companies, charities or individuals suspected of funding terrorist 
activities.  For this reason it is perfectly possible for a state to sanction its own 
citizens.  Those on the receiving end of economic sanctions are typically known as 
the ‘target’.  In this thesis I will refer to economic sanctions imposed on an entire 
state as ‘collective’ and economic sanctions that are imposed more narrowly as 
‘targeted’. 
Fourth, on my definition, economic sanctions are imposed in response to the 
political behaviour of the target - as distinguished from its economic behaviour.  
Such a stipulation is common in the economic sanctions literature.  For example, 
Robert Pape distinguishes economic sanctions from what he calls ‘trade wars’: 
 
 15 
When the United States threatens China with economic punishment if it 
does not respect human rights, that is an economic sanction; when 
punishment is threatened over copyright infringement, that is a trade 
war.11   
 
Not everyone accepts this distinction.  David Baldwin, for instance, denies 
that economic sanctions must be a response to political behaviour.  For Baldwin 
economic sanctions can be a response to any type of behaviour - there is no reason to 
restrict the definition of economic sanctions to those measures which aim to respond 
to political behaviour.12  Thus, contra Pape, Baldwin argues that if the U.S imposes 
restrictions on trade with China over copyright issues then this is an economic 
sanction.  However, it is important to note that Baldwin and I have different aims in 
writing about economic sanctions.  Baldwin aims to instruct statesmen in their use of 
economic power to achieve foreign policy goals.  For Baldwin then, the 
political/economic distinction is not particularly relevant to his project.  I, on the 
other hand, am interested in the ethical uses of economic power.  For my purposes 
the distinction is relevant because I suspect that the ethical issues surrounding 
measures responding to political issues are importantly different to those surrounding 
measures responding to economic issues.  Thus it makes sense to consider the two 
separately.  In any case, if the reader does not accept the basis for my distinction, I 
have no problem with her considering this to be a thesis addressing the ethics of a 
particular type of economic sanction: those responding to political behaviour. 
A final objection to this approach – also made by David Baldwin – is that 
there is no clear-cut distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ and so 
there is no clear-cut basis for making the distinction even if it is warranted.13  I 
concede that the distinction between the two might be a bit fuzzy at the edges but 
there are undeniably clear-cut cases such as Pape’s example of responding to human 
rights violations versus responding to copyright infringement.  In this thesis all the 
cases of economic sanctions that I address are clear cut cases. 
Finally, I should point out that my definition of economic sanction is broader 
than most found in the literature.  This is because most theorists define economic 
                                               
11 Pape, 1997, 94. 
12 Baldwin, 1985, 32. 
13 Baldwin and Pape, 191. 
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sanctions with reference to a specific objective and/or with reference to a specific 
mechanism by which they believe economic sanctions to work.14  However, there is 
considerable advantage in a broader definition that does not tie economic sanctions 
to any particular objective or operational mechanism.  First, it allows us to address 
the question of which objectives it is morally permissible to pursue by means of 
economic sanctions.  Second, it allows us to consider whether some operational 
mechanisms are more morally problematic than others.  Consideration of such issues 
is surely essential to an ethical analysis of economic sanctions; it does not make 
sense to make such consideration impossible from the outset with a restrictive 
definition of economic sanctions.   
Nevertheless, I do need to discuss the various possible objectives and 
operational mechanisms of economic sanctions and this is the matter I turn to 
address next.   
 
The Objectives of Economic Sanctions 
 
Economic sanctions theorists tend to conceptualise economic sanctions 
in one of two ways: as tools of foreign policy or as tools of international law 
enforcement.  In what follows I discuss each in turn. 
 
Foreign Policy Conception 
 
Economic sanctions are most commonly conceptualised as being tools for 
achieving foreign policy objectives.  They are part of the foreign policy ‘toolkit’: a 
range of measures that includes diplomacy, propaganda, covert action, the use of 
military force etc., which politicians have at their disposal when attempting to 
influence the behaviour of other states.  The foreign policy conception comes in both 
simple and more sophisticated versions.  On the simple version, the objective of 
economic sanctions is to change a target’s ‘objectionable’ policy or behaviour where 
a policy or behaviour is understood to be ‘objectionable’ if it conflicts with the 
                                               
14 A good example of this tendency is Robert Pape’s definition of economic sanctions as measures 
which ‘seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade 
in order to coerce the target government to change its political behaviour.’  See Pape, 1997, 94. 
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interests of the sender.  Thus, where the sender is a state, a target’s policy or 
behaviour is ‘objectionable’ if it conflicts with the sending state’s national interest.15  
That’s the simple version. 
Until fairly recently, a frequent criticism levelled at economic sanctions was 
that they never worked – that they most often failed to change a target’s 
objectionable policy or behaviour.  This concern led many to ask the question: if 
economic sanctions don’t work, why do we keep using them?16  The attempt to 
answer this question has led some theorists to develop more sophisticated 
conceptions of economic sanctions. 
David Baldwin, for instance, argues that although changing a target’s 
‘objectionable’ policy or behaviour is sometimes the objective of economic 
sanctions, politicians often employ economic sanctions in much more nuanced 
and subtle ways.17   
First, Baldwin argues that economic sanctions are often employed with 
the more limited objective of influencing a target’s ‘beliefs, attitudes, opinions, 
expectations, emotions and/or propensities to act’.18  No immediate policy or 
behaviour change is expected - even if long-term some change is hoped for.  In 
such cases Baldwin argues that economic sanctions are being used 
symbolically to ‘send a message’.  They can signal specific intentions or 
general foreign policy orientations or they can be used to show support or 
disapproval for the policies of other states.  If the economic sanctions are 
imposed at some cost to the sending state then this demonstrates the sender’s 
commitment to its position and strengthens the message being sent.  
Importantly, even if the objective of an episode of economic sanctions is to 
‘send a message’, it is unlikely to feature as the officially stated objective.  The 
message is stronger if the sanctions are framed as demanding a change in the 
target’s objectionable policy or behaviour - even if it is clear that the economic 
sanctions alone cannot hope to change this behaviour. 
                                               
15 Hufbauer et al., 2007; Galtung, 1967; Pape, 1997. 
16 See Baldwin, 1999/2000, 80.  Also Nossal, 302. 
17 Strictly speaking Baldwin is analysing the concept of ‘economic statecraft’ not the concept 
of economic sanctions.  However, he states that he will use the two terms interchangeably in 
his book.  Baldwin, 1985, 36. 
18 Baldwin, 1985, 20. 
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Second, Baldwin argues that economic sanctions may have multiple 
objectives of which some will be more important to the sender than others.  
Behaviour change might be a sender’s secondary or even tertiary objective 
whilst ‘sending a message’ might be the primary objective.  Even if the most 
important objective for the sender is to ‘send a message’ the economic 
sanctions must be framed as demanding behaviour change if this secondary or 
tertiary objective is to be met.19 
Third, economic sanctions may have multiple targets.  For example, if 
economic sanctions are employed as a general deterrent then there will be 
many targets of the influence attempt extending well beyond the original 
recipient of the economic sanctions.20   
David Cortright and George A. Lopez have also worked on developing 
more sophisticated understandings of economic sanctions.  They agree with 
Baldwin that economic sanctions may have objectives other than that of 
changing a target state’s behaviour and that they may, indeed, have multiple 
objectives.  Economic sanctions, they argue, can be imposed for purposes that 
include deterrence, demonstrating resolve, upholding international norms and 
sending messages of disapproval as well as influencing behaviour change.21   
Finally, Richard Nossal argues that senders might also have retributive 
punishment as their objective, i.e. they intend to inflict economic harm on a 
target they regard to have wronged them.22  For Nossal, to be clear, saying a 
sender has been ‘wronged’ is not to say it has been morally wronged, it is only 
to say that the target’s actions have displeased the sender.  Thus senders may 
‘punish’ agents who – objectively – have done nothing morally wrong – just as 
a mafia boss might punish underlings who have been passing information to 
the police.  Again, it is important to realise that even if the purpose of the 
economic sanctions is retributive punishment it is unlikely to be stated as such 
by the sender for fear of appearing irrational or vindictive.   
                                               
19 Baldwin, 1985, 17-18. 
20 Baldwin, 1985, 17. 
21 Cortright & Lopez, 2000, 16. 
22 Nossal, 314. 
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For all these reasons it would be a mistake to assume from the fact that 
economic sanctions often fail to achieve their stated objectives that economic 
sanctions do not work; stated objectives are not always true objectives – the 
true objectives might be to punish or send a message.  Even when the stated 
objectives are true objectives they may not be the primary objectives. 
In spite of all this, however, it should be noted that later work on the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions has shown it to be false that economic 
sanctions never or rarely achieve their stated behaviour or policy change goals.  
The analysis produced by Hufbauer et al. - which is the most comprehensive 
statistical study of economic sanctions to date - concluded that economic 
sanctions worked (i.e. achieved their stated policy change objectives) in 
approximately one third of cases.23   
Given the above discussion, it seems to me that changing or preventing  
objectionable policies or behaviour, ‘sending a message’ and punishment are 
all possible objectives of economic sanctions.   
I now turn to consider the law enforcement conception of economic 
sanctions. 
 
Law Enforcement Conception 
 
Economic sanctions are sometimes alternatively conceptualised as being a 
tool for enforcing international law or international norms of behaviour.  On this 
conception, the ultimate objective of economic sanctions is thus understood to be 
international law enforcement.   
For Margaret Doxey, enforcement of the law through the use of economic 
sanctions might take several forms.   
First, enforcement might involve ending ongoing violations of international 
law/norms – the domestic analogy is that of stopping a crime in progress.  Doxey’s 
own example is that of economic sanctions imposed to reverse the illegal invasion of 
the Falklands Islands by Argentina.   
                                               
23 Hufbuaer et al., 159.  Success rate calculated as 34%. 
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Second, enforcement might require preventing violations of international law 
from occurring in the first place.  The domestic equivalent is that of preventing a 
known criminal conspiracy from being realised.  As she notes, under chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, given adequate support from its members, the Security Council can 
designate any situation a threat to peace and then order preventive action to ensure 
the threat is not realised.   
Third, enforcement might require that economic sanctions are imposed 
punitively subsequent to violations of international law to deter either the recipient 
state or others from repeating the violations. Here economic sanctions are ‘a kind of 
fine for international misbehaviour’.24  She argues that such economic sanctions, 
especially if imposed at some cost to the sending state, demonstrate the sending 
state’s commitment to international law, its willingness to punish further breaches 
and, possibly, its willingness to take harsher measures in future.25   
The main difference between the law enforcement and the foreign policy 
conceptions of economic sanctions is that the former claims that the objectives of 
economic sanctions are purely to enforce international law/international norms of 
behaviour whereas the latter claims that the objectives of economic sanctions are 
determined by a sender’s foreign policy.  (Of course the two conceptions are not 
mutually exclusive.  A given sanctions episode may both be in a state’s national 
interest and work to enforce international law). 
The difference between the two conceptions can partially be explained with 
reference to the focus of the respective theorists’ studies: those employing a foreign 
policy conception tend to focus on states as the senders of economic sanctions 
whereas those employing a law enforcement conception tend to focus on the UN as 
sender.  Undoubtedly the foreign policy conception fits states better than the UN and 
the law enforcement conception fits the UN better than states.  However, it would be 
wrong to say that the foreign policy conception applies to states and the law 
enforcement conception to the UN.  States can also act to enforce international law.  
Likewise, the UN is not immune to the national interests of its more powerful 
member states.  In a powerful critique of the UN’s sanctions on Iraq, Joy Gordon 
                                               
24 Doxey, 92. 
25 Doxey, 8-9, 90-97. 
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argues that the sanctions were hijacked by the US in order to pursue its own national 
interest.26   
Again, deciding by definitional fiat between the two conceptions of economic 
sanctions seems to close down interesting avenues of ethical enquiry.  Therefore, in 
this thesis I will assume that the objectives of economic sanctions may include both 
international law enforcement and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  In either 
case the intermediate objective might be to change or prevent an 
objectionable/unlawful policy, to send a message about an objectionable/unlawful 
policy or to punish it. 
 
The Mechanisms of Economic Sanctions 
 
Whatever the objectives of economic sanctions, we need to address the 
question of how economic sanctions work: what is their operational mechanism?  I 
will start by considering sanctions aimed at changing or preventing the 
objectionable/unlawful policies or behaviour of targets before moving on to consider 
sanctions imposed with the objective of sending a message or with punitive 
objectives. 
 
Changing or Preventing Objectionable/Unlawful Policies 
 
Theorists of economic sanctions began addressing this question in the 1970s 
and 80s and took as their model collective sanctions imposed on states - which was 
the predominant type of sanctioning at the time.  They theorised that economic 
sanctions worked via the imposition of economic pressure.  Call this the ‘economic 
pressure’ mechanism.  Robert Pape sums this view up well when he states that 
economic sanctions ‘seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state 
by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its 
political behaviour.’27  In elaborating on this mechanism Pape argues that: 
 
                                               
26 Gordon, 2010. 
27 Pape, 1997, 94. 
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Targets of economic sanctions understand they would be better off 
economically if they conceded to the coercer’s demands, and make their 
decision based on whether they consider their political objectives to be 
worth the economic costs.28 
 
(Note that the term ‘coercion’ is used fairly loosely in the economic sanctions 
literature to mean roughly any kind of pressure aimed at forcing a target state’s 
government or its citizens to do something against their will.  In the next chapter I 
discuss whether economic sanctions really are coercive in a more restricted 
philosophical sense). 
A similar view to Pape is shared by Hufbauer et al.  They use the following 
framework to analyse the utility of economic sanctions: 
 
Stripped to the bear bones, the formula for a successful sanctions effort is 
simple: The costs of defiance borne by the target must be greater than its 
perceived cost of compliance.  That is, the political and economic costs to the 
target from sanctions must be greater than the political and security costs of 
complying with the sender’s demands.29 
 
Indeed, the view that economic sanctions ‘work’ via the imposition of 
economic pressure is the most widely accepted in the literature.  Johann Galtung 
even calls it ‘the general theory of economic sanctions’ and he elucidates as 
follows.30  Focussing on collective economic sanctions, Galtung argues that the 
objective of economic sanctions is to cause an amount of economic harm sufficient 
to bring about the ‘political disintegration’ of the state which, in turn, will result in 
the state being forced to comply with the sender’s demands.  For Galtung ‘political 
disintegration’ is a split in the leadership of a state or a split between the leadership 
and the people that occurs as people within the state disagree about what to do with 
regards to the sanctions and the resulting economic crisis. Under what Galtung calls 
the ‘naïve theory’ of economic sanctions (which he rejects), the more severe the 
economic pressure, the faster and more significant the political disintegration and the 
sooner the state will comply.  This theory is naïve, Galtung argues, because it does 
not take into account the fact that sanctions might - at least initially - result in 
                                               
28 Pape, 1997, 94. 
29 Hufbauer et al, 50. 
30 Galtung, 379. 
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political integration, as the people of the state pull together in the face of adversity.  
This is especially likely to occur if the target government can muster up the spirit of 
nationalism.  Indeed ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effects are often cited as a reason for the 
failure of economic sanctions.  Under Galtung’s ‘revised theory’ of economic 
sanctions, economic pressure results initially in political integration but will 
eventually lead to political disintegration as economic pressure increases but, he 
warns, the levels of economic harm required for this might in some cases be 
exceptionally severe.31   
Baldwin, however, argues that although economic pressure is one possibility 
for how economic sanctions might ‘work’, it is not the only one.  In particular he 
argues that economic sanctions do not have to cause economic harm to work.  He 
argues that even if the economic sanctions make barely a dent in a target state’s 
economy, its government may be moved to act out of a concern to avoid 
international embarrassment or a reputation as a pariah state.  This is particularly 
likely to occur when targets believe themselves to be members in good standing of 
international society.  Suffering international condemnation might be unacceptable 
to them.  In other cases Baldwin argues that targets might worry that the economic 
sanctions are a prelude to war.  Since a just war must be a last resort, those about to 
resort to war often impose sanctions first - either in a genuine attempt to reach a non-
military resolution or, more cynically, to demonstrate to domestic and international 
audiences that non-military methods have been attempted and failed – thus making 
war the last resort. A target might comply with the economic sanctions not because 
they damage the economy but out of concern to avoid war.32  I will call this second 
mechanism ‘non-economic pressure’ since its power does not derive from its 
economic effects. 
Economic sanctions employing either the economic or non-economic 
pressure mechanisms work only indirectly: pressure is applied to targets to force 
them to change their objectionable/unlawful policies themselves.  Thus such 
sanctions are sometimes referred to as ‘indirect’ sanctions and I will adopt this 
terminology.33 
                                               
31 Galtung, 388-9. 
32 Baldwin, 24. 
33 I borrow the terminology of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ sanctions from Gordon, 1999, 123. 
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However, economic sanctions can operate directly by denying a target the 
resources necessary for pursuit of their objectionable/unlawful policy.  For example, 
if a target state’s militarization is the objectionable/unlawful policy then economic 
sanctions might be designed to so destroy a target state’s economy that it does not 
have the resources available to build up or maintain its military capacity.  Hufbauer 
et al. accept the possibility of this mechanism.34  Joy Gordon claims this was 
originally the intended mechanism for the UN sanctions on Iraq.35  Such ‘direct 
sanctions’ do not apply pressure to change a target’s policy but rather work directly 
by denying a target the resources it needs to pursue the objectionable/unlawful 
policy.  Call this the ‘denial of resources’ mechanism. 
Pape argues that economic measures employing this direct mechanism are 
not economic sanctions but rather something called ‘economic warfare’; for Pape 
only measures utilising indirect economic pressure are economic sanctions.36  Again 
I do not want to rule out economic sanctions using the denial of resources 
mechanism by definitional fiat.  Pape’s major reason for excluding such sanctions is 
that the purpose of his study is to measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
and that is much easier to do if there is only one mechanism to consider (i.e. 
economic pressure) since it entails one is always comparing like with like.  My 
thesis, however, does not address the problem of effectiveness but rather ethical 
concerns and hence this is no good reason to exclude direct sanctions from my 
thesis.   
Having considered collective sanctions, I know turn to consider targeted 
sanctions.  Targeted sanctions became popular after the devastation caused by the 
collective sanctions imposed on Iraq led many senders to rethink their sanctioning 
policies (I discuss this further in chapter two).  Very little has been written so far on 
the mechanisms by which targeted sanctions might work.  However, it is obvious 
that targeted sanctions too have direct and indirect variants.  Direct targeted 
sanctions include, for example, arms embargoes which directly prevent states from 
pursuing aggressive military projects and nuclear sanctions which prevent target 
states from obtaining materials necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons, e.g. 
                                               
34 Hufbauer, 4. 
35 However, Gordon claims that as time went on the coercive mechanism took over.   
36 Pape, 1997, 94. 
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uranium.  Additionally, asset freezes of either state funds or the funds of government 
officials may operate with a direct mechanism.  Freezing Libya’s state funds and the 
funds of Colonel Gadaffi was intended to make it impossible for him to pay 
mercenaries during the Arab Spring.  Plus the freezing of assets suspected of 
belonging to terrorist groups is intended to make financing terrorist operations more 
difficult.37   
Of course targeted sanctions could also work with an indirect mechanism.  
Asset freezes on the foreign investments of top government officials might prompt 
them to encourage their leader to change policy or, if the assets frozen are the 
leader’s, it might act as an incentive to her to change her policy.  Depending on the 
amounts at stake, the pressure employed here could be either economic or non-
economic.  Even if the amounts involved are trivial, it is surely very embarrassing 
for a leader to have her bank accounts frozen by another state or an international 
organisation. 
Of course not all economic sanctions aim to change or prevent an 
objectionable/unlawful policy.  Some aim to send a message or to punish.  These 
sanctions have different operational mechanisms as I go onto discuss. 
 
Sending a Message 
 
If the objective is simply to ‘send a message’ then the imposition of sanctions 
in itself should be sufficient to achieve this – causing economic harm should not be 
necessary.  Having said this, there are undoubtedly ways of making the message 
stronger and causing some economic harm to the target might do this.  Of course, as 
both Baldwin and Doxey note, this is not the only way to strengthen the message.  If 
the sanctions are costly to the sender – because, for instance, they involve putting a 
stop to valuable exports, this willingness of the sender to bear costs shows how 
seriously it takes the situation. 
 
                                               
37 Targeted or ‘smart’ sanctions have been analysed in great detail by David Cortright and George 




Punishment necessarily involves the infliction of some harm, suffering or 
otherwise unpleasant consequences on the target, and this is the case whether the 
objective of the punishment is to deter or whether the punishment is purely 
retributive.  Thus economic sanctions imposed as punishment must either inflict 
some economic harm or, if a target state (or organisation/individual) is sensitive 
about its/their standing in the international community, symbolic sanctions 
expressing international condemnation might suffice as punishment.  I discuss the 
use of economic sanctions as punishment in more detail in chapter eight.   
The following table summarises the objectives and related operational 
mechanisms of economic sanctions as I have defined them.    
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Summary of the Possible Objectives of Economic Sanctions 
and their Related Operational Mechanisms 
 















Economic Pressure; and/or 
 
Non-Economic Pressure (e.g. international 




Denial of resources  
 









Infliction of economic harm as a penalty and/or 
sanctions express international condemnation 
 
For reasons set out in chapter two, this thesis focuses on economic sanctions 
imposed with the objectives and operational mechanisms highlighted above in bold. 
 
Table 1.1 Summary of the Possible Objectives of Economic Sanctions and their 
Related Operational Mechanisms. 
 
The above table summarises the three main objectives that economic 
sanctions might have: to change or prevent a target’s objectionable/unlawful policy 
or behaviour, to ‘send a message’, or to punish, together with each objective’s 
related operational mechanism(s). 
Having established the nature of economic sanctions in this chapter, in the 
next chapter I ask the question: what is wrong with economic sanctions?  What 
exactly is it about the nature of economic sanctions than renders their use in need of 
moral justification? 
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Chapter 2: What’s Wrong with Economic Sanctions? 
 
The ethics of economic sanctions is a topic that has been curiously neglected 
by philosophers.  Only a handful of philosophical journal articles and book chapters 
have ever been published on the subject.38  It is unclear exactly why this is the case 
but one possible explanation is that economic sanctions are viewed by many as 
morally unproblematic: as peaceful means for achieving morally valuable objectives 
such as ending human rights violations or reversing military invasions.  The aim of 
this chapter is to show that this view is mistaken, and that the ethics of economic 
sanctions is a worthwhile topic of study.   
In particular I argue that economic sanctions have two morally problematic 
features; first, in many cases they inflict harm on individuals – often individuals who 
bear no moral responsibility whatsoever for their government’s 
objectionable/unlawful policy; second, as a means of international coercion (or 
compulsion) they undermine the self-determination of target states.  To the extent 
that we think the ability of a state to be self-determining is morally valuable, 
economic sanctions will be morally problematic.   
To be clear, I am not arguing that these two features make the use of 
economic sanctions morally wrong all things considered; rather, I am arguing that 
they are features of economic sanctions which make their use morally problematic, 
i.e. it is in virtue of these features that economic sanctions stand in need of moral 
justification.    
In what follows I consider cases of economic sanctions by objective type (as 
outlined in the previous chapter). 
 
                                               
38 The majority of this philosophical work can be attributed to Joy Gordon.  See Gordon 2011, 2010, 
1999 (note that  2010 is predominantly an empirical study). 
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1.  Objective to change or prevent a target's objectionable/unlawful 
policy or behaviour 
 
Infliction of Harm 
 
Collective economic sanctions - direct and indirect (economic pressure mechanism) - 
can wreak terrible harms.  It is, for example, without dispute that the economic 
sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1990 and 2003 caused exceptionally severe 
harms; the worst harms, in fact, caused by any economic sanctions.  Indeed, so 
terrible was the case of Iraq that it led the United Nations to rethink its entire 
sanctions policy.  For that reason alone it is worth describing in some detail the 
effects of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq between the two Gulf Wars.  
Mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions were first imposed by the UN 
against Iraq in August 1990 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with the demand 
that Iraq withdraw from the territory.  The economic sanctions banned all trade and 
financial transactions between UN member states and Iraq with the exception of 
‘supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, 
foodstuffs’.39   
Despite the economic sanctions Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait and so 
the United States led a coalition of states into the first Gulf War which began in 
January 1991.  Once the war was over the economic sanctions remained in place with 
a fresh demand by the United Nations that Iraq comply with UN resolutions 
concerning weapons of mass destruction. 
Iraq was particularly vulnerable to comprehensive sanctions because it relied 
on oil exports for the vast majority of its income and on imports for the majority of 
its food and other basic goods.40  Thus the economic impact of the sanctions was 
severe.  In 1989 Iraq’s GDP had been $66.2 billion; by 1996 (the year the oil-for-
food programme began) it had fallen to $10.8 billion.41  Similarly, per capita annual 
income was $3,510 in 1989; $450 by 1996.42 
                                               
39 Gordon, 2010, 21. 
40 Gordon, 2010, 33. 
41 In May 1996 the Oil for Food Programme began whereby Iraq was permitted to sell a restricted 
amount of oil and use the proceeds to purchase humanitarian goods – thus increasing GDP figures. 
42 Gordon, 2010, 21. 
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The humanitarian cost was much worse.  UNICEF estimated that the 
economic sanctions were directly responsible for the deaths of 500,000 children aged 
under five.43  This figure is disputed but even the most modest estimates quote 
figures in the tens of thousands.  Given that the sanctions allowed for the import of 
medicine and food how did this happen? 
In ordinary circumstances the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq might not 
have resulted in the extreme suffering experienced by the population.  However, the 
Gulf War had included a bombing campaign aimed not solely at military targets but 
also Iraq’s infrastructure and industrial capacity resulting in ‘widespread devastation 
of all service facilities such as electricity, water, sewerage, telecommunications, 
radio and television stations, some dams and some large productive enterprises’.44  It 
was this damage coupled with the economic sanctions that caused the severe harms 
experienced by the Iraqi people.  The problem was that Iraq was unable to import the 
equipment it needed to restore its damaged infrastructure.  Therefore, although Iraq 
could import food and medicine, it was difficult to distribute it because Iraq could 
not import the equipment necessary to repair roads and bridges destroyed in the 
bombings or obtain spare parts for vehicles.  Similarly, Iraq could not repair its 
power stations – the lack of a reliable power supply meant that essential medicines 
and food could not be properly stored.  Further, the inability to repair the water 
treatment and sewerage systems meant the population had no clean water to drink 
and resulted in typhoid and cholera epidemics. 
Admittedly, Iraq was an unusual case and the majority of sanctions regimes 
do not cause such severe harms.  But even if they do not plunge a state into economic 
and humanitarian turmoil, the effects of economic sanctions may still be significant.  
They may prevent or reduce economic growth, keep unemployment and poverty 
rates high and push up prices.  They also might make it difficult or impossible for 
citizens of the target state to access sanctioned goods or services that they may 
regard as highly desirable (if not actually essential). 
Empirical studies of the effects of economic sanctions have also revealed the 
following problems.   
                                               
43 Gordon, 2010, 37. 
44 Gordon, 2010, 22. 
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A common unintended side-effect of economic sanctions is the 
criminalisation of a target state – a process which takes place during the period of 
sanctioning but whose effects persist well after the sanctions have been lifted.  Peter 
Andreas argues that the criminalisation of a target state can be analysed on three 
dimensions: political, economic and societal.   
With respect to the political dimension, the rulers of targeted regimes may 
sponsor organised crime in order to raise revenues previously generated through 
legitimate means or in order to import restricted goods into the country.  
Consequently, smuggling and its associated activities become institutionalised at the 
level of the state – for example, the state’s customs and tax collecting policies and 
procedures may be adapted to facilitate smuggling and/or outright theft.  Importantly, 
the links that the state forms with organised crime persist after the sanctions are lifted 
and criminal activities are likely continue since, although regime officials no longer 
need to raise revenues in this way and no longer need to smuggle in restricted goods, 
there is still considerable profit to be made from a black market economy.  Post 
sanctions, smugglers who had previously smuggled oil or other restricted items turn 
to alternatives such as drugs, weapons, cigarettes or people trafficking and bring 
them into the country through their well-established smuggling routes. 
On the economic side, the black market economy thrives whilst, at the same 
time, the sanctions force the legitimate economy into recession.  The black market 
throws up a new criminal elite: sanctions busting entrepreneurs.  After the sanctions 
are over these criminal entrepreneurs often buy up legitimate businesses rendered 
almost worthless by the sanctions and run these businesses like they would their 
criminal enterprises.  Thus even previously legitimate business becomes criminalised 
in the post sanctions period. 
The sanctions also have the effect of criminalising society.  Under a period of 
sanctions, smuggling becomes seen as a ‘normal’ activity; certainly not illegal or 
immoral.  In some circumstances it can be seen even as patriotic and smugglers are 
upheld as role models.  Attitudes towards smuggling, bribery and corruption formed 
during a period of sanctions are slow to change and a black market economy may be 
tolerated by society well after the sanctions have ended.45 
                                               
45 Andreas, 2005. 
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  Further, empirical studies have shown that economic sanctions can cause 
increased political repression and human rights violations within a target state.46  
This should not be altogether surprising since the target presumably knows that 
sanctions are intended to cause political protest and will act to disincentivise such 
protest. 
Another problem with economic sanctions is that economies do not bounce 
back as soon as economic sanctions are lifted – targeted economies can struggle for 
years after sanctions are lifted to get back to where they were pre-sanctions.  If a 
target state is a developing nation then economic sanctions can set back or stall its 
growth; this can mean thousands of people continuing to live in poverty who 
otherwise would not have been.   
Post Iraq, a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations - including the United Nations and economic sanctions theorists – 
began to seriously investigate the possibility of alternative forms of sanctions; 
sanctions not targeted against ‘ordinary people’ but rather targeted against those 
considered to be morally responsible for the objectionable policies of the state.  The 
results - targeted economic sanctions - have now replaced collective sanctions as the 
UN’s economic sanctions tool of choice.  Targeted sanctions, recall, include 
measures such as imposing financial sanctions on top government officials or those 
suspected of financing terrorism, arms embargoes, nuclear sanctions (which ban the 
export of materials necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons) and bans on 
‘items intended for internal repression’ such as torture equipment.   
The harms inflicted by targeted sanctions are for the most part much less 
extensive than those inflicted by collective sanctions; nevertheless they are not 
harmless.  Those subject to financial sanctions lose access to their cash and 
investments and, further, are placed on the UN’s Consolidated List of sanctioned 
individuals which carries a huge social stigma that can be seriously damaging for 
those concerned – especially business people who rely on their reputation (and their 
cashflow) to do business.47   
On the other hand, some targeted sanctions may genuinely seem to be 
harmless.  For example, a ban on items intended for internal repression or arms 
                                               
46 Wood, 2008; Peksen and Drury, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010.   
47 Lang, 100. 
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embargoes should ideally help to reduce harm.  However, such measures can 
backfire.  Arms embargoes, for example, can sometimes have the unfortunate effect 
of entrenching existing power differentials since the weaker side is unable to import 
weapons to strengthen itself.  If the more powerful side is also the side guilty of 
wrongdoing then an arms embargo is not a neutral mechanism for helping reduce 
violence but actually weighs in on the side of the wrongdoer and so exacerbates the 
damage done.  For example, the arms embargo imposed during the break up of the 
former Yugoslavia was widely criticised as it did not permit the Bosnian Muslims to 
defend themselves from the genocidal attacks of the Serbian army.48 
Further, as discussed above, targeted sanctions like arms embargoes can 
contribute to the criminalisation of the state as arms smuggling networks spring up to 
supply the required weapons.49 
The harms inflicted by economic sanctions obviously make them morally 
problematic but, equally, as I go onto discuss now, the way in which the harms are 
inflicted and the reasons for their infliction also render them morally problematic. 
Indirect collective sanctions, recall, aim to pressure citizens of the target state 
into forcing their government to change the objectionable policy.  Economic 
sanctions attach costs to any continued support of or acquiescence to the target 
government’s objectionable policy.  Thus every citizen affected by the sanctions is 
forced to reassess their position on the matter: on balance do the net benefits of 
continuing to support/acquiesce to the objectionable policy outweigh the net benefits 
of withdrawing their support or actively protesting against it?  The sender of the 
sanctions hopes the answer to this question is ‘no’ and that so many people will 
protest that the government will be forced to change its policy to avoid the risk of 
losing power.  Indirect collective economic sanctions are morally problematic then 
because they inflict economic harm in order to pressure citizens into demanding their 
government changes policy.  The sanctions thus make target citizens agents of the 
sender – pressured into demanding their own government fulfil the sender’s wishes 
rather than their own.  They are effectively ‘conscripted’ to the sender’s cause – a 
                                               
48 Gordon, 2011, 315. 
49 See Andreas 2005.  Though, in the particular cases he analyses, he notes that the criminalisation 
resulting from arms embargoes is less than the criminalisation resulting from comprehensive 
sanctions. 
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cause they presumably do not share.  Additionally, it is worth pointing out that in 
cases where governments are very repressive this is a very dangerous position to put 
citizens in as going up against the government can have serious repercussions.  Thus 
not only are citizens used as a mere means to an end but in many cases they will be 
used in ways which expose them to great risks.  Further, the logic of indirect 
sanctions is particularly unfortunate, as the more repressive and violent a government 
is to its own citizens, the harsher the sanctions must be to overcome citizens’ 
resistance to protesting.  Finally, a great number of the citizens used in this way will 
be people most would consider to be innocent: the ‘ordinary people’ who bear no 
responsibility for their state’s objectionable policies.50   
As discussed in chapter one, direct collective sanctions do not operate via this 
mechanism.  Rather, their aim is to achieve an ending of the objectionable policy 
directly.  For example, the sender may desire that the target state ends a military 
build up or cease work on weapons of mass destruction.  The collective economic 
sanctions work directly by 1) denying the target the resources it needs to meet its 
military objectives (e.g. denying imports of arms, dual use materials) and 2) denying 
the target the import/export of other goods, services and finance – the idea being that 
this will destroy the target economy to such an extent that the government will have 
no funds available to spend on militarization.  Such sanctions aim to achieve their 
objectives without any action on the part of citizens. 
Direct collective sanctions are also prima facie morally problematic.  As Joy 
Gordon notes, such sanctions are like a siege writ large.  The sanctions prevent the 
import of goods into a country just as a surrounding enemy army would a castle or 
city.  Thus, sanctions are vulnerable to the same moral criticisms as siege – they 
attack the innocent and guilty indiscriminately.  In fact the innocent usually suffer 
worse since increasingly scarce resources are usually allocated as a matter of priority 
to the army or leadership.  As Gordon states ‘the harm is done to those who are least 
able to defend themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least 
input into policy or military decisions, and who are the most vulnerable’.51 
To summarise then economic sanctions are morally problematic because they 
inflict harm.  Furthermore, in the case of indirect sanctions, sanctions use people as a 
                                               
50 I discuss the question of moral responsibility for objectionable policies in detail in chapter five. 
51 Gordon, 1999, 125. 
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mere means to an end - possibly in ways that expose them to great risks.  
Additionally, in the case of both indirect and direct sanctions, many of the people 
thus affected will be people we would consider to be innocent – those who bear no 
responsibility for their government’s objectionable/unlawful policy.   
So far of course we have not considered collective economic sanctions 
operating with a non-economic pressure mechanism.  Such economic sanctions do 
not inflict economic harms but rather operate by instilling embarrassment, shame or 
fear of war.  Although it is true that individual citizens often identify with their state 
and feel the embarrassment and shame heaped upon it as their own, and although it is 
true that citizens will often fear war, the harms inflicted on individuals by these types 
of sanctions are minor in comparison to the more tangible economic harms brought 
about by direct economic sanctions or indirect economic sanctions operating with an 
economic pressure mechanism.  Therefore, I have no more to say about them in this 
section. 
 
A Means of International Coercion 
 
Economic sanctions are widely regarded to be a means of international 
coercion.  Many theorists even define economic sanctions as coercive.  However, 
they rarely pause to explain exactly what they mean by ‘coercion’ and arguably – 
under many philosophical theories of coercion – economic sanctions are not actually 
coercive at all – at least not in any morally interesting way.  In this section therefore I 
take a closer look at the issue of coercion.  Drawing on the philosophical literature on 
domestic coercion, I start by arguing for a particular view of coercion.  I then turn to 
consider the circumstances in which economic sanctions are coercive on this view.  I 
conclude the section by explaining why the coerciveness of economic sanctions is 
morally problematic. 
 
A View of Coercion 
 
In ordinary language the term ‘coercion’ is applied rather loosely to a whole 
range of measures by which one party may force another to do something contrary to 
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their will.  Virginia Held captures this intuition when she writes that ‘coercion is the 
activity of causing someone to do something against his will, or of bringing about his 
doing what he does against his will’.52  This, I believe, is the way the term ‘coercion’ 
is used in the economic sanctions literature.  However, Robert Nozick’s influential 
definition of coercion however is much narrower.  For Nozick: 
 
Person P coerces person Q into not doing act A if and only if: 
 
1. P threatens to bring about or have brought about some 
consequence if Q does A (and knows he’s threatening to do 
this). 
2. A with this threatened consequence is rendered substantially 
less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A was without 
this threatened consequence. 
3. (Part of) P’s reason for deciding to bring about the 
consequence or have it brought about, if Q does A, is that P 
believes this consequence worsens Q’s alternative of doing A 
(i.e. that P believes that this consequence worsens Q’s 
alternative of doing A, or that Q would believe it does). 
4. Q does not do A. 
5. Part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen the 
likelihood of) the consequence which P has threatened to 
bring about or have brought about. 
6. Q knows that P has threatened to do the something 
mentioned in (1), if he, Q, does A. 
7. Q believes that, and P believes that Q believes that, P’s 
threatened consequence would leave Q worse off, having 
done A, than if Q didn’t do A and P didn’t bring about the 
consequence.53 
 
One obvious way in which Held’s definition is wider than Nozick’s is that 
she does not limit the instruments of coercion to threats.  For instance, she quotes 
approvingly J.R Lucas’ assertion that ‘imprisonment is the paradigm form of 
coercion’.54  According to Held’s definition, a person locked in a cell against their 
will is coerced to stay there though they are not under any threat.  According to 
Nozick’s definition, a person locked in a cell against their will is not being coerced at 
all because coercion requires the use of threats.  One might say that they are 
                                               
52 Held, 51. 
53 Nozick, 440-462. 
54 J.R Lucas, The Principles of Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 60 quoted in 
Held, 54. 
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compelled to stay in the cell, but not that they are coerced.55  If a person were placed 
in an unlocked cell and threatened with death if he tried to leave, only then would he 
be coerced to stay there under Nozick’s account.56  There is clearly a distinct 
difference between the cases of the locked and unlocked cells: in the first case 
compliance is achieved by means of direct force – the door is locked, in the second 
case compliance is achieved by means of threats intended to constrain the will of the 
prisoner.  In the first case the prisoner really cannot leave the cell because he is 
physically prevented from doing so.  In the second case the prisoner could actually 
leave the cell though it would be very unwise.  I will use the term ‘compulsion’ to 
refer to compliance achieved by direct force and ‘coercion’ to refer to compliance 
achieved by means of threats.  The remainder of this discussion relates to coercion. 
Since Nozick’s 1969 paper a considerable philosophical literature has sprung 
up around the task of defining ‘coercion’.  This task is motivated by a variety of 
concerns: are individuals excused from morally wrong acts carried out under 
coercion?  Are contracts made under coercion valid?  Do coercers act wrongly and, if 
so, why?  However, despite all the effort that has gone into this area, agreement on 
any definition remains elusive.  This has led some to argue that there is no one 
unified and overarching definition of coercion to be found.  Rather, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an instance of coercion will depend on the context in which 
the enquiry is taking place.  For instance Mitchell Berman argues that the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the kind of coercion that excuses one from moral 
responsibility (which he calls coercione) might differ from the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that determine the coercer has acted wrongly (which he calls 
coercionw).57   
I think this is probably right and in what follows I consider coercion in the 
context of whether or not the coercer acts prima facie wrongly.58  That is, after all, 
what I want to know with regards to economic sanctions: does the sender coerce the 
target state (or the citizens thereof) in a way that is morally interesting for my 
                                               
55 See for example Joel Feinberg’s distinction between coercion and compulsion, Feinberg, 1989, 191.  
Nozick doesn’t actually make any comment on cases of compulsion, seemingly taking for granted that 
there is no need to consider them. 
56 Held would also agree this was an instance of coercion. 
57 Berman, 45.   
58 Allowing for the possibility that the coercion might be justified means it can only be prima facie 
wrong. 
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purposes, i.e. in a way that means the sending state has acted prima facie wrongly.  I 
am less interested in whether the target is morally responsible for any policy changes 
enacted due to the sanctions or whether the target is required to continue to respect 
agreements reached under threat of economic sanctions.  Though these are 
admittedly important questions, the scope of my enquiry does not permit me to 
consider them here. 
A useful place to start then is by considering what might be wrong with 
coercion.  For most theorists coercion – whatever their particular definition – is 
morally problematic at least in part because it involves the subjugation (or the 
attempted subjugation) of one individual’s will by another and so undermines their 
autonomy.  As Gerald Dworkin puts it: 
 
Whenever coercion takes place one will is subordinated to 
another.  The coerced is no longer a completely independent 
agent.  If my will is overborne by yours I serve your ends and not 
mine.  I am motivated by your interests and not mine.  I do what 
you want, not what I want.59   
 
We can see this clearly when we consider the case of the highwayman’s 
proposal ‘your money or your life!’ which is often taken as a paradigm case of 
coercion.  The victim does what the highwayman wants (hands over her money) not 
what she herself wants (to hold onto the money).  The victim’s choice to hand over 
the money is made involuntarily.  It is a forced choice and it is wrong because it 
undermines the victim’s autonomy.  So in order to get necessary and sufficient 
conditions for coercionw we need to determine under what circumstances X’s 
proposal to Y renders Y’s choice involuntary.   
Serena Olsaretti argues that ‘a choice is voluntary if and only if it is not made 
because there is no acceptable alternative to it’.60  To be clear, a choice can be 
                                               
59 Dworkin, 1.  Some people believe there is a paradox here.  They argue that talk of ‘choosing’ 
against your will is a contradiction – if you choose to do X then you will to do X.  The victim chooses 
to hand over her money to the highwayman and therefore it cannot be against her will to do so.  
Indeed there is a sense that things being as they are, the victim wants to live and therefore she does 
genuinely want to hand over the money.  However, the phrase ‘choosing to do X against your will’ 
does not seem meaningless to most people.  There is not space to consider this issue here in any depth 
but it has been considered by others.  See, for example, the Dworkin paper referenced above.   
60 Olsaretti, 2004, 139.  In later work she has altered this to read ‘a choice is non-voluntary if and only 
if it is made because the alternatives which the chooser believes she faces are unacceptable’.  See 
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voluntary even if there are no acceptable alternatives if it would have been chosen 
anyway, i.e. if it would be chosen even if there were acceptable alternatives.  A 
person who is unable to leave a fortified city, but who does not desire to leave the 
city, remains there voluntarily.61  Thus we can say that A coercesw B into doing X if 
and only if:   
 
1. A threatens B with an unacceptable consequence if B does not do X. 
2. B would not do X in the absence of A’s threat. 
3. B does X. 
 
Before I go any further with this though it will be useful to flesh out further 
the notion of ‘acceptable alternatives’.   
 
i. Objectively or Subjectively Unacceptable? 
 
On Olsaretti’s account whether an alternative is acceptable or not should be 
assessed according to an objective standard such that ‘an option is unacceptable if 
pursuing or choosing it threatens some basic need’.62  Olsaretti does not discuss this 
further but one assumes she thinks that all human beings have the same basic needs.  
This does not, of course, mean that all individuals will find the same alternatives 
acceptable or unacceptable.  For instance, if one is blind then having one’s guide dog 
taken away is unacceptable (assuming freedom of movement is a basic need) but if 
one is not blind then having one’s guide dog taken away is not unacceptable.63   
In any case Olsaretti’s main concern is that consequences should not be 
assessed according to an individual’s subjective preferences.  I think this is a mistake 
and that the acceptability of options ought to be subjectively rather than objectively 
determined.   
                                                                                                                                     
Olsaretti, 2008, 3.  This is to account for the ability of bluffs to coerce: the agent might believe there is 
no acceptable alternative but to do what the coercer wants but in the case of bluffs they are mistaken.  
For the sake of simplicity I set this complication aside. 
61 Olsaretti, 2004, 138. 
62 Olsaretti, 2004, 154. 
63 It is true that many people are very attached to their dogs but it does not seem that their dogs meet 
some basic need. 
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To see why this is so, consider that a good coercer will use her victim’s 
preferences against her so that the victim does what she wants.  If her victim has an 
(objectively) warped preference structure it makes no difference to the coercer.  Say 
putative coercer, A, knows that X feels she can only drink champagne and that the 
idea of never being able to drink champagne again is literally unbearable for her.  It 
seems that A commits the same prima facie wrong by threatening to prevent X from 
ever drinking champagne again as she does by threatening to beat up X.  A knows 
both will have the same effect.  I do not see why A does something prima facie 
wrong in the second case but not the first.  So in the case of coercionw, the 
alternatives should be subjectively unacceptable.  A coercesw X by threatening to 
prevent her from ever drinking champagne again. 
 
ii. Absolutely or Relatively Unacceptable? 
 
For the alternative to be unacceptable it is not sufficient that it be 
unacceptable relative to the other options – it must be unacceptable in its own terms.  
Here Olsaretti borrows from Gerald Cohen who argues that the unacceptable 
alternative has to be ‘thoroughly bad… in some [absolute] sense’.64  Cohen argues 
that the alternative must be absolutely unacceptable not merely relatively 
unacceptable.  Otherwise, he argues, the upshot is that perfectly rational people make 
all their choices involuntarily since any less preferred option will be relatively 
‘unacceptable’.65  For example if X is choosing between a good, well-paid job in 
New York and a good job in LA on twice as much money, the New York job is 
relatively unacceptable and so the job-seeker takes the LA job involuntarily.  I think 
Cohen is right on this point.   
But, one might ask, how can an alternative be both subjectively unacceptable 
and unacceptable in some absolute sense?  Well, if one allows that individuals can 
rank their subjective preferences from most to least preferred then at some point in 
this ranking there will be a threshold and everything that falls below this threshold is 
absolutely unacceptable to that individual.  In the example above, both the LA and 
                                               
64 Cohen, 282. 
65 Cohen, 283. 
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New York jobs are above the threshold whereas, one would assume, unemployment 
without benefits would definitely fall below the threshold. 
An objective standard of acceptability sets an absolute limit in the exact same 
way – one can list all the needs human beings must have met to live flourishing lives 
from most to least necessary and draw a threshold line at some point – perhaps, as 
Olsaretti does, at the level of ‘basic needs’. 
 
iii. Moralised and Non-moralised Theories of Coercion 
 
So far I have presented a view of coercion that is non-moralised.  That is, 
whether a proposal is coercive or not depends on whether or not an agent’s choice to 
act is voluntary and the necessary and sufficient conditions for this can all be 
explained without invoking moral values.  Moralised theories of coercion on the 
other hand contend that coercion claims cannot be assessed without involving moral 
values.  Proponents of moralised theories might argue either that: 
 
1. A lack of any acceptable alternatives is not sufficient for involuntary 
choice; or 
2. A choice made due to a lack of any acceptable alternatives is 
involuntary but involuntary choice is not sufficient for coercion in 
the morally significant sense that the coercer acts wrongly.  
 
I will consider each in turn. 
 
1.  Lack of any acceptable alternatives insufficient for involuntary choice 
 
The most fully worked out theory of moralised coercion is that of Alan 
Wertheimer.  Wertheimer has what he calls a ‘two-pronged’ theory of coercion in 
which A coerces B into doing X if and only if:  
 
1. A creates a choice situation for B such that B has no reasonable 
choice but to do X (choice prong), and  
2. It is wrong for A to make such a proposal to B (proposal prong).   
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(Note that A’s proposal is wrong for Wertheimer’s purposes if the proposed 
consequences for non-compliance would violate B’s moral rights.)66  Thus a coercive 
proposal is a proposal to make someone worse off than they ought to be if they do 
not comply.  A lack of any acceptable alternative (the choice prong – roughly 
speaking) is not sufficient for coercion.  (Note that Wertheimer does not divide 
coercion into coercione, coercionw etc., his concept of ‘coercion’ is intended to cover 
all contexts in which coercion claims are made). 
Wertheimer illustrates his two-pronged theory with an example borrowed 
from Daniel Lyons.  A rich benefactor of a private boys’ school tells the headmaster 
he will give the school this year’s annual donation only if they start admitting girls.67  
Assuming that the donation is necessary to keep the school open is the benefactor’s 
proposal coercive?  Well the benefactor has no duty to make his annual donation - he 
does not violate the moral rights of the headmaster or the pupils if he withholds it.  
He does not make them any worse off than they ought to be.  Therefore the proposal 
is not coercive.  On the other hand if the local government, which did have a duty to 
fund the school, made the same proposal, that proposal would be coercive.  A further 
consequence of this moralised theory is that a choice is not deemed to have been 
made involuntarily if it is brought about by a moral threat even if it is true that the 
victim had no choice but to do X.  Wertheimer states that ‘one acts voluntarily when 
responding to moral threats’ and so the headmaster chooses to admit girls 
voluntarily.68 
The problem with such an argument, as Olsaretti points out, is that it results 
in a moralised theory of voluntariness that seems completely counter-intuitive: one 
does not want to say of the headmaster that he chose to admit girls voluntarily.  
Given this, why does Wertheimer take this view?   Well for Wertheimer the primary 
function of coercion claims is to bar ascription of responsibility or render contracts 
void.  Wertheimer wants to be able to say that fair contracts entered into where one 
party ‘has no choice’ are still valid since we want people in desperate situations to be 
able to enter into contracts to better their situations.  Wertheimer warns that a non-
                                               
66 Wertheimer, 172.   
67 Wertheimer, 213. 
68 Wertheimer, 250. 
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moralised theory of coercion faces the problem of distinguishing between those 
involuntary agreements that it wishes to hold valid and those involuntary agreements 
that it wishes to hold void.  He therefore considers a moralised theory to have 
significant advantages over a non-moralised theory.  However, again, this issue is 
irrelevant to my argument.  That the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
coercionw are unhelpful if we take them to be necessary conditions for coercione or 
even coercioni (contract invalidating) is irrelevant since I do not suggest doing such a 
thing.  Therefore, Wertheimer’s objections do not hold against a non-moralised 
account of coercionw and the non-moralised account has the additional advantage of 
not being counter-intuitive.  
To return to the benefactor, does he coercew the headmaster on my account of 
coercionw?  Recall that A coercesw B into doing X if and only if:   
 
1. A threatens B with an unacceptable consequence if B does not do X. 
2. B would not do X in the absence of A’s threat. 
3. B does X. 
 
Where the existence of an unacceptable alternative is judged according to the 
recipient’s subjective preferences and where alternatives are unacceptable in some 
absolute sense. 
Assuming that the closure of the school is an unacceptable consequence for 
this headmaster and he would not have chosen to admit girls in the absence of the 
benefactor’s threat then, yes, the proposal is coercivew and the benefactor acts prima 
facie wrongly.  Of course this does not mean his actions cannot be justified.  If one 
thinks that the school’s accepting girls is a morally important objective then the use 
of coercionw to achieve this objective could be morally justified. 
 
2.  Involuntary choice not sufficient for coercion 
 
There are other types of moralised theories that do not involve a moralised 
concept of voluntariness.  These theories concede that an agent’s choice is 
involuntary in situations where there is no acceptable alternative (though they may 
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cash out this situation in slightly different terms) but deny this renders the proposal 
coercive in the sense that the coercer commits a wrongdoing.  Vinit Haksar and 
Berman have accounts of this nature.  For Haksar for a proposal to be coercive in the 
sense that the coercer acts wrongly it is not sufficient that it leaves one ‘with no 
choice’, it must threaten to violate the ‘victim’s’ rights.  A fair contract signed by an 
agent who ‘had no choice’ but to sign it is not coercive in the sense that the coercer 
acts wrongly.  To use his example, the village doctor does no wrong in selling 
medicine to a rich man for $1 even if the rich man has no choice but to pay for he 
will die otherwise.  The rich man’s choice to pay is involuntary but the doctor’s 
proposal is not coercive in the sense that the doctor acts wrongly.69  However, when 
Haksar discusses ‘coercion’ in the wrongdoing sense he means wrong in the all 
things considered sense.  When I discuss ‘coercion’ in the wrongdoing sense (i.e. 
coercionw) I mean prima facie wrong.  So we are not talking about the same thing.  
On my account, the doctor’s actions are not all things considered wrong – they are 
prima facie wrong.  I would also claim that the doctor’s proposal – although prima 
facie wrong – is morally justified.    It is morally justifiable for him to threaten to 
refuse to give medicine to rich patients who can afford it.  If he does not charge for 
medicine he will not be able to buy more for his other patients and so on.  Further, it 
is a fair price that barely covers his costs and the rich man can afford it.  He is only 
coercingw him into doing the morally right thing.  Therefore, in the end I do not think 
our positions are so different.  Haksar concedes that ‘having no choice’ is an intrinsic 
evil and accepts that although the proposals which leave one with no choice are not 
coercive in the all things considered wrongful sense, they are coercive in a ‘neutral 
sense’ and require an ‘ordinary justification’ just as putting prices up in a shop 
requires an ordinary justification.70 
I now turn to consider the circumstances in which economic sanctions might 
be coercivew. 
 
                                               
69 Haksar, 1976, 75. 
70 Haksar, 1976, 78. 
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In what Circumstances are Economic Sanctions Coercive? 
 
The claim that economic sanctions are coercive is best understood as being 
made with respect to economic sanctions imposed with the objective of changing a 
target’s objectionable/unlawful policy and which work via an indirect mechanism 
employing economic or non-economic pressure.  In what follows I consider the 
collective version of such sanctions before turning to the targeted version. 
 
Collective Economic Sanctions 
   
Collective economic sanctions employing an indirect mechanism issue a 
threat to the target government.  If the pressure applied is economic, the threat to the 
target government is something like this: if you do not change some policy X, we 
will impose (or continue to impose) economic sanctions, your economy will suffer 
and you run the risk of losing power.  If the threat is non-economic then it might take 
various forms; one form it might take goes something like this: if you do not change 
some policy X, we will impose (or continue to impose) economic sanctions, this will 
be hugely embarrassing for you.71   
The target government is thus faced with two alternatives to weigh up.  In the 
case of economic pressure this is: abandon policy X or suffer economic sanctions and 
possibly lose power.  In the case of non-economic pressure this is: abandon policy X 
or suffer huge embarrassment. 
The threat to the target government will only be coercivew if the economic 
sanctions are an unacceptable alternative to changing policy X.  Whether this is so 
will depend on a number of factors.  I consider economic pressure before turning to 
consider non-economic pressure.  Some relevant factors for economic pressure are as 
follows. 
                                               
71 In both cases the explicit threat is that sanctions will be imposed or continued.  The threatening 
consequences of the sanctions (loss of power for the government, huge embarrassment) are not 
typically made explicit by the sender.  However, it is reasonable to believe these consequences are 
understood by all parties as being the obvious outcome of economic sanctions.  Indeed if sanctions did 
not have unpleasant consequences, the sender’s declared plan to impose them would not be 
particularly threatening.   
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First, it matters whether the target government expects the economic 
sanctions to cause political protest.  If the economic harms are expected to be 
minimal then significant protest is unlikely.  Even if the harms are expected to be 
significant there might be steps the target government can take to avoid protest in 
response to the economic sanctions.  First, they might be able to reduce the economic 
harms, e.g. by encouraging smuggling or by developing import substitutes.  Second, 
they might be able to prevent the economic harm from generating political protest.  
One method would be to exploit nationalist sentiment to crate a rally-round-the-flag 
effect.  Alternatively the government could increase the level of repression and 
terrify the population into submission.  If a government is confident that it can retain 
power in the face of economic sanctions, economic sanctions will not be an 
unacceptable alternative. 
Second, it matters how committed the target government is to remaining in 
power.  Governments that have terrorised their populations and carried out terrible 
crimes against them have significant incentives to remain in power as they may be 
subject to severe retribution once out of power.  On the other hand, a government 
without such concerns might be less worried about losing power.  Thus economic 
sanctions are more likely to be an unacceptable alternative – other things being equal 
- when imposed against a criminal government. 
In summary then it appears that economic sanctions employing an economic 
pressure mechanism could be coercive in certain circumstances.  What, though, is the 
situation with non-economic pressure?  Can economic sanctions employing a non-
economic pressure mechanism coerce a target? 
The answer to that question will depend on the type of non-economic 
pressure employed.  Let us take for examples economic sanctions as a threat of war 
and economic sanctions causing international embarrassment.   
In the case where economic sanctions are thought to ‘work’ by being 
perceived by their target as a threat of war, it is war and the consequences of war that 
are the unacceptable alternatives to changing policy X rather than any harmful 
consequences that will be brought about by the economic sanctions themselves.  
Hence, such economic sanctions are not coercive; rather, it is the underlying threat of 
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war which coerces.  It is fear of war and its consequences rather than fear of 
economic sanctions and their consequences which coerces targets into compliance.72   
Economic sanctions that ‘work’ through causing their targets (only) 
international embarrassment threaten nothing but the embarrassment itself.  Can 
international embarrassment be an unacceptable alternative to policy change?  One 
should not underestimate the psychological pressure such a mechanism could bring 
to bear on officials of targeted governments; particularly governments that consider 
themselves to be members in good standing of international society.  In extreme 
cases one could imagine that continuing to suffer the embarrassment of economic 
sanctions was an unacceptable alternative to policy change.  However, it is important 
to note that government officials are only likely to feel embarrassed if they believe 
that their policies are wrongful/unlawful.  If they believe their polices are neither 
wrongful nor unlawful then the sanctions are likely to be met with anger and 
defiance rather than embarrassment.  Thus, economic sanctions that operate through 
this ‘embarrassment mechanism’ will only coerce if the target itself considers its 
policies to be wrongful/unlawful.  Without claiming that such a mechanism is 
entirely morally unproblematic it does seem fair to say that the fact it can only work 
if the target itself believes its policies to be wrongful/unlawful, renders it less 
problematic than other forms of economic sanctions. 
To summarise then, economic sanctions employing a non-economic pressure 
mechanism are either not coercive in and of themselves or, where they are coercive, 
are significantly less problematic than coercive sanctions employing an economic 
pressure mechanism.  Further, as we saw in the previous section, economic sanctions 
employing a non-economic pressure mechanism do not inflict any serious harms.  
For all these reasons, I set such economic sanctions aside for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
 
                                               
72 Some might object that in the case of indirect economic sanctions employing an economic pressure 
mechanism, it is likewise the threat of losing power that coerces governments rather than the 
economic sanctions themselves.  This objection is mistaken.  A government’s losing power is a direct 
consequence of the imposition of economic sanctions.  War, however, is not a direct consequence of 
the imposition of economic sanctions. 
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Targeted Economic Sanctions 
 
Targeted sanctions may also be coercivew.  For example, a government 
official suffering financial sanctions will have to weigh up the two alternatives of 
never having her financial assets returned and changing policy X.  If the loss of her 
financial assets is an unacceptable alternative to policy change then the targeted 
financial sanctions are coercivew. 
 
Why International Coercion is Morally Problematic 
 
So some economic sanctions are coercivew in a morally interesting sense: they 
coercew their targets.  Earlier I argued that the wrongness of coercionw is found in the 
way it involves the subjugation of the victim’s will by the coercer and therefore 
undermines the victim’s autonomy.  This applies in the same way to the case of 
economic sanctions.  Government officials of target states subjected to collective 
sanctions are forced to fulfil the sender’s wishes rather than their own wishes and 
rather than the authentic (i.e. non-coerced) wishes of their citizens.73  This is morally 
problematic because it undermines the self-determination of states.  A state is self-
determining if it is able to make decisions for itself on matters of policy.  Self-
determination is thought to be especially valuable when it comes to matters of 
domestic policy; the thought being that domestic policy ought to be determined by 
those who will be affected by it and not dictated by outsiders.  One of the major 
objections to humanitarian intervention is that such interventions undermine the self-
determination of the target state.   
Likewise, targeted sanctions against government officials threaten the self-
determination of states because government officials can be coerced into acting in 
the interests of the sender instead of in the interests of their own citizens.  For 
instance, imagine the UK Prime Minister had a considerable sum of money sitting in 
an offshore bank account in state Y.  If state Y imposed financial sanctions on the 
Prime Minister with the demand that he change some UK policy, the Prime Minister 
– depending on the sums involved – might be coerced into doing so. 
                                               
73 Citizens are also coerced by such sanctions.  For citizens the threat is different: persuade your 
government to abandon policy X or suffer economic/non-economic harms. 
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Finally, a word on direct sanctions.  Direct sanctions, recall, are those which 
aim to change a policy by denying a target state the resources necessary to pursue it.  
From the above discussion it should be obvious that direct sanctions are a case of 
compulsion rather than coercion.  Direct sanctions attempt to achieve their ends 
without encountering the ‘will of the state’ at all.  Nevertheless, compulsion 
undermines self-determination just as well as coercion.  Thus direct sanctions also 
undermine self-determination.  Unlike indirect sanctions which use threats to force a 
target state to abandon a policy, direct sanctions make that policy physically 
impossible.  Thus direct sanctions are subject to the same criticism as indirect 
sanctions – they both undermine a state’s ability to be self-determining. 
Prima facie the ability of a state to determine its own policies – self 
determination - is morally valuable and therefore undermining this ability requires 
justification.  I consider this issue in chapter six. 
 
2.  Objective to Send a Message to the Target 
 
Most economic sanctions that are designed to ‘send a message’ inflict little in 
the way of economic harm and, further, are not designed to pressure or coerce an 
immediate change in the target’s objectionable/unlawful policy or behaviour.  
Without claiming that they are entirely morally unproblematic, it is fair to say that 
they are significantly less morally problematic than economic sanctions that are 
designed to change a target’s objectionable/unlawful policy, considered above, or 
economic sanctions that are designed to punish, as considered below.  Hence for the 
purposes of this thesis I set them aside. 
 
 3.  Objective to Punish the Target 
 
If collective economic sanctions are used as a kind of punishment then prima 
facie they are morally problematic because they are instances of collective 
punishment: every citizen within the target state is punished for the 
objectionable/unlawful policy irrespective of whether or not they bear any moral 
responsibility for it. 
 50 
Targeted economic sanctions might be less problematic in this regard but, 
even if we assume that targeted economic sanctions are correctly targeted at those 
who are guilty (which, due to lack of proper due process procedures, we cannot), it is 
still a practice that requires justification – a claim I expect to be accepted by most 
philosophers given the huge amount philosophical literature devoted to the task of 
justifying the practice of punishment in the domestic case.  I consider whether or not 




To conclude, economic sanctions are prima facie morally problematic 
because first, in many cases they inflict harm on individuals – often individuals who 
bear no moral responsibility whatsoever for their government’s 
objectionable/unlawful policies, and second, because as a means of international 
coercion (or compulsion), their imposition may undermine the self determination of 
target states.  It is in virtue of these problematic features that economic sanctions 
stand in need of moral justification.  The remainder of this thesis is an attempt to 
provide such a justification.   
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Chapter 3: Clearing the Ground 
 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there is little in the way of 
philosophical work on the ethics of economic sanctions.  There is, however, a public 
debate on the issue and several justifications for economic sanctions have been put 
forward in this debate.  Furthermore, in working on this topic and presenting my 
work at philosophy conferences and work in progress seminars, I have been 
presented with several more philosophical justifications for economic sanctions.  In 
this chapter my aim is to sympathetically reconstruct these justifications into their 
strongest form and then assess their plausibility.  I end by concluding that none of the 
justifications offered are plausible, thus clearing the ground for the consideration of 
alternative justifications in later chapters. 
In what follows the first three justifications primarily relate to collective 
economic sanctions, the final three justifications relate to any kind of economic 
sanctions. 
 
1. The ‘Better than War, Better than Nothing’ Justification 
 
One often hears the assertion that ‘economic sanctions are better than war, 
better than nothing’ as if that is all that can or should be said on the ethics of 
economic sanctions.  But what exactly does that mean?  How could we re-construct 
the argument that lies behind such a claim?  Something like this first formulation 
seems reasonable. 
 
P1.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then there are three courses of action which other states could take 
in response to it: war, economic sanctions or ‘doing nothing’. 
 




P3.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then economic sanctions always have better expected consequences 
than either war or ‘doing nothing’. 
 
C.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then other states are always morally required to impose economic 
sanctions against it.  
 
The background assumption to premise one appears to be that economic 
sanctions are designed to change the political behaviour of the target.  In particular, I 
think many people have the example of the Iraq sanctions in mind (i.e. collective, 
comprehensive sanctions) when they bring forward this justification.  Therefore, for 
the sake of example, let us say that the significantly harmful or threatening behaviour 
with respect to which the action is being contemplated is that of a tyrannical leader 
developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  The objective of the war or 
economic sanctions is to end this weapons programme.  ‘Doing nothing’ with respect 
to this state of affairs is best understood as doing exactly what one would have done 
if the relevant state of affairs had never arisen.  In this case of the WMD example, 
‘doing nothing’ means acting as if there were no weapons programme at all and 
therefore means that no action of any kind is taken to end the weapons programme.  
Of course, premise one’s assumption that the economic sanctions are designed to 
change the political behaviour of the target means that, even if this justification 
holds, it can only justify economic sanctions that aim to change the political 
behaviour of the target.  It cannot justify economic sanctions which aim to ‘send a 
message’ or punish targets.  Nevertheless, it is worth considering as a justification to 
the former type of economic sanction. 
Premise two is a standard consequentialist premise.  I think it is quite clear 
that the better than war better than nothing (BWBN) argument is consequentialist in 
form.  The general idea seems to be that ‘doing nothing’ would be disastrous and so 
something must be done.  Further, of the two options – war and economic sanctions – 
economic sanctions are the less harmful.  Hence economic sanctions are ‘better than 
war, better than nothing’.   
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Admittedly, it is not obvious exactly what people mean when they say that 
economic sanctions are ‘better than war, better than nothing’ for there are many ways 
of evaluating consequences.  Here I am going to assume that the course of action 
which has the best expected consequences is the one which has the greatest expected 
balance of benefit over harm.  However, there are (at least) two different ways of 
weighing the harms – either of which may be intended by the proponent of the 
BWBN argument.  First, there is the pure consequentialist argument that economic 
sanctions are better than war because they cause less harm overall.  Second, there is 
the quasi-consequentialist argument that economic sanctions are better than war 
because they cause less harm to our own people – that is, citizens of the sending 
state.  The pure consequentialist argument weighs harms done to all individuals 
equally.  The quasi-consequentialist argument builds in a view about the moral status 
of individuals based on their citizenship and assumes that harms done to non-citizens 
may either be completely disregarded or at least discounted versus harms to citizens.  
This quasi-consequentialist argument is not a plausible moral view.  A person’s 
citizenship is, largely, not a matter of choice but of circumstance and as such is a 
morally arbitrary factor.74  Their moral status should not be affected by it.  (I am 
aware that this claim is controversial and I argue for it in chapter five).  In what 
follows therefore I consider only the pure-consequentialist version of the BWBN 
argument.   
Premise three – that if a state is engaging in behaviour that is significantly 
threatening or harmful, economic sanctions always have better consequences than 
war or ‘doing nothing’ - is fairly self-explanatory.  The conclusion that follows is 
that in such cases economic sanctions are morally required.   
There are a number of objections that can be made against the ‘better than 
war’ argument as it stands.   
First, according to premise one there are only three possible courses of action 
to be factored into the consequentialist calculation: war, economic sanctions and 
doing nothing.  However, it is not necessarily true that these are the only three 
possible courses of action.  Depending on the case at hand there might be other 
                                               
74 Setting aside issues of voluntary immigration etc. 
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things one could try such as diplomatic sanctions or conditional aid.  Premise one is 
thus false and should be restated as follows:  
 
P1*.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then there are several alternative courses of action which other states 
could take in response to this including - amongst others - war, economic 
sanctions or ‘doing nothing’. 
 
I now turn to premise three.  Recall that according to premise three ‘if a state 
is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or harmful, economic 
sanctions always have better consequences than war or doing nothing’.   That is, 
economic sanctions always have the greatest expected balance of benefit over harm.  
Unfortunately, premise three is false.  There are (at least) three reasons for this. 
First, taking into account the expected consequences of both war and 
economic sanctions means taking account of the probability that the respective 
measures will succeed.  The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions to date concluded that economic sanctions succeeded in only one 
third of cases.75  However, the more economically powerful states - which are 
usually the ones imposing economic sanctions - are often militarily superior as well 
and are likely to win a war.  Thus, the probability of war achieving the objective 
might be considerably higher than the probability of economic sanctions achieving it.  
If we factor these probabilities into the consequentialist calculation the result might 
often be that economic sanctions have lower expected benefits than war and thus 
overall do not have better expected consequences than war.   
Further, if economic sanctions in a particular case do not achieve their 
objective, or have a very low probability of achieving their objective, then they will 
not be better than ‘doing nothing’.  If economic sanctions do not work then all the 
harm that would have occurred if one did nothing still occurs plus there is the 
additional harm caused by the sanctions themselves.   
                                               
75 Hufbauer et al., 2007. 
 
 55 
Proponents of the BWBN argument need to properly reflect the probability of 
success of the various measures in a consequentialist calculation if they want to 
select the course of action with the best consequences.  The table below shows this 
calculation for the WMD example.  The ‘expected benefits’ are the value of ending 
the weapons programme multiplied by the probability of this being achieved, the 
expected harms are the disvalue of failing to end the weapons programme multiplied 
by the probability this will be the case, and the known harms are the certain harms 
that arise from war (e.g. deaths and destruction), economic sanctions (primarily 
economic harms) and ‘doing nothing’. 
 
Known Harms Net
Prob of Success Value Expected Value Prob of Failure Value Expected Value Value
War 50% 100 50 50% -100 -50 -60 -60
Economic Sanctions 33.3% 100 33.3 66.7% -100 -66.7 -20 -53.4
Diplomatic Sanctions 10% 100 10 90% -100 -90 0 -80
Do Nothing 0% 100 0 0% 0 0 -100 -100
Expected Benefits Expected Harms
 
In this example economic sanctions are the least harmful course of action but 
it is easy to see how this could change with changing probabilities of success.   
 
Known Harms Net
Prob of Success Value Expected Value Prob of Failure Value Expected Value Value
War 90% 100 90 10% -100 -10 -60 20
Economic Sanctions 7.5% 100 7.5 92.5% -100 -92.5 -20 -105
Diplomatic Sanctions 5% 100 5 95% -100 -95 0 -90
Do Nothing 0% 100 0 0% 0 0 -100 -100
Expected Benefits Expected Harms
 
In this example war is the least harmful course of action. 
Basically, the upshot is that in a case where economic sanctions have a low 
probability of succeeding the better consequences could easily be those of war or 
‘doing nothing’. 
Second, it is not true that economic sanctions are always less harmful than 
war.  There are many different types of economic sanctions and the assumption that 
they are less harmful than war is more plausible in relation to some than others.  For 
instance, targeted sanctions such as asset-freezes on the investments of government 
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officials harm only those officials and their close relatives – and even then those 
harms are restricted to economic losses.  Targeted sanctions like these are clearly less 
harmful than war.  On the other hand, comprehensive trade sanctions may cause 
considerable damage to an economy and, in extreme cases, result in the deaths of 
people within the target state as happened in the case of Iraq.  Where economic 
sanctions cause this level of harm it is possible that they are more harmful than war.  
The BWBN argument needs to take account of this possibility. 
Third, it is worth pointing out that economic sanctions can sometimes 
unintentionally trigger a war, e.g. some argue that the US oil boycott on Japan 
triggered the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The risk of this occurring should also be 
included in the consequentialist calculation. 
Taking into account the above points, the BWBN argument should be 
restated to read as follows: 
 
P1*.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then there are several alternative courses of action which other states 
could take in response to this including - amongst others - war, economic 
sanctions or ‘doing nothing’. 
 
P2.  The morally required course of action is the one which has the best 
expected consequences. 
 
C.  If a state is engaged in behaviour that is significantly threatening or 
harmful, then other states are morally required to impose economic 
sanctions if they have the best expected consequences. 
 
The third version of the argument is obviously very different to the second.  
Most significantly, on this version economic sanctions are not always morally 
required but rather may or may not be morally required depending on the case at 
hand.   
However, even in this, its most defensible form, there is an objection that can 
be made against the BWBN argument.  As a fundamentally consequentialist 
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argument, it does not acknowledge deontological constraints on action.  The BWBN 
argument weighs up only the aggregate harm inflicted; it does not give any 
consideration to the question of who the harm is imposed upon or why.  This is a 
particular problem when it comes to collective, comprehensive sanctions such as 
those imposed on Iraq.  As we have seen, indirect collective sanctions violate two 
important deontological constraints - they intentionally inflict harm on innocent 
people and further use innocent people as a means to an end; possibly, in some cases, 
even forcing them to risk their lives.  War, on the other hand, at least when fought 
according to international law, does not deliberately target innocent people.  So even 
if comprehensive collective economic sanctions might cause less harm than war 
overall, that harm is deliberately targeted at innocent people.  This counts against the 
moral permissibility of economic sanctions but is not taken into account by the 
BWBN argument.76  
In conclusion then the argument fails as a justification – economic sanctions 
require more justification than simply being ‘better than war, better than nothing’. 
 
2. The ‘Blame-Shifting’ Justification 
 
Other arguments that aim to justify economic sanctions – and particularly the 
suffering of innocents caused by collective economic sanctions - include what I will 
call ‘blame-shifting’ arguments.  The general argument goes that it is not the sender 
who is to blame for the suffering of innocents living within the target state; it is their 
own government.  There are two main variations of the blame-shifting argument.   
The first variation of the blame-shifting argument claims that the target 
government is entirely morally responsible (in the blameworthy sense) for all the 
                                               
76 One way in which this problem could be alleviated would be by building these deontological 
constraints into the consequentialist value theory, i.e. by weighing the harms inflicted on innocent 
people more heavily than those inflicted on the guilty. For an example of how concerns of justice can 
be incorporated into a consequentialist framework see Feldman, 1999.  However, although such 
theories will often rule out the intentional infliction of harm on innocents (since such harms are 
weighted so heavily) these harms ultimately remain permissible if the benefits at stake are very 
significant.  Hence although a theory like this could take some account of these deontological 
constraints, it would not recognise them as absolute.  Hence the objection stands. 
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suffering caused by the sanctions since it could comply with the sender’s demands 
but does not.77   
The second variation does not deny that the sender is morally responsible (in 
the blameworthy sense) for some suffering, what is denied is moral responsibility for 
excess suffering, i.e. suffering in excess of that intended by the sender.  Senders 
almost always allow humanitarian exemptions (e.g. for food and medicine) in order 
to avoid humanitarian catastrophe.  If humanitarian catastrophe nevertheless occurs 
then this excess suffering, it is claimed, is the moral responsibility of the target 
government because it is redistributing scarce resources or humanitarian aid in a way 
that makes the impact of sanctions worse than they would otherwise be.  For 
example, the target government might redistribute scarce resources towards its 
supporters and away from its opposition in an attempt to hang on to power.  
Alternatively, the target government may forbid the distribution of humanitarian aid 
because it wants to show pictures of extreme deprivation for propaganda purposes or 
may direct humanitarian aid towards the military.  In what follows I take each 
variation of the blame-shifting argument in turn.   
 
The ‘Refusal to Comply’ Variation 
 
The first variation of the blame-shifting argument claims that the target 
government is entirely morally responsible for all the suffering caused by the 
sanctions since it could comply with the sender’s demands but does not.  A very old 
example of this kind of blame-shifting argument is given by Michael Walzer who 
quotes Josephus’ account of the 72AD siege of Jerusalem: ‘Titus, [the Roman 
commander besieging Jerusalem] …lamented the deaths of so many Jerusalemites, 
‘and lifting up his hands to heaven…called God to witness, that it was not his 
doing’.78  Josephus goes on to argue that it was the political and military leadership 
of Jerusalem that was to blame for the all the deaths because they refused to 
surrender.  Walzer is not particularly impressed by this argument.  The argument, he 
says, ‘makes Titus himself an impersonal agent of destruction, set off by the 
                                               
77 In what follows ‘moral responsibility’ refers to moral responsibility in the blameworthiness sense. 
78 Walzer, 2006, 162. 
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obstinacy of others, without plans and purposes of his own’.79  It is wrong to see 
Titus this way, of course, since Titus is a moral agent and is free to choose his 
response to the refusal of surrender.  Hence he is morally responsible for the choice 
that he does make. 
Along similar lines it seems quite clear to me that the sender also bears moral 
responsibility for the harms of the economic sanctions; the sender, after all, is free to 
impose sanctions or not to impose sanctions in response to a refusal to comply.  The 
sender has a choice and should be held morally responsible for the choice made.   
None of this of course entails that the target government is blameless for the 
ensuing economic sanctions.  It might be quite wrong for the target government to 
refuse to comply with the demands of the economic sanctions; for example because 
the demands are perfectly reasonable or because the suffering that will be inflicted as 
a consequence is vastly disproportionate to any good that can be achieved by 
refusing to comply.80  In this case both the sender and the target government will 
share moral responsibility for the harms of sanctioning. 
 
Excess Suffering Variation 
 
The first thing to note about this second variation is that – even if it is 
plausible – it is only a partial justification – it only justifies the suffering that is in 
excess of that intended by the sender.  It cannot justify any suffering that is intended 
by the sender.   
The second thing to note is that it only applies if the circumstances it assumes 
hold do actually hold, i.e. it only applies in circumstances where there actually is 
excess suffering and, further, where the target government’s redistribution policies 
are a cause of this.  These circumstances might well not hold.  After all, extreme 
suffering is not necessarily unintended, i.e. is not necessarily ‘excess’.  Even where it 
is, it is not necessarily caused by the target’s redistribution policies.  Admittedly, it is 
very plausible that in some cases of sanctions, target governments make the 
economic harms worse than the sending governments intend them to be.  With 
respect to indirect collective sanctions, target governments know that the intention 
                                               
79 Walzer, 2006, 162. 
80 For this view (though not applied to economic sanctions) see Zimmerman, 1985b. 
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behind the sanctions is to pressure those who support the target government and 
those who are disinterested or apathetic towards it to pressure the government into 
changing the objectionable policy.  Thus the target will do its utmost to ensure that 
these groups suffer least from the sanctions.  They will be much less concerned about 
the impact of the sanctions on the groups who have traditionally opposed the 
government.  Since such groups already oppose the policy it does no harm to the 
target to let economic harms fall on them.  In fact, if it weakens their ability to 
protest or otherwise attempt to subvert the target government then so much the 
better.  That the government may then also use the suffering of opposition groups for 
propaganda purposes to attempt to persuade the international community to help get 
the sanctions lifted is not entirely unlikely either.  These courses of action are 
perfectly rational for a target government that does not want to change its policy – 
they are obvious defensive moves against economic sanctions – and their possibility 
is entirely foreseeable.   
Similarly, in the case of direct sanctions it is a foreseeable possibility that the 
target government will direct scarce resources and even humanitarian aid to the 
military and leadership as a matter or priority rather than sharing them in an 
equitable manner.  This is likely to result in suffering for other groups in excess of 
that intended by the sender.   
Having said all that, suffering in excess of that intended by the sender may be 
caused by factors other than the target’s redistribution policies.  For instance, it could 
be due to negligence on the part of the sender, e.g. if humanitarian exemptions were 
insufficient or not processed efficiently.  In such cases the ‘blame shifting’ argument 
could not even get off the ground.   
For the sake of argument though let us assume that there is suffering in 
excess of that intended by the sender and this is due to the target governments’ 
redistributional policies.  Is it right to think that the sender is not to blame for this 
excess suffering? 
I suspect that arguments to the effect that the sender is not to blame for the 
excess suffering in this case are motivated by the ‘doctrine of intervening agency’ or  
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something similar.81  According to the doctrine of intervening agency, blame for 
harms cannot be traced through the intervening agency of another agent where that 
agent’s intervention is free, voluntary and informed.  Thus if I beat you up and leave 
you lying defenceless on the ground and after I am gone your neighbour, who 
(unbeknown to me) hates you, takes this opportunity to stab you death, I am not to 
blame for your death; your neighbour is to blame.  Here your neighbour is the 
‘intervening agent’ and blame for your death cannot be traced through your 
neighbour back to me; to put it colloquially, the buck stops with your neighbour.  
The logic behind this idea is that agents are entirely morally responsible for their 
free, voluntary and informed choices even if those choices are only available because 
of the prior actions of others.  Further, agents should not be held morally responsible 
– even in part – for harms that arise from the free, voluntary and informed actions of 
others – for that is to make agents responsible for the actions of others and that is 
unfair. 
However, even if the doctrine of intervening agency is plausible in a case like 
the one sketched above (and I take no stand on that), it is not plausible in cases where 
the harm that the intervening agent will inflict as a result of your actions is 
foreseeable.   
To show this let’s consider another example.  Imagine a police officer who 
locks up the town drunk for the night in a cell with a notorious serial killer who has 
just been captured.  She hopes that being locked up with a serial killer will scare him 
into being less trouble in the future.  She foresees there is a high probability the serial 
killer will kill him but goes ahead anyway.  Unfortunately the serial killer does kill 
him.  Obviously, the serial killer is to blame for the drunk’s death.  However, surely 
it is intuitively obvious that the police officer is partly to blame for the drunk’s death 
as well?  Of course the police officer’s moral responsibility for the death is less than 
that of the serial killer, we would not call her a murderer but we might, I submit, 
think her guilty of some lesser crime. 
In a similar manner, I contend that where the excess suffering from economic 
sanctions is foreseeable, both the sender and target are morally responsible for the 
excess suffering though the sender bears a lower level of moral responsibility. 
                                               
81 On the ‘Doctrine of Intervening Agency’.  See Hart & Honoré, 1985 esp. chapters 12 and 13; 
Kadish, 1985. 
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Proponents of the doctrine of intervening agency are likely to object to this 
conclusion by arguing that in effect it makes one agent morally responsible for the 
actions of another.  One should, one would think, only be held morally responsible 
for one’s own actions.  However, I would respond that we are not holding agents 
morally responsible for the actions of others at all; rather we are holding agents 
responsible for the contribution they make to the actions of others and, by extension, 
the contribution they make to their harms.82  Thus we are holding agents responsible 
only for their own actions.  The police officer did not kill the drunk but she created a 
situation where it was foreseeable that he would likely be killed.  It is the latter action 
for which we hold her responsible.  That is why in the case of the police officer we 
do not consider her guilty of murder but of some lesser crime.  Therefore this 
objection does not hold.   
To conclude, then, blame-shifting arguments fail to justify the harms senders 
inflict on innocent people.  The most blame-shifting arguments can do for us is point 
us in the direction of partners in crime.   
 
3.  Consent 
 
Another possible justification is that those innocents who are harmed by 
collective economic sanctions might consent to suffer such harms.83  It is widely 
argued, for instance, that the Black population of South Africa consented to the anti-
Apartheid sanctions and that this justified the harms they suffered.  Indeed, if an 
agent genuinely consents to suffer harm then her rights are not violated since she has 
waived her right to not be harmed in this way.  Therefore, I agree that, in principle, if 
those innocents who would suffer the harm of economic sanctions consented to this 
then the harms inflicted would be justified.  However, there are some problems with 
a consent justification for economic sanctions. 
First, the consent justification cannot justify harms that are intentionally 
inflicted on innocent people in order to coerce them into protesting against an 
objectionable policy.  Conceptually it makes no sense to think of them as consenting 
                                               
82 See Gardner, 2007a, 132. 
83 This justification has been suggested by several writers.  See for example Christiansen and Powers, 
1995 and Damrosch, 1994. 
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to be coerced into protesting - as if they just wanted some extra motivation to give up 
supporting the objectionable policy.84  The consent justification can only justify 
harming innocents as a side-effect.  In the case of South Africa, which was a case of 
indirect economic sanctions, the harms falling on the innocent Black population were 
side-effects and therefore can be justified by consent, but those falling on innocent 
members of the White population - which were intended - cannot.  Hence indirect 
sanctions – at least those that involve the intentional infliction of harm on innocent 
people – cannot be justified by appeal to consent. 
The consent justification might, however, be able to provide a justification for 
direct collective sanctions.  At least, there is no conceptual problem with the idea.  
There are, unfortunately though, some non-conceptual problems which I will go 
through now. 
First, most obviously, the innocent victims of the direct sanctions might not 
consent to suffer the harms of sanctions.  
Second, the majority of the innocent victims of direct sanctions might consent 
but a minority might not.  If a minority refuse to consent then it remains wrong to 
impose collective sanctions which will inevitably harm the minority in question. 
Third, even if it is thought that everyone has actually consented, there 
remains the epistemic problem of verifying this.  How does one know that everyone 
has consented to the sanctions?  It is impossible to get the explicit consent of 
everyone.  Lori Damrosch suggests that we rely on the statements of ‘authentic 
civilian leaders’ stating that ‘the international community should defer to those 
leaders’ judgements concerning what degree of hardships the civilian population is 
willing to endure’.85  However, we need to be aware that the interests and 
motivations of ‘authentic civilian leaders’ might not always perfectly align with 
those of the ordinary population.  Leaders tend to suffer less from sanctions – 
especially if they are in exile – and also have the most to gain – perhaps even 
political control of a state.86  Although it is impossible to get the explicit consent to 
                                               
84 That is not to say that it is conceptually impossible to consent to be coerced.  A drug addict might 
consent to be locked up in order to be forced into withdrawing from drugs, for example.  However, to 
draw such an analogy with supporters of the objectionable policy consenting to be forced to protest is 
absurd.   
85 Damrosch, 1994, 73. 
86 Gordon, 1999, 130. 
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sanctions from everyone, one can surely do better than merely consult ‘authentic 
civilian leaders’.  One could do some work on the ground – interviewing a cross-
section of people for example.  One will never be able to get the explicit consent of 
everyone but should still be able to judge general feelings on the matter. 
One final remark – even if the existence of consent is often unclear, the 
absence of consent is often very clear.  The widespread absence of consent among a 
population ought to be a deciding factor against economic sanctions in all cases 
where the objective of the sanctions intended to ‘help’ that very population.  If the 
people the sanctions are intended to help do not want them then they should not be 
imposed.  If the Black population of South Africa had vociferously argued against 
the imposition of economic sanctions then their wishes ought to have been respected.  
The suffering population is best placed to judge whether the harms that they will 
have to endure are worth the potential benefits.   
Having set these justifications aside I now want to consider some more 
hopeful justifications. 
 
4. The ‘Libertarian’ Justification 
 
One could claim that economic sanctions do not inflict harm on target 
citizens, they merely allow harm to occur to target citizens (i.e. invoke the 
doing/allowing distinction).  After all, economic sanctions are constituted by ‘not 
trading’ and it is this ‘not trading’ that causes the harm.  The fact that the sender is 
refraining from doing something that would prevent the harm makes it appear prima 
facie that the sender is merely allowing the harm to occur rather than inflicting harm.   
If this were so then it would be relevant to any justification of economic 
sanctions.  Other things being equal, many people would consider the infliction of 
harm harder to justify than the allowing of harm.  The infliction of harm is 
considered to be a violation of negative rights against harmful interventions such as 
killing, assault or theft; the allowing of harm, by contrast, is considered to be a 
violation of positive rights to aid or support which many would argue are much less 
weighty.87  A libertarian might even go as far as to argue that there are no such things 
                                               
87 For the view that the doing/allowing distinction maps on to the positive/negative rights distinction 
see Philippa Foot, 2002b, 84.  Not everyone agrees with this view but it is widely accepted.   
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as positive rights and that there are no duties to avoid allowing harm at all.  If this 
were the case then, on a libertarian view, economic sanctions would not even stand 
in need of justification.88   That, of course, would make my project redundant.  
Fortunately, the libertarian justification does not hold.  As I will show, economic 
sanctions stand in need of justification irrespective of the status of positive rights 
because they are cases of inflicting harm rather than allowing harm.89 
First and foremost, the domestic analogy where sender X voluntarily decides 
to stop trading with target Y is very misleading.  As discussed in chapter one, the 
sender of the economic sanctions passes legislation that prevents its citizens from 
trading with citizens of the target state; it will force them to renege on existing 
contracts and prevent them contracting any future trade by threat of legal penalties.  
Thus the sender intervenes to prevent the trade that would otherwise occur between 
citizens of state X and citizens of state Y.  Given this correct picture of economic 
sanctions then it seems obvious that the sender’s actions in intervening to prevent the 
trade that would otherwise have occurred inflicts harm on Y – the sender does not 
passively allow it to happen. 
However, some might object – rightly - that this argument only applies to 
states with private enterprise; for example, if state X’s oil companies are all 
nationalised it could be argued that if state X imposes an oil embargo on target state 
Y this does not constitute third party intervention into the affairs of others; rather, the 
domestic analogy holds – state X is refusing to trade with state Y.  Is this still a case 
of X inflicting rather than allowing harm to state Y?  I think that it is. 
 I want to start with a simple hypothetical example.  Imagine that state X 
stops selling food to state Y in order to cause a famine.  Y imports almost all its food 
from X and does not grow nearly enough of its own food to supply the population; 
Y’s sudden decision leaves it in crisis.  The only alternative supplier who has enough 
surplus food to supply Y in time to avoid many deaths from starvation is state Z.  
However, state Z refuses to do so because it will mean cancelling contracts with 
                                               
88 Libertarians deny the existence of positive rights because they deny the existence of enforceable 
duties to prevent harm befalling others.   (With the exception of special positive rights/duties created 
by voluntary contract).   
89Of course a consequentialist is likely to think it irrelevant whether economic sanctions violate 
negative or positive rights or whether they are instances of imposing or allowing harm; for the 
consequentialist, it is the fact that economic sanctions have harmful consequences (however brought 
about) that renders them in need of moral justification.  
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existing purchasers and losing their goodwill (even though its existing purchasers 
would not starve).  As a result a famine develops in state Y and many people die.  
When state X and state Z are criticised for killing the citizens of state Y they state 
that they are not killing the people of state Y, they are merely letting them die.90  Is 
this plausible?  In assessing this I want to start by using Philippa Foot’s distinction 
between doing and allowing. 
Foot argues that an agent who inflicts harm is one who initiates a sequence of 
events that results in harm; an agent who allows harm, by contrast, is one who could 
stop a sequence of events that has already been set in motion from resulting in harm 
but does not.91  According to Foot there are two ways an agent can allow a pre-
existing sequence of events to continue, i.e. two ways of allowing harm.  First, one 
could ‘forbear to prevent’ the sequence from continuing; that is, completely stand 
aside and, as it were, just watch it happen.  Second, one could ‘remove an obstacle 
which is…holding back the train of events’.92  In Foot’s example of the second 
possibility, the agent, let’s call him ‘A’, finds himself involuntarily attached to a 
patient with organ failure and is providing the patient’s life support via his own 
organs.  Foot argues that if A removes the connecting tubes then he is allowing the 
patient to die because he is removing an obstacle (i.e. his life support) which is 
holding back the pre-existing train of events (i.e. the train of events which would 
usually follow organ failure).93  What does Foot’s analysis of the doing/allowing 
distinction imply for our example? 
In the case of state Z it really does appear that Z is allowing the harm.  State 
Z is allowing X’s economic sanctions to develop into food shortages and then into a 
famine by refusing to sell Y the food that would prevent this.  Z is allowing a pre-
existing sequence of events (sanctions leading to food shortages leading to famine) to 
continue to their harmful conclusion of starvation.  In Foot’s terminology Z is 
‘forbearing to prevent’ the sequence from continuing, Z is, as it were, just sitting 
back and watching the famine happen.  Z is allowing the Y-citizens to die. 
                                               
90 I assume that the killing/letting die distinction is a species of the wider harming/allowing harm 
distinction. 
91 Foot, 2002a, 89-90.  Note that on my understanding of causation, both the agent who initiates a 
sequence of events and the agent who allows them to reach their harmful conclusion make a causal 
contribution to the resulting harm and thus can be said to be a ‘cause’ of the harm. 
92 Foot, 1978, 26. 
93 Foot, 2002b, 88. 
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However, the case of state X is very different.  It does appear that state X is 
the initiator of the sequence of events that conclude with starvation.  It is X’s 
economic sanctions – X’s not selling of food to Y – which initiates a sequence of 
events that end with starvation in state Y.  X creates the famine.  On Foot’s analysis 
this would entail that state X kills the citizens of state Y by not selling them food; it 
does not merely let them die.   
One might perhaps resist this conclusion by claiming that X does not initiate 
the sequence of events; rather, the sequence of events was initiated by the fact that 
state Y had an unfortunate reliance on imports from X to provide its population with 
sufficient food.  State X had been preventing any harm arising from this reliance by 
trading with Y in the past but, once it removes its trade, the harm that results is due 
to this pre-existing reliance.  In other words, X allows the famine to occur in Foot’s 
second possible way – X removes an obstacle to the famine’s instantiation (where the 
obstacle is understood as selling food).  Understood this way, X is like A who 
detaches himself from the patient with organ failure – by his connection he had been 
preventing the man’s death from his pre-existing medical condition from occurring 
but has now decided to stop preventing that harm from occurring by detaching 
himself and allowing the pre-existing threat to materialise.   
I do not think we should be persuaded by this argument.  It is not the case that 
there was a pre-existing risk of famine that X was preventing by selling food in the 
same way that there was a pre-existing risk of death for the patient that A was 
preventing.  Prior to developing trading relations with X, Y would have bought its 
food from other suppliers or grown enough of its own to feed the population.  If there 
is a pre-existing risk of famine due to its reliance on state X then this risk is not 
independent of state X but entirely depends for its existence on the attitude of state 
X.  Y’s reliance on X is only a risk if state X makes it so.  The patient’s medical 
condition, by contrast, is a risk to the patient independent of anyone’s attitudes.   
Presumably he developed a medical condition independent of anything A did.  Once 
the medical condition became severe, A was hooked up to the patient to prevent him 
from dying.  A really did become an obstacle to a sequence of events set in motion 
by the patient’s medical condition – a condition which existed entirely independently 
of anything A did.       
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Therefore, economic sanctions are instances of inflicting harm, not merely 
allowing it.  Thus even if one held that positive rights did not exist, economic 
sanctions would still stand in need of moral justification. 
 I believe this is the best way to understand economic sanctions – as the 
infliction of harm rather than as the passive allowing of harm.  In addition to the 
arguments supplied above, this understanding has the advantage that it accords with 
most people’s intuitions and it also matches the views of senders of economic 
sanctions – senders certainly discuss the imposition of sanctions as though they 
believe themselves to be inflicting economic harms on targets.   In this I believe they 
are right. 
However, before I move onto the next justification, I have one final comment 
to make. It is worth pointing out that even if one remains convinced that economic 
sanctions are cases of allowing rather than inflicting harm, one would also have to be 
committed to the highly controversial view that positive rights did not exist in order 
to hold that my project was redundant.   
 
5. The ‘Free Trade’ Justification 
 
One might concede that economic sanctions inflict harm (as opposed to 
merely allowing it) yet nevertheless argue that there is no right to be protected from 
the harms inflicted by the refusal to trade because there is no such thing as a duty to 
trade – even in cases where harm will result.  I will argue that this view is mistaken; 
there is a duty to trade in certain circumstances.   
I will, however, start by conceding that there can be no comprehensive duty 
to trade - in the sense that everyone has a duty to trade with everyone else.  This is 
for the simple reason that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ – we cannot possibly trade with 
everyone so we cannot have a duty to do so.  Further, there cannot be a duty to trade 
with even a smaller set of individuals, say, everyone who wants to trade with us.  
Such requirements would undermine important liberties.  However, I think there are 
special circumstances where there is a duty to trade with a particular individual. 
One very obvious example of this runs as follows.  Imagine the case of a 
person dying of thirst who staggers into a shop asking for a bottle of water.  She has 
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the money but, for whatever reason, the shopkeeper refuses to sell her the water and 
she dies.  Intuitively, in such a situation the shopkeeper has the duty to trade with the 
person dying of thirst and the shopkeeper wrongs her by her refusal.94  It cannot be 
said in this situation that there is no duty to trade.   
A second example are cases in which two parties have built up a regular 
pattern of trade over the years and this has created a reasonable expectation in the 
minds of one or both parties that the trade will continue indefinitely.  If, further, one 
party has come to rely upon the trade such that its sudden removal would cause that 
party severe harms, then intuitively there is a moral duty to continue to trade – at 
least for a reasonable period of time during which the reliant party can make 
adjustments.  For example, imagine X is Y’s major supplier, selling Y 75% of the 
raw materials Y needs for her manufacturing business and their trading relationship 
has been established for several years.  Y could find alternative suppliers but it would 
take time.  If X stops supplying Y overnight then Y will not be able to fulfil orders, 
her company’s reputation will suffer and her business may never recover.  If, for 
whatever reason, X decides to stop supplying Y then intuitively X has a duty to give 
Y reasonable notice and continue to trade with Y for a reasonable period of time – 
during which Y could find alternative suppliers.  In this case, again, there is a duty to 
trade – at least for a reasonable period of time. 
A third example are cases where there is only one supplier, i.e. where the 
supplier has a monopoly.  If the goods supplied are essential, e.g. water or electricity 
then intuitively there is again a duty on the part of the monopolist to trade.  If the 
goods supplied are non-essential it is less obvious that there is a duty on the part of 
the monopolist to trade but I think a case can still be made for it.  Some non-essential 
items: books, expensive clothes, TVs, ipads etc. make important contributions to 
people’s lives and for the monopolist to arbitrarily deny them to some individuals is 
wrong.  Again there is a duty to trade.   
The second and third cases are analogous to many cases of harmful economic 
sanctions.  Economic sanctions cause harm because either a) the target has become 
reliant on a pattern of regular trading that cannot quickly be substituted or b) the 
                                               
94 Intuitively, the shopkeeper has the duty to give the water to the person dying of thirst whether she 
has the money to pay for it or not.  However, I set this issue aside since I am only considering the duty 
to trade here. 
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sanctions are being imposed by the UN or a large multi-lateral group such that the 
target cannot obtain alternative supplies.  In this second case the UN is like the 
monopolist.  In both cases I would argue that there is a prima facie duty to trade that 
is being violated by the economic sanctions.  This is not to say that the refusal to 
trade cannot be justified, it is only to say that it does require justification. 
 
6. The ‘Trading with the Enemy’ Justification 
 
It is sometimes argued that economic sanctions could never be prohibited by 
international law because such a prohibition would make continuing to trade with the 
enemy a legal duty and this is absurd.  Likewise, one could argue that economic 
sanctions must be morally permissible because if economic sanctions were not 
morally permissible this would entail the absurd conclusion that there is a moral duty 
on the part of states to continue to trade with the enemy and/or a duty to allow their 
citizens to continue to trade with the enemy.   
In what follows I take a closer look at the moral version of this argument.  It 
can be set out as follows:   
 
P1.   If economic sanctions are not morally permissible then this entails 
a duty on the part of states to continue to trade with the enemy 
and/or to allow their citizens to continue to trade with the enemy. 
P2.   There is no duty on the part of states to continue to trade with their 
enemies and/or to allow their citizens to continue to trade with the 
enemy. 
C.     Economic sanctions are morally permissible. 
 
This argument is flawed.  Even if both premises are true all one is entitled to 
conclude from them is that economic sanctions are morally permissible where the 
sender would otherwise be trading with its enemies.   If we assume by ‘enemies’ it is 
meant an entity (state, terrorist organisation etc.) or an individual that poses a current 
or future threat to the sender then economic sanctions are frequently imposed on 
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targets that are not enemies.95  Therefore the argument cannot show that economic 
sanctions in general are morally permissible.96   
Nevertheless, this argument could potentially justify the permissibility of 
economic sanctions in the more narrow range of cases where they are imposed on 
the sender’s enemies.  In other words the conclusion could be restated thus: 
 
C*. Economic sanctions against a sender’s enemies are morally permissible. 
 
Where a sender’s ‘enemies’ are understood to be those entities and individuals who 
pose a current or future threat to the sender.   
Of course this conclusion will only be true if both premises are also true.  I 
have no issue with premise one.  However, I question premise two.  Why is there no 
duty to continue to trade with the enemy?   
Well one could argue that there is no duty to trade with the enemy simply 
because there is no duty to trade with anyone.  However, as I argued earlier, there are 
duties to continue to trade with those who have developed reasonable expectations 
that you do so.  Hence the argument that there is no duty to trade with the enemy 
cannot simply be derived from there being no duty to trade with anyone.  In any 
case, proponents of the ‘trading with the enemy’ argument emphasise the fact that 
one would be forced to trade with one’s enemies – not the fact that one would be 
forced to trade in general – hence it is unlikely that they consider themselves to be 
deriving their argument from an argument that one should not be forced to trade in 
general.  Setting this issue aside then why is there no duty to continue trade with the 
enemy?  I assume the thought behind this idea is first, that there is no duty to 
                                               
95 Economic sanctions can be imposed on friends as well as enemies.  As a matter of practice it is not 
uncommon for more or less friendly states – or at least states that no-one would consider to be 
enemies – to sanction one another on very specific policy matters.  As a matter of theory it might even 
be desirable for friendly states to sanction one another.  In an interesting paper Avia Pasternak has 
advocated a mechanism whereby liberal democratic states – most of whom are not ‘enemies’ - 
sanction each other for violations of their liberal democratic principles in a communal effort to uphold 
such principles.  See Pasternak, 2009. 
96 Likewise the legalised variation of the argument does not show that sanctions cannot be prohibited 
under international law.  The law could quite easily make sanctions illegal with exceptions for 
specified circumstances (such as when the target to be sanctioned is a threat to the sender).  This 
would be consistent to the way war is treated in international law, i.e. illegal except in cases of self- or 
other-defence against aggression. 
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contribute to threats against oneself and second, that trading with the enemy 
contributes to threats against oneself.  I will accept that trading with the enemy can 
contribute to threats against oneself.  In some cases this will be obvious, e.g. selling 
guns to a state one is at war with will contribute to the threat posed by the enemy 
state.  In other cases this will be less obvious: trade in mundane everyday items 
keeps an economy strong and ensures the enemy state has plenty of cash to purchase 
weapons etc.  However, I question the first assumption that there is no duty to 
contribute to threats against oneself.  I concede that contributing to threats against 
oneself is imprudent (to say the least) but it is not obvious to me that there is never a 
duty to do so.  Hence in what follows I consider whether it is true that there is never 
a duty to contribute to threats against oneself.  I take this question in two parts: first I 
consider cases where the threat to oneself is unjust then I consider cases where the 
threat to oneself is just. 
Why is there no duty to contribute to unjust threats towards oneself?  If the 
threat to oneself is unjust then one plausible argument for there being no duty to 
contribute to the threat against oneself is because there is no duty to contribute to the 
wrongdoing of others – this is true whether the threat is directed towards oneself or a 
third party.  In fact in chapter eight I make the stronger argument that there is a duty 
to avoid contributing to the wrongdoing of others, i.e. a duty to sanction.  However, 
this duty can be overridden.  For example, say state A is at war against state B after 
being unjustly attacked by state B.  State A citizens are currently engaged in selling 
food to state B citizens as they always have been.  The food contributes to the threat 
against state A as it ensures the army and its supporting workers are well-fed and 
strong.  Prima facie state A has no duty to assist state B in its wrongdoing and thus 
may permissibly stop selling food to state B.  However, in cases where the citizens 
of state B have no other sources of food this will lead to mass starvation in B.  Those 
who will die in the famine will not be the soldiers who pose the threat – soldiers, the 
leadership and the rich will always be fed first.  The ones who suffer will be the 
poorest civilians who, for most part, will be innocent people.  Thus the sanctions will 
kill innocent people.  Although there is a duty not to contribute to the wrongdoing 
there is also a duty to not kill innocent people.  It is likely that in some cases the duty 
to not kill innocent people trumps the duty to not contribute to wrongdoing even 
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when that wrongdoing is directed against oneself.  In this case then there would be a 
duty to trade food with state B.  If that is so then it is not true that there is never a 
duty to trade with the enemy.  Such cases will, of course, be rare since most enemy 
states would be able to import their food from elsewhere.  Nevertheless, my point 
stands - even where trade does contribute to threats against oneself - one might have 
overriding moral reasons to continue to trade with the enemy. 
Second, I consider the case where the threat towards oneself is just.  Perhaps 
one has initiated an aggressive war and the enemy state is fighting back in self-
defence.  What are we to make of the claim that there is no duty to contribute to 
threats towards oneself in such a case?  It obviously cannot mean that there is no 
duty to contribute to wrongdoing for there is no wrongdoing on the part of the enemy 
state.  What are we to make of the claim?  It simply seems to be odd to make this 
claim in the context of a just threat.  Imagine a bank robber is fleeing the scene of a 
crime pursued by an unarmed police officer.  The bank robber could throw a spare 
gun at the police office so that the police officer has more of a chance of catching 
her.  The question of whether or not she has a duty to do so just seems a bit odd.  
Surely it’s obvious what the bank robber’s duty is?  Her duty is to surrender to the 
police officer.  In the same way, the duty of the aggressive state is to surrender.  The 
question of whether the aggressing state does or does not have a duty to assist the 




None of the six arguments given above supplies a plausible justification for 
economic sanctions.  If none of these arguments can ground a justification for 
economic sanctions, where else can we look?  In the next chapter I turn to consider 
the approach taken by the existing philosophical literature: that of using the just war 





Chapter 4: Economic Sanctions and the Just War Principles 
 
Of the few writers who have considered the ethics of economic sanctions, the 
majority point to the analogies between economic sanctions and war and use the just 
war principles as a framework within which to assess their moral permissibility.  In 
this chapter I survey and critique these attempts to use the just war principles as a 
framework.   
I start in section one by offering a very brief description of the just war 
principles.  All the theorists considered in this chapter are employing a contemporary 
mainstream view of just war theory and cite Michael Walzer in this regard and so it 
is primarily Walzer’s interpretation of the just war principles that I describe here.   
In section two I consider and critique the arguments for using the just war 
principles as a framework for the moral assessment of economic sanctions.  I 
conclude that, although there are indeed many analogies between the cases of war 
and economic sanctions, there are many disanalogies.  This means that the just war 
principles cannot be straightforwardly transplanted from the case of war to the case 
of economic sanctions.   
 
The Just War Principles 
 
The contemporary mainstream interpretation of just war theory has shaped, 
and has been shaped by, international law and therefore shares significant features 
with it as will become apparent.97  Arguably, it finds its best articulation in Michael 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, and I will refer to this often in what follows.98 
Just war theory is split into three parts: jus ad bellum, which sets out the 
principles that must be followed for the resort to war to be just, jus in bello, which 
sets out the principles that must be followed during war and, a more recent addition, 
jus post bellum which sets out principles to be followed post war.  In mainstream just 
war theory the three parts are logically independent.  Thus it is possible to start a just 
war and fight it unjustly and vice versa.  In this section I will focus on jus ad bellum 
                                               
97 Coates, 1997. 
98 Walzer, 2006. 
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and jus in bello since none of the theorists I consider address the issue of just post 
bellum. 
 
Jus ad bellum 
 
There are six principles of jus ad bellum as set out below.  For the resort to 
war to be just, all six conditions must be met.   
Just Cause: There must be a just cause for war.  In mainstream just war 
theory, just cause is limited to defence against aggression.  There are no other just 
causes.  Wars for the sake of colonial expansion or economic gain or punishment, for 
example, are all ruled out.   
But what counts as ‘aggression’?  Mainstream just war theory and 
international law is ‘statist’, that is it takes states to be the main actors in 
international society and therefore takes war to be a relation between states, not 
individuals.  Indeed, Michael Walzer defines the paradigm case of aggression as ‘any 
use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty 
or territorial integrity of another’.99  According to mainstream just war theory, states 
have a moral right to political sovereignty and territorial integrity which they are 
entitled to defend.  This is supported by international law which recognises states as 
being separate legal entities and accords them these same rights by law.  Walzer 
argues that a state’s right to defend itself from aggression derives from the rights of 
its citizens to life, to liberty and to the common way of life those citizens share.  The 
right of a state to go to war to defend its rights can then be justified using what 
Walzer calls the ‘domestic analogy’ with self-defence.  Just as an individual may use 
proportionate force when necessary to defend himself from an unjustified attack, so 
may a state.  Similarly, just as a third party may assist an individual suffering an 
unjustified attack, so states may come to the assistance of other states that are under 
attack.100   
That settled there are still some problematic issues - in particular there is the 
issue of humanitarian intervention to consider.  In cases of humanitarian intervention, 
the state turns its aggression on its own people.  May another state intervene to 
                                               
99 Walzer, 2006, 62. 
100 Walzer, 2006, 59. 
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protect these people?  Under the mainstream view of just war theory sketched above, 
military intervention would violate a state’s right to political sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and would be an act of aggression itself.  In addition, Walzer 
argues that political communities have a right to ‘self-determination’, that is, the 
right to develop their own social and political structures themselves over time 
without external interference.  Walzer argues that such a right rules out the 
possibility of humanitarian intervention.  As he states: 
 
The recognition of sovereignty is the only way we have of establishing 
an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won.  
It is this arena and the activities that go on within it that we want to 
protect, and we protect them, much as we protect individual integrity, 
by marking out boundaries that cannot be crossed, rights that cannot be 
violated.  As with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are things 
that we cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible good.101 
 
However, Walzer allows for an exception ‘when the violation of human 
rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of a community or 
self-determination...seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, in case of enslavement or 
massacre [or which otherwise] shock the conscience of mankind’.102  Once again 
Walzer’s views mirror international law.  A norm of non-intervention is recognised 
in international law – it is generally not permissible to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of foreign states – however, the UN’s 2006 ‘responsibility to protect’ 
resolution allows for military intervention in situations of ‘genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.’103     
Proportionality: The harm that will foreseeably be caused by the war must 
not be disproportionate to the good that it is hoped will be achieved.  The good 
consequences to be counted are limited to those specified in the just cause, i.e. the 
ending of aggression.  Any incidental good consequences, such as the kick-starting 
of an economy, should not be included in the proportionality calculation.  However, 
the harmful consequences of war are not limited to certain types and should all be 
                                               
101 Walzer, 89. 
102 Walzer, 90. 
103 UN Security Council Resolution 1674. 
 77 
counted.   Further, the calculation must include the harms suffered by all parties to 
the war and those suffered by neutral states.   
As Thomas Hurka stresses, the proportionality principle does not necessarily 
require that the good consequences must outweigh the bad; the requirement is only 
that the harm is not disproportionate to the good, the harm may therefore exceed the 
good as long as it does not exceed it by a disproportionate amount.104  Hurka argues 
that given the unpredictable nature of war and the subjectivity inherent in 
determining what harms might be ‘disproportionate’, fine grained assessments of 
proportionality will be impossible.  However, more coarse-grained assessments are 
perfectly plausible and should always be made.105 
Right Intention: The decision to go to war must be made with the right 
intention - the intention to achieve the just cause.  The just cause must not be a 
pretext for some unjust end that is secretly intended. 
Legitimate Authority: The decision to go to war must be made by a legitimate 
authority.  That is, one which has the moral right to act on behalf of its people and 
take them into a war.  In international law there is a presumption that the 
governments of all states are legitimate authorities.  However, mainstream just war 
theory imposes additional requirements for legitimacy; for instance, Walzer argues 
that a legitimate government must have the support of its people, otherwise it has no 
right to act on their behalf.106  
According to mainstream just war theory, private individuals may not wage 
war.  According to A. J Coates, war is a legal instrument and the power to enforce 
the law is vested in the government on behalf the political community.  Thus, private 
war is an instance of taking the law into your own hands and is a kind of vigilante 
justice.107   
Last Resort: War must be the last resort.  Given the horrendous harms it 
creates, war must be necessary in order to be just.  If other, less harmful, alternatives 
are available such as some kind of economic sanctions or diplomatic measures, then 
war is not necessary and therefore not just.  This does not mean that all the 
                                               
104 Hurka, 6. 
105 Hurka, 33. 
106 Walzer, 99. 
107 Coates, 127. 
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alternative measures must actually be attempted first, if it is obvious they would not 
work then there is no requirement to make such attempts. 
Reasonable Chance of Success: There must be a reasonable chance of 
success.  This is to prevent hopeless wars where people die pointlessly.  The 
difficulty in interpreting this principle concerns what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ 
chance of success.  Where a state is the actual or potential victim of aggression from 
a much stronger opponent, as is often the case, it is likely that its chance of success in 
resisting the aggression is small.  Yet, as Walzer puts it, the failure to resist in such 
cases ‘concedes the loss…of independence for the sake of the survival of individual 
men and women.  It points toward a certain sort of international society, founded not 
on the defence of rights but on the adjustment to power’.108  Indeed, Brian Orend 
notes that this principle is not part of international law as it is considered biased 
against small or weak states.109  So, given the great importance of the rights a 
defensive war aims to protect, it seems a ‘reasonable’ chance of success might be a 
very small one.  Nevertheless, if there is a negligible or no chance of success at all, it 
could be that appeasement or surrender is the more moral option.  
 
Jus in bello 
 
Below are stated some of the more significant rules of jus in bello.  All the 
requirements of jus in bello must be met for an individual military action to be 
morally permissible.   
Discrimination: The principle of discrimination requires attackers to 
distinguish between two classes of people in war: combatants and non-combatants, 
and stipulates their different treatment.  According to this principle, combatants are 
morally liable to attack at any time and, correspondingly, it is always morally 
permissible to attack them.  This holds whether the combatants fight for a just cause 
or an unjust cause and reflects what Walzer calls the ‘moral equality of soldiers’.110    
Non-combatants, on the other hand, have immunity from attack and it is never 
morally permissible to attack them directly; however, if non-combatants are killed 
                                               
108 Walzer, 2006, 72. 
109 Orend, 2008. 
110 Walzer, 2006, 127. 
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not as the result of a direct attack, but rather as an unintentional side effect of an 
attack against combatants or military property, then the unintentional killing of those 
non-combatants may be morally permissible under the doctrine of double effect.   
Necessity: This is the requirement that any harm done during the war must be 
militarily necessary.  That is, any individual military action must make a contribution 
to the winning of the war if it is to be morally permissible.  Thus, the principle rules 
out pointless violence.   
Proportionality: Like the jus ad bellum principle, which requires that the total 
expected harm caused by the war should not be disproportionate to the good to be 
achieved, the jus in bello principle of proportionality requires that each individual 
military action is proportionate. 
Having very briefly characterised the contemporary mainstream interpretation 
of the just war principles I will now show how writers have used these principles as a 
framework to assess the moral permissibility of economic sanctions. 
 
Applying Just War Principles to Economic Sanctions 
 
The best known accounts applying the just war principles to cases of 
economic sanctions are those of Joy Gordon, Albert C. Pierce and Adam Winkler.111  
In what follows I discuss each in turn. 
Gordon applies the just war principles only to the case of collective 
comprehensive economic sanctions.  Although she does not explicitly justify her 
decision to use just war principles for this purpose, some justifications can be drawn 
from her paper.  For example, she states:   
 
If sanctions were … peaceful there would be no ethical dilemma.  If, 
on the other hand, they were flatly understood as an act of aggression, 
the framework of the rules of war would offer guidance for their use.  
It is precisely because they do so much human damage in the name of 
achieving peace that it is so difficult to untangle their ethical 
ramifications.112 
 
                                               
111 See Gordon 1999a, Pierce 1996 and Winkler 1999.  Note that in her paper Gordon also assesses the 
moral permissibility of economic sanctions using the frameworks of deontology and utilitarianism.   
112 Gordon, 1999a, 124. 
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Elsewhere she further argues that ‘sanctions may continue to be invoked as a 
tool of international governance.  But it is a tool that is indeed a form of violence – 
no less than guns or bombs – and it is ethically imperative that we see it as precisely 
that’.113 
Her idea seems to be that collective comprehensive sanctions are acts of 
aggression that cause significant human damage in the name of achieving peace or 
international governance and therefore that they are sufficiently ‘war-like’ for the 
rules of war to apply.   
Gordon then goes on to apply the just war principles to comprehensive 
collective sanctions.  Such sanctions, she argues, are like a siege writ large.  The 
blockade of ports prevents the import of goods into a country just as a surrounding 
enemy army would a castle or city.  Thus sanctions are vulnerable to the same moral 
criticisms as a siege.  Sieges do not discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants.  In fact in a siege it is usually the non-combatants who suffer the most 
since increasingly scarce resources will be allocated as a matter of priority to the 
army or leadership.  As Gordon states in both sieges and in the case of 
comprehensive collective sanctions ‘the harm is done to those who are least able to 
defend themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least input 
into policy or military decisions, and who are the most vulnerable’.114  Gordon thus 
concludes that comprehensive collective sanctions are morally impermissible 
because they violate the just war principle of discrimination.  Having considered 
Gordon’s arguments, I now turn to the views of Albert C. Pierce.   
Like Gordon, Pierce thinks that the just war principles can provide a 
framework for assessing the moral permissibility of economic sanctions.  He argues 
that: 
 
If those principles [of just war theory] are an established and 
accepted means of evaluating the use of one instrument of 
statecraft that can cause great pain, suffering, and physical harm, 
then they might well be appropriate in evaluating another 
instrument that can produce similar effects.115   
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So Pierce draws an explicit analogy between war and economic sanctions in 
that they both involve great pain, suffering, and physical harm.  He then suggests 
that, for that reason, moral principles for evaluating the one might well be 
appropriate for evaluating the other.   
Again, like Gordon, Pierce then goes onto argue that comprehensive 
collective sanctions violate the just war principle of discrimination.  However, he 
also considers in more detail how the principle of discrimination might apply 
differently to the case of economic sanctions.  Pierce starts by taking Walzer’s 
definition of non-combatants and seeks to apply it to cases of sanctions.  He states: 
 
If we move from the war case to the economic sanctions case…who are 
[non-combatants in Walzer’s sense] and who are not?  A starting point 
is to argue that here the functional equivalent of ‘aggressive war’ is the 
policy the imposer of sanctions objects to and is trying to persuade the 
target nation’s leadership to change…Logically, then, the moral 
equivalent of the ‘combatants’ would be those who have ordered and 
are implementing that [policy] – that is, the political leadership and the 
organs of state control.  Those not in the chain of agency – that is, those 
not ordering or implementing [that policy] – are ‘non-combatants’ and 
are innocent.116 
 
Indeed, this does seem a reasonable approach to take if we are applying 
Walzer’s just war principles to the case of economic sanctions. 
Pierce then goes on to briefly consider the jus ad bellum principles.  Although 
he believes all the ad bellum principles are ‘relevant and useful [for] moral analysis 
of economic sanctions’, he focuses on the principles of ‘proportionality’ and 
‘probability of success’ and concludes these could both potentially be met in 
sanctions cases.  At least, there is nothing essential to the nature of sanctions that 
would rule them out.   
Finally, he claims that just war principles can be applied to all types of 
economic sanctions.  As he states: 
 
The theoretical propositions in this paper can be applied to any type 
of economic sanctions, and …the moral conclusions one might 
draw will depend to a great extent on how discriminate the 
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sanctions imposed are.  That is to say, sanctions narrowly targeted 
to affect exclusively or even primarily the parties responsible for the 
policies outsiders are trying to change should more easily pass the 
discrimination test…This calls for further work, but as a theoretical 
proposition, targeted sanctions appear to be morally superior to their 
indiscriminate cousins.117 
 
It is worth noting here that Pierce’s claim that the just war principles can be 
applied even to targeted economic sanctions doesn’t actually follow from his 
previous argument.  Targeted economic sanctions often do not cause ‘great pain, 
suffering and physical harm’ and yet, according to Pierce’s previous argument, it is 
because economic sanctions cause ‘great pain, suffering and physical harm’, that it 
might well be appropriate to apply just war principles to them.  Thus Pierce has in 
fact given us no reason to think that it might be appropriate to apply just war 
principles to the case of targeted economic sanctions. 
The final account is that of Adam Winkler who argues that: 
 
The just war tradition is a longstanding moral framework for analysing 
the intentional infliction of harm by one state upon the citizens of 
another.  In light of its broad acceptance and long history, this body of 
laws, codified in international treaties and established by the practice of 
states, offers…fertile soil for international agreement.118 
 
So again Winkler draws an analogy between wars and economic sanctions in 
that both involve ‘the intentional infliction of harm by one state upon the citizens of 
another’.  His second point - that the just war principles have broad acceptance and 
stand the best chance of reaching consensus on the moral permissibility of economic 
sanctions - may well be true.  However, it is a prudential and not a moral argument 
and does not serve to establish that just war principles provide the right moral 
framework for assessing sanctions.  Hence I set it aside. 
As with Gordon and Pierce, Winkler considers the principle of discrimination 
to be the most significant stumbling block for economic sanctions’ moral 
permissibility and argues that it rules out the use of comprehensive collective 
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economic sanctions.  For Winkler, the non-combatants in a case of sanctions are 
‘ordinary civilians’, that is: 
 
People who have done little more than inhabit a state with disfavoured 
policies…These people pose no threat to other states, but merely go 
about their usual routine of trying to survive or prosper by way of 
participation in the economy.119   
 
But who for Winkler are combatants?  One possibility he notes is that the 
combatants are the same people as in war, i.e. soldiers. For example when sanctions 
were imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait, the combatants were Iraqi 
soldiers.  Otherwise, he argues, political officials who bear responsibility for the 
planning and carrying out of the aggression or disfavoured policies can be thought of 
as combatants.  In this then Winkler is broadly in line with Pierce.   
Winkler also considers the principles of jus ad bellum.  Although he thinks all 
the principles may be applied to sanctions he focuses on ‘just cause’ and ‘right 
intention’ believing the others to ‘translate to sanctions…in obvious ways’.120  
Winkler notes that, as we have seen, just cause allows for self and other-defence 
against aggression and also humanitarian intervention (in grave cases) and therefore 
sanctions would be morally permissible if used for these purposes: ‘where just war 
would declare the use of armed force to be legitimate, economic sanctions of some 
sort are justifiable’.121  Similarly, he argues that the principles of ‘right intention’ can 
theoretically be met in cases of economic sanctions though he warns that the 
propensity for economic sanctions to be imposed without clear purpose (as discussed 
in chapter one) means that the requirement of right intention might not be met in 
many actual cases.122 
Finally, Winkler, like Pierce, believes just war theory can be applied to all 
types of sanctions – both economic and diplomatic.  He states: 
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Total embargoes, even with humanitarian exemptions should not be 
used, but arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and the freezing of 
foreign assets fit comfortably within just war principles.123 
 
Does Winkler’s claim that the just war principles can be applied to all types 
of economic and diplomatic sanctions follow from his previous argument?  If we 
interpret Winkler – as I think we should - as arguing previously that the just war 
principles should be applied to economic sanctions because, like war, they involve 
the ‘intentional infliction of harm’ then certainly the claim does not follow.  This is 
because it is clear that many targeted economic sanctions do not involve the 
intentional infliction of harm, e.g. arms embargoes.   
In summary, all three writers justify the use of just war principles as a moral 
framework for assessing comprehensive collective sanctions by drawing an analogy 
between economic sanctions and war.  This leads them all to conclude that 
comprehensive collective sanctions are always impermissible because they violate 
the just war principle of discrimination.  Pierce and Winkler further extend the use of 
just war principles to targeted economic sanctions and conclude that targeted 
economic sanctions that do not harm non-combatants may be morally permissible 
because it is at least theoretically possible that they can meet the just war principles.   
This would appear to be a neat solution to the issue of the ethics of economic 
sanctions.  However, I believe there are problems with their approach. 
First, why should we assume that the contemporary mainstream just war 
principles as articulated by Michael Walzer are the right ones?  Perhaps there are 
better understandings of what the just war principles entail.   
Second, although it is true that there are many analogies between the cases of 
war and economic sanctions there are many disanalogies.  This is most obvious when 
we consider targeted economic sanctions like asset freezes and arms embargoes.  
This problem, as I indicate above, appears to have been overlooked by Pierce and 
Winkler.  Further, although it is less obvious, it will become clear in later chapters 
that there are also important disanalogies between the cases of war and 
comprehensive collective sanctions.  The existence of disanalogies between cases of 
war and economic sanctions is problematic because the contemporary mainstream 
                                               
123 Winkler, 154. 
 85 
just war principles – including Walzer’s - are derived from a set of complex and 
detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of war.  These arguments 
contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of war, do not always 
hold true in the case of economic sanctions.  To the extent that economic sanctions 
are disanalogous to war, the more problematic this issue will be.   
Nevertheless, I believe that the rich just war tradition does offer a valuable 
starting point for theorising about economic sanctions.  Therefore, in the four 
chapters that follow I attempt to systematically consider how the wider just war 
tradition might be brought to bear on the case of economic sanctions, beginning not 
with the just war principles but with the underlying arguments for those principles.  
In particular I consider whether (all types of) economic sanctions might be justified 
on the grounds of defensive rights (including the right to defend citizens of other 
states as in the case of humanitarian intervention), on the grounds that they are the 
lesser evil and on the grounds that they are a form of punishment.   
In the final chapter of the thesis I step away from the just war tradition to 
consider whether there is a duty to refuse to supply goods and services to those states 
which would use them for wrongful purposes such a committing human rights 
violations.  This is an important moral consideration for the case of economic 
sanctions and, further, not a consideration that typically arises in the context of war.  
This shows the limitations that would arise if we relied purely on the just war 






Chapter 5: Economic Sanctions and Defensive Rights 
 
Economic sanctions are often imposed for reasons that can broadly be 
construed as defensive.  Some examples are the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN 
following its invasion of Kuwait, the sanctions imposed on Cuba by the US 
following its expropriation of US owned assets, the sanctions imposed by the 
European Union on Argentina following its invasion of the Falkland Islands, the 
sanctions imposed the US on Iran after Iran had taken US hostages.  This fact about 
economic sanctions raises the question of whether the use of economic sanctions 
could, like war, be justified on the grounds of self-defence or the defence of others.  
Certainly most of the people who have written on the ethics of economic sanctions 
have implicitly assumed that self- or other-defence provides a justification for their 
imposition - after all, as we saw in the previous chapter, most of these writers have 
employed just war theory as a framework for their moral analysis and modern just 
war theory holds that war is morally justified only on the grounds of self-defence or 
the defence of others.124   
In this chapter I test this implicit assumption by explicitly examining whether 
economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds of self-defence or the defence of 
others.   
I begin in section one by setting out in some detail what an individual right to 
self- and other-defence entails.  Note that in so doing I take the existence of some 
individual right to self and other-defence as a given - I do not argue for the existence 
of such a right against views that would deny it, e.g. pacifist views.  My objective is 
rather to set out a view of the right to self- and other-defence that will be acceptable 
to most who believe such rights exist, taking a stand on controversial components of 
the right only where it is relevant to the case of economic sanctions.   
In section two I argue that the concepts of individual self- and other-defence 
need to be extended along three dimensions if they are to be applied to the case of 
economic sanctions.  First, they must be extended from paradigmatic cases which 
involve the infliction of physical harm to the infliction of economic harm.  It is true 
enough that economic harms can result in physical harms – a devastated economy 
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might result in starvation, for example.  However, in many cases of economic 
sanctions the damage will not extend to the physical harm of individuals. Second, 
they must be extended from paradigmatic cases involving the defence of life or very 
basic rights to the defence of a greater range of rights.  Although economic sanctions 
are used to defend rights to life and other fundamental rights such as bodily integrity, 
they are also used to defend less fundamental rights such as the right to property, 
religious freedom or democracy.  Third, they must be extended from the individual 
case to the international case.  This is the most difficult element and will take up 
most of section two. 
Having developed extended concepts of self- and other-defence suitable for 
the case of economic sanctions I turn to apply them in section three.  I conclude that 
indirect collective sanctions, by virtue of their very nature, can never be justified on 
the grounds of self- or other-defence; direct collective sanctions will rarely be so 
justified, but targeted sanctions have a reasonable chance of being justified. 
 
1.  The Individual Right to Self- and Other-Defence 
 
The right to self-defence is paradigmatically the right of an individual to 
defend her life or some other fundamental interest of hers from an unjust attack using 
a level of force which would not ordinarily be morally permissible.  For instance                                                                         
suppose X is being stalked by known serial killer Y and one night comes home to 
find Y in her kitchen with a gun.  As Y raises his arm to point his gun at X, X stabs 
Y with a kitchen knife and kills him before he has a chance to shoot.  This is a clear 
cut case of self-defence.  Other-defence is the right of a third party to intervene in 
such cases and defend the innocent person from their attacker – again, using lethal 
force if necessary.   
In this section I aim to set out a fairly uncontroversial view of the individual 
right to self-defence though I am forced to take a position on four controversial 
points which are relevant to the later discussion on economic sanctions.  I start by 
setting out the basic view of self-defence before I move onto the more controversial 
points.  Note that since the justification of other-defence is so similar to that of self-
defence I will only discuss self-defence here.   
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According to most views your defensive attack can be justified on the 
grounds of self defence only if the following necessary conditions are met: 
 
The Unjust Attack Condition:  The initial attack on you is unjust.  
This is crucial.  If the initial attack on you is just then you have no 
right to defend yourself.  For example the serial killer cannot claim he 
permissibly killed the victims who resisted him on the grounds of 
self-defence. 
 
The Necessity Condition: Your defensive response is necessary.  
There is no other, less harmful way of defending yourself.   
 
The Proportionality Condition: Your response is proportionate.  The 
harm caused by your defensive action must be weighed up against the 
benefits achieved by it.  This means that generally you may use more 
force to save your life than to prevent someone punching you.  The 
proportionality requirement does not, however, demand perfect 
equivalence.  Most would accept that you may use lethal force to 
defend yourself from very serious harms such as being raped, blinded, 
maimed or kidnapped and so on and not only to save your life.   
 
Having established the basics I now need to argue for a particular view on 
four controversial points: first, who is liable to suffer defensive harms and why; 
second, whether the necessity condition is objective or subjective; third, whether 
‘imminence’ is a necessary condition; fourth, whether the necessity condition entails 
a duty to retreat.  Note that in this section my aim is merely to argue for particular 
views on the individual right to self defence – it is in section two that I show how 
these views are relevant to the case of economic sanctions. 
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Who is Liable to Suffer Defensive Harms?  Why? 
 
The right to self-defence can be explained in different ways but most 
common is some form of the rights forfeiture view. 125  The rights forfeiture view that 
I find most plausible is that of David Rodin.  Rodin argues thus:  
 
I have the right to life. Therefore, if an aggressor makes an attack upon 
my life, in the absence of any special justifying circumstances, he 
wrongs me. Because I am innocent and he is at fault for the aggression, 
his claim against me that I not use necessary and proportionate lethal 
force against him becomes forfeited (or fails to be entailed by his right 
to life). Therefore I have a right (liberty) to kill him.126 
 
It is consistent with Rodin’s account to say that the aggressor forfeits his right 
to life (when the attack on his life would be necessary and proportionate) because he 
is morally responsible in the blameworthy sense for the attack.  But what does it take 
to be morally responsible in the blameworthy sense for an attack?  Joel Feinberg 
argues that one is morally responsible for a harm or threat of harm in the 
blameworthy sense if and only if: 
 
1) he was at fault in acting or omitting to act and the faultiness of 
his act or omission consisted, at least in part, in the creation of 
either a certainty or an unreasonable risk of harm (fault 
condition);  
 
2) his faulty act (or omission) caused the harm (causal condition); 
and 
 
3) the resultant harm was within the scope of the risk (or certainty) 
in virtue of which the act is properly characterised as faulty.  
(That is the harm risked in (1) must be the same sort of harm as 
actually caused in (2)) (causal relevance condition).127 
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In what follows I will assume that Feinberg’s tri-conditional model of moral 
responsibility is correct.  It is outside the scope of my thesis to develop an account of 
moral responsibility and, although Feinberg’s is surely open to criticism, it is widely 
accepted and cited in the literature.   
If an aggressor meets these conditions for moral responsibility then the 
aggressor has wronged his victim (violated her rights) and, so long as the use of 
defensive force against him is necessary and not disproportionate, then the aggressor 
forfeits his right to life/right not to be attacked in the circumstances.128  It is clear, for 
example, that serial killer Y meets these conditions and thus forfeits his right to life 
with respect to X in the circumstances outlined above.  In the terminology of this 
chapter Y is ‘liable’ to suffer defensive harms.129   
A major objection to views like Rodin’s is that attackers who are not morally 
responsible for their attack (i.e. attackers who are morally innocent) are not liable to 
suffer defensive harm.  Thus, for example, if you are attacked by an individual who 
has been hypnotised to kill you, that individual is not liable to be killed by you in 
self-defence even if such defence would be both necessary and proportionate.  
Similarly, imagine a man pushed off the top of the building and headed straight for 
you; if he lands on you he will be saved but you will be crushed to death.  
Fortunately (for you), there is an awning above you and it is possible for you to alter 
its angle so as to deflect him away from yourself: he will die but you will be 
saved.130  The falling man is, like the hypnotised man, morally innocent and thus not 
liable to suffer defensive harms.  Thus, in both cases, killing your attackers cannot be 
justified on the grounds of self-defence. 
This, many have argued, is a counter-intuitive conclusion and thus moral 
responsibility on the part of the aggressor cannot be necessary for a defensive act to 
be justified on the grounds of self-defence.  The debate concerning innocent attackers 
and their liability or otherwise to be killed in self-defence is well-known and I have 
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nothing to add to it here.131  Instead, I want to point out that in fact Rodin’s argument 
does not actually show that it is wrong to kill innocent aggressors; only that if you 
kill them you cannot justify your actions on the grounds of self-defence.  You might, 
however, be able to justify your actions on some other grounds.  For example, Cécile 
Fabre argues that in situations where two agents are morally on a par, i.e. where they 
are both morally innocent, each agent is permitted to give greater weight to her own 
life on the grounds that: 
 
a) there are limits to the sacrifices which one can reasonably expect 
agents to make for the sake of others and  
b) expecting them to sacrifice their life for the sake of the agent who is 
posing the lethal threat to which they are not liable lies beyond the 
bounds of reasonableness.132 
 
Thus, the apparent counter-intuitive conclusions of Rodin’s theory can easily 
be avoided.  We can therefore add a fourth necessary condition as follows: 
 
The Liability Condition: The defensive harm is targeted only at those 
liable to suffer the defensive harm.  
 
The liability condition is important because, as I show in section two, the 
liability condition rules out the use of collective economic sanctions in most 
circumstances. 
 
Objective and Subjective Views of Necessity 
 
On an objective view of necessity, your defensive act is morally 
justified only if it is necessary.  On a subjective view of necessity, your 
defensive action is morally justified only if you reasonably believe it to be 
necessary.  The difference is important.  Consider the following case. 
In Gunman, a police officer is investigating an abandoned house.  When she 
enters the house she is immediately confronted by a man waving a gun at her and 
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shouting that he will kill her.  As he raises the gun to point at her head, she fires first 
and kills him with the reasonable belief that this action is necessary to save her life.  
However, after she kills him she finds out that the gun was a replica and her life was 
never in any danger.  On a subjective view of self-defence her actions are justified 
since it was reasonable for her to believe that the gunman would kill her.  On an 
objective view of self defence her actions are not justified since it was not in fact 
necessary for her to kill the gunman.     
The problem with the objective view is that it cannot guide action.  The 
objective view tells us that our defensive acts are justified on the grounds of self-
defence only if they are necessary from a ‘God’s eye’ point of view where all the 
relevant facts are known.  However, human beings do not and cannot occupy a God’s 
eye point of view and so the objective view offers human beings no guidance about 
when they may justifiably engage in self-defence.   
Even after the fact human beings cannot say with certainty that any particular 
defensive act was objectively necessary.  To be sure, it is possible to sometimes 
determine that the act was objectively unnecessary, e.g. in the case where the 
gunman had a replica gun.  However, proving that a defensive act was necessary (as 
opposed to unnecessary) requires possession of all the relevant facts, i.e. a God’s eye 
point of view.  For example, for a gunman with a real gun we would need to know 
that he would not have changed his mind in the split second before pulling the 
trigger, that the gun would not have jammed and so on if we were to prove that the 
defensive act was objectively necessary.  Thus in addition to being unable to guide 
action, the objective view makes it impossible for us to determine after the fact 
whether a particular instance of self-defence was justified or not. 
The subjective view on the other hand takes into account the fact that we are 
human beings capable of doing no more than forming reasonable beliefs about the 
necessity of our defence.  Therefore, I accept the subjective view. 
 
The Imminence Condition 
 
On some views of self-defence, the initial attack must be already underway or 
imminent (as in the serial killer example) for your defence to be morally permissible.  
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If this were so it would prove seriously problematic for my project because in many 
cases economic sanctions are imposed preventively to head off threats expected to 
materialise in the (possibly quite distant) future and that are in no way imminent.  
Fortunately, as I will argue, the view that imminence is a necessary condition for 
morally justified self-defence is mistaken.  To argue this I take as my starting point a 
thought experiment from Allen Buchanan.  In Paralysis, you have conclusive 
evidence that a villain has a plan to kill you for no justifiable reason.   He plans to 
carry out his attack in a few weeks when, due to some disease, you will be 
completely paralysed and unable to defend yourself.  For some reason you are unable 
to rely on the police or anyone else to help you.  There is no way of stopping the 
villain short of killing him.  Is it morally permissible to kill the villain in self-defence 
now while you still can even though the villain’s attack is not imminent?133  Well in 
this case the attack on you is unjust so the unjust attack condition is met.  The 
proportionality condition is met: a life for a life.  The necessity condition is also met: 
ex-hypothesi the only way to prevent the villain from killing you is by killing him 
and there is no less harmful alternative.  In particular, the only way to prevent the 
villain from killing you is by killing him now – if you wait until his attack is 
imminent it will be too late.  However, it is obvious that the imminence condition is 
not met.  Nonetheless Buchanan argues that intuitively one is permitted to kill the 
villain in this case and therefore imminence cannot be a necessary condition.  I agree 
with his view and in what follows I will consider and reject two arguments in favour 
of retaining the imminence condition: what I call the ‘epistemic argument’ and what 
Buchanan calls the ‘simple rights based argument’134.   
Here I use the term ‘epistemic argument’ to refer to a group of arguments 
which share the highly intuitive view that it is only in circumstances of imminent 
attack that we can come to form a reasonable belief that defensive force is necessary.  
Hence it is only in circumstances of imminent attack that self-defence can be 
justified. 
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One version of the epistemic argument claims that the sort of high quality 
evidence needed for a belief to be reasonable can only be obtained when an attack is 
imminent.  I would argue that although this is often the case in practice, it is not 
necessarily so.  Consider the Gunman case above.  The evidence in this case of 
imminent ‘attack’ was completely misleading.  Compare this to the case of Paralysis 
where there has been time to gather and assess evidence, possibly from several 
independent sources.  Imminence is no guarantee of high quality evidence.  Hence 
there is no categorical difference in the epistemic conditions surrounding imminent 
and non-imminent attacks – at least where it concerns reliability or extent of 
evidence.   
Another version of the epistemic argument is that where the attack is 
temporally distant there is time for circumstances to change so as to render defensive 
action unnecessary: the attacker has time to change her mind or, alternatively, 
circumstances could change such that options other than lethal force open up to us.  
Therefore, when faced with distant threats, it is never reasonable for us to believe 
that defensive force is necessary.  Although I concede it is often the case that with 
distant threats that circumstances could change to render defensive action 
unnecessary; this is not necessarily so.  We can imagine cases – like Paralysis – 
where circumstances will not change to render our defensive action unnecessary.  
Moreover, even in cases of imminent attack there is likewise time for circumstances 
to change and render defensive action unnecessary.  Imagine a case like Gunman but 
slightly different – where the gun is not a replica and the Gunman really is intending 
to kill the police officer at the time he makes his threat.  Even in this case of 
imminent attack, the gun might jam or the Gunman might have a sudden change of 
heart.  So, again, there is no categorical difference in the epistemic conditions 
surrounding imminent and non-imminent attacks.   
Having rejected the epistemic argument I now want to examine the simple 
rights based argument; in particular, David Rodin’s version of the simple rights 
based argument (which is the argument Buchanan addresses).   
Rodin argues that imminence is a necessary condition for justified self-
defence and that it would be wrong to harm someone to prevent a non-imminent 
attack even if that harm were necessary to prevent it.  This is because, Rodin argues, 
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individuals posing a non-imminent threat haven’t done anything wrong yet and thus 
are not yet liable to suffer defensive harms.135  To support this assertion he presents 
his version of the simple rights based argument:   
 
If one accepts that the permission to kill in self-defence is tied to 
some wrongdoing on the part of the aggressor, then it is easy to see 
why there is a problem with preventive acts of self-defence…Without 
the presence of active aggression it is difficult to see how there can 
exist the liability to harm which seems to be such a crucial part of the 
classic model of self-defence.136  
 
Here it is important to note that Rodin intends ‘the presence of active 
aggression’ to cover imminent threats as well as actual aggression – otherwise his 
argument would also rule out self-defence against imminent attack and this is not a 
position that he holds.  Rodin uses a case to illustrate his views.  In Jealous 
Husband, X has been sleeping with Y’s wife.  X knows Y is violently jealous and 
comes home one day to find Y going through his private letters.  In the letters is one 
from Y’s wife proving X has been sleeping with her and as soon as Y sees it, X 
knows Y will almost certainly try and take his revenge by killing him.  In this 
situation Rodin notes it does not seem it would be permissible for X to kill Y before 
he reads the letter, only afterwards (presuming it does in fact lead to an immediate 
murderous rage).137 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that in this case X’s killing Y is 
necessary if X is to save his own life – X cannot snatch the letter out of Y’s hand 
before he reads it etc.  I agree with Rodin that in this case it would be wrong for X to 
kill Y.  However, I will argue that it is not wrong because Y’s attack is non-
imminent.  Therefore, Rodin’s case does not show that imminence is a necessary 
condition for justified self defence.  Before I do this, however, I first want to 
consider and reject Buchanan’s own response to the simple rights based argument.   
To defend his view from the simple rights based argument Buchanan makes 
an analogy with the law of conspiracy.  He argues: 
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The law of conspiracy explains how someone can have done something 
wrong, namely, imposed an unjust risk on others, without actually 
harming or being about to harm.  And to the extent that we believe that 
enforcement of the law of conspiracy, including the use of deadly force 
when necessary, is justified, it seems that the moral plausibility of the 
law of conspiracy refutes the simple rights based argument…If 
something like the elements of the crime of conspiracy were present in 
the case of a state or a terrorist group conspiring to commit a massive 
unjust harm, it would be justifiable to use force to arrest and punish 
them, and to use lethal force against them if they resisted arrest, if this 
were necessary to stop them.138   
 
However, this passage is a bit ambiguous.  What does he mean when he says 
it would be permissible to use lethal force ‘if this were necessary to stop them’?  It 
most naturally reads as a permission to use lethal force if it were necessary to stop 
them resisting arrest.  If Buchanan envisages the conspirators resisting arrest 
violently such that it puts the lives of arresting officers in danger then that seems 
right.  However, this would then be a straightforward case of self-defence against 
imminent attack and therefore this does not refute the simple rights based argument.  
The alternative interpretation of this passage is that it is justifiable to kill the 
conspirators even if they are running away if it is the only way to prevent their 
conspiracy being realised.  Perhaps the police know it’s their only chance to arrest 
the conspirators and so prevent their attack.  This would be consistent with 
Buchanan’s overall view as it suggests that in conditions of necessity it is permissible 
to use lethal force in self-defence even if the attack is not imminent.139  However, 
this interpretation begs the question.  If you accept the premise that a morally 
plausible version of conspiracy law would allow you to kill conspirators involved in 
a non-imminent attack when the conditions of necessity were met, then you must 
already accept Buchanan’s conclusion that imminence is not a necessary condition 
for an act of killing to be one of justified self-defence.  Therefore, Buchanan’s 
conspiracy law analogy does not refute the simple rights based argument.   
I now want to suggest an alternative strategy for overcoming the simple rights 
based argument.  The question we should be asking here is not whether the non-
                                               
138 Buchanan, 2007, 135. 
139 Obviously in this case it is the defence of others rather than self defence but I assume it makes no 
significant difference. 
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imminent attacker has done anything wrong, nor what exactly she has done wrong 
but whether she has done something wrong that renders her liable to suffer defensive 
harms.  I think that she has – at least in cases that meet the other conditions for 
justifiable self-defence (necessity, proportionality, unjust attack).  In such cases the 
non-imminent attacker has culpably put her victims in a position where it is 
necessary to kill their attacker.140  Her victims have no other choice if they are to 
save their own lives.  The victim in Paralysis has been placed in a kill-or-be-killed 
situation, and to put someone in such a situation is definitely to commit a serious 
wrong, one for which you surely forfeit your own right to life and render yourself 
liable to suffer defensive harms.  Therefore, when one kills the attacker in this 
situation it is a permissible act of self-defence.  I think this explanation overcomes 
the simple rights based argument whilst remaining consistent with Buchanan’s 
overall account.  
Now let’s go back to Rodin’s Jealous Husband case.  I agree with Rodin that 
it would be wrong of X to kill the jealous husband in this case even if it were 
necessary to save X’s life.  However, the jealous husband is very different to the 
villain in Paralysis.  In particular, the jealous husband has not put X in a kill-or-be-
killed situation.  X may indeed be in a kill-or-be-killed situation but jealous husband 
has not put him there.  It is true that jealous husband poses a threat to X but posing a 
threat is distinctively different from culpably issuing a threat.  We can pose threats in 
all kinds of innocent ways which do not render us liable to suffer defensive harms.  
For example, I may pose a threat to you if I park my car in a narrow alley down 
which you are fleeing from a murderous attacker but this does not render me liable to 
suffer your defensive harms.  In the case of Jealous Husband it is only after he flies 
into a murderous rage that he culpably issues the threat that renders him liable to 
suffer defensive harms.  Rodin is thus right to think that we may not kill the jealous 
husband until he flies into a murderous rage but he is wrong to conclude from this 
that imminence is a necessary condition for justified self-defence. 
Therefore, neither the epistemic argument nor the simple rights based 
argument succeed in showing that imminence is a necessary condition for an act of 
killing to qualify as morally justified self-defence.  It therefore appears that self-
                                               
140 By ‘culpable’ I mean with full moral responsibility. 
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defence is morally permissible even when the attack is not imminent.  I now turn to 
consider the duty to retreat. 
 
Necessity and the Duty to Retreat 
 
Recall that for an act of self-defence to be morally justified it must be 
(reasonably believed to be) necessary. For some this necessity condition entails the 
‘duty to retreat’ in confrontations where it is possible to escape being killed or 
injured by running away.  If it is possible to run away and thus avoid being killed it 
cannot be necessary to kill your attacker in self-defence since there is a less harmful 
way of saving your life: running away.  However, the idea that the necessity 
condition always requires a duty to retreat is controversial. 
In particular, many argue that if you are confronted in your own home by a 
burglar there is no requirement to flee from your home while she ransacks it if you 
are able to use force to stop her.  The idea is that a duty to retreat can sometimes 
require an innocent person to give up too much.  ‘A man’s home is his castle’ they 
say and he should not be required to abandon its defence. 
Similarly, in his discussion on the self-defence of battered women, Richard 
A. Rosen writes that in some cases battered women have to go to extreme lengths to 
avoid their abusive partners who will often threaten to kill them if they leave and 
attempt to track them down if they do.  Rosen argues that in such cases if a battered 
woman has to leave her children, change her name and hide away for the rest of her 
life in Alaska just to get away from her partner then this is asking too much of her – 
she cannot have a duty to do this.141   
I think this is right.  We usually think it costs nothing to retreat but this is not 
always so and while it is one thing to run away from a stranger who has attempted to 
rob you, it is quite another to be expected to leave everything you’ve ever known 
behind because someone is threatening to kill you and the police cannot or will not 
help.  I will return to this issue in the second section. 
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2.  Economic Sanctions and the Concepts of Self- and Other-Defence 
 
In this section I consider whether the self-defence justification – as outlined 
in the previous section – can provide a framework for a moral analysis of economic 
sanctions.  The task at hand then is to extend the concept of individual self-defence 
along three dimensions: from the infliction of violence to the infliction of economic 
harms, from cases involving the defence of very basic rights to cases involving the 
defence of less basic rights and from the individual case to the international case.  In 
what follows I draw heavily on the work of David Rodin, adapting his position where 
necessary. 
 
Extending from Physical Harms to Economic Harms and from Defence 
of Basic Rights to Less Basic Rights 
 
Although economic sanctions are used to defend rights to life and other 
fundamental rights such as bodily integrity, they are also used to defend less 
fundamental rights such as the right to property, religious freedom or democracy.  
Further, economic sanctions are often not lethal and do not in any case involve the 
direct infliction of physical violence.  Thus it might seem a bit of a stretch to attempt 
to justify economic sanctions as a type of self- or other-defence. 
However, we can understand the rights to self- and other-defence as being a 
sub-set of a wider class of defensive rights. As David Rodin puts it: 
 
The right to commit homicide in self-defense is not sui generis, a case 
alone unto itself. It is rather one case within a range of morally and 
legally justified defensive actions. It is a range which might properly 
include defending one's position in a queue by delivering some sharp 
words to an interloper, defending a valuable art work by striking a thief 
who is about to steal it, through to defending one's life by shooting and 
killing an assailant who is about to kill you.142  
 
For Rodin, all justified defensive acts have the same underlying moral 
structure. Thus the necessary conditions for morally permissible defensive acts 
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are the same: unjust attack, proportionality, necessity and liability, whether they 
involve killing to defend one’s life or delivering sharp words to a queue 
jumper.143  For Rodin, defensive rights derive from the fact that one has a right to 
a certain object that is being threatened and, if that object is being threatened by 
an aggressor who is at fault, then one has the derived right to defend the object 
using necessary and proportionate force – where the force need not be physical 
violence.144  If we accept this, and I see no reason not to, it does make sense to 
consider economic sanctions as the exercise of defensive rights.  Note, however, 
that in what follows I continue to use the terms ‘self-defence’ and ‘other-
defence’ for the sake of familiarity and simplicity.  
 
Extension to the International Case 
 
The problem of extending the concept of individual self-defence to the 
international case is not unique to the question of economic sanctions; it is also a 
problem for just war theorists attempting to justify war on the grounds of self-
defence.  In what follows therefore I draw on the work of just war theorists, 
particularly David Rodin, to develop an account of how the concept of individual 
self-defence could be extended to the international case – the case of ‘national-
defence’.   
Rodin argues that there are two broad strategies that can be taken when 
extending the concept of individual self-defence to the international case: the 
analogical strategy and the reductive strategy.  The analogical strategy takes the 
domestic analogy at face value: states are like people – if state A attacks state B then 
state B has the right to defend itself against state A (which has forfeited its right not 
to be attacked) in order to defend its ‘common life’.  Here Rodin takes the common 
life of a state to ‘consist in the set of interconnected social structures which emerge 
when people live together in a community…the common life has a character and 
identity over time, it grows and develops, and it is shaped…by those who live within 
it’.145  The reductive strategy, by contrast, paints ‘a moral picture of war as a 
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composite of individual acts of [self- and other-] defence’.146  Every individual’s life 
is threatened by the soldiers on the opposing side and they have the right to defend 
themselves and their fellow citizens against their attacks – a defensive war is simply 
a group of people exercising their individual rights to self- and other-defence in a co-
ordinated manner.  Saying that state B has the ‘right to war’ is simply a short-hand 
way of referring to this. 
There are also, Rodin argues, mixed analogical/reductive positions; for 
example, one could argue states hold the right to national-defence because states 
have the right to defend the rights of their citizens to life, bodily integrity and so on – 
rights which will be violated by an armed attack.147   
Rodin in fact argues that neither the analogical strategy nor the reductive 
strategy nor any mixed strategy can ground the right to national-defence and hence 
thinks that the project should be abandoned.148  I agree with Rodin that neither the 
pure reductive nor analogical strategies can ground the right to national defence 
though, as my focus is on economic sanctions and not war, for different reasons.  On 
the other hand, I believe that the mixed strategy considered above can ground the 
right to impose economic sanctions in national-defence.  I take these points in turn. 
The analogical strategy fails for economic sanctions because it is clear that 
economic sanctions are imposed as defensive measures in situations where the 
common life of the state is not threatened.  For example, economic sanctions might 
be imposed on a state which has taken hostages, on a state which refuses to extradite 
suspected terrorists or on a state which has expropriated property contrary to 
international law.  None of these actions – the hostage taking, the refusal to extradite 
terrorist suspects or the expropriation of property, typically threatens the common 
life of a state.  Thus it would be nonsense to attempt to justify these economic 
sanctions on the grounds that they are a means of defending the common life of a 
state.   
The reductive strategy also fails.  It is prima facie a plausible way of 
understanding war where soldiers on both sides are attempting to kill each other.  
However, economic sanctions are by their very nature a collective weapon.  One 
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soldier may kill another but if one individual refuses to trade with another that person 
will just buy what she needs from someone else.  Economic sanctions must be 
imposed by a collective agent to have any impact at all.  Further, economic sanctions 
are sometimes one-sided, i.e. endured by their targets without any retaliatory 
economic sanctions.  Therefore, modelling cases of economic sanctions on the 
actions of individuals engaged in a fight would be a strain. 
A more natural way of modelling economic sanctions is using one of the 
mixed analogical/reductive strategies that Rodin also rejects.  Recall that one mixed 
position runs that states hold the right to national-defence because they have the right 
to defend the rights of their citizens to life, bodily integrity and so on.  This position 
is better for modelling economic sanctions as it satisfactorily accounts for those 
sanctions which are imposed in situations where the common life is not threatened.  
In cases of hostage taking the lives of the hostages are under threat.  In the 
expropriation case it is property rights.  In the extradition case it is the right of the 
victims of terrorism to see receive justice.  The state has the right and the duty to 
defend its citizens’ rights in these cases.  The mixed model also better accounts for 
the collective nature of sanctioning and its often one-sided nature.  Of course, on this 
account, the right to national defence is best viewed as ‘other defence’ rather than 
‘self defence’, the state as a collective agent is defending the rights of its citizens, but 
nothing particularly hangs on this distinction. 
However, Rodin argues against using this mixed model to ground the right to 
national-defence.  He uses two arguments: ‘the argument from humanitarian 
intervention’ and ‘the argument from bloodless invasion’.  I consider each in turn. 
Rodin’s argument from humanitarian intervention is in two parts as follows: 
 
1. If state A has a right to defend the rights of A-citizens from state B’s 
unjust attack then state C also has a right to defend the rights of A-
citizens from state B’s unjust attack.  
2. If state C has a right to defend the rights of A-citizens when they are 
being unjustly attacked by state B, state C has a right to defend the 
rights of A-citizens when they are being unjustly attacked by state A 
itself.  In other words state C has a right to humanitarian intervention in 
state A.149 
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That the right to humanitarian intervention (which is basically a right to invade for 
humanitarian purposes) can thus be derived from the right to national-defence on this 
mixed model is a big problem in Rodin’s eyes because, as he puts it:   
 
If there is a right to humanitarian intervention then it is because the 
moral basis of the right of national defence can in certain 
circumstances be justly overridden, not because the right of 
humanitarian intervention is, in some sense, an application of those 
moral considerations.150   
 
For Rodin the right to humanitarian intervention is in ‘deep tension’ with the right to 
national-defence since the right to national-defence is normally thought to entail the 
right to resist interventions – humanitarian or otherwise.151  However, according to 
Rodin, the mixed model recognises no such tension. 
Let’s consider Rodin’s argument in more detail.  Part one of the argument is 
really just the claim that wherever a state has the right of self-defence, a third party 
state has the right of other-defence.  This is a plausible assumption and I will not 
challenge it here.  Part two of the argument is the claim that if a third party state has 
the right of other-defence in situation X then the same third party state also has the 
right of other-defence in situation Y where situation Y is identical in every respect to 
situation X except for the identity of the attacker.  This claim is more debatable and I 
will consider it in more detail.  If the claim is that purely changing the identity of the 
attacker whilst everything else about the attacker remains the same then the claim is 
plausible.  For instance say serial killer X is about to kill her victim in circumstances 
where a third party has the right to other-defence.  If copycat serial killer Y is about 
to kill her victim in identical circumstances and Y is identical to X in relevant ways 
(i.e. same physical strength, same propensity to kill) I agree the third party would 
also have the right to other-defence.  However, in most cases changing the identity of 
the attacker cannot help but change the circumstances in ways which may be relevant 
to there being a justified case for other-defence.  For example, one attacker may be 
much more powerful than another meaning that much greater force must be used 
against her.  It is possible that this greater force would be disproportionate whereas 
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the smaller amount of force needed to defend oneself from the less powerful attacker 
would not be. 
There are likely to be relevant differences between state A and state C.  
Hence the claim that if state C has a right to defend the rights of A-citizens when 
they are being unjustly attacked by state B, state C has a right to defend the rights of 
A-citizens when they are being unjustly attacked by state A itself is only contingently 
true – it is only true if there are no relevant differences between the two states.   
However, in cases where there are no relevant differences then Rodin is right 
that one can derive a right to humanitarian intervention from the right to national-
defence (and vice-versa).  Is this as problematic as Rodin thinks it is?  I do not think 
it is because I think the mixed model is still capable of generating the ‘deep tension’ 
Rodin wants to see.  Where state A is attacking its own citizens the mixed model 
implies that state C has the right of humanitarian intervention because state C has the 
right to protect the rights of A-citizens.  The mixed model also implies that state A 
has the right to national-defence because it has the right to protect the rights of A-
citizens – and the rights of A-citizens would certainly be threatened by a military 
invasion – even one carried out for humanitarian purposes.  However, this results in a 
contradiction: If A has the right to national-defence it would entail that C had a duty 
not to invade – even for humanitarian purposes.  Nevertheless on the mixed model C 
does have the right to invade for humanitarian purposes.  Therefore the tension 
Rodin wants to see definitely remains.  However, although I have shown that there is 
a prima facie contradiction flowing from the mixed model and thus appeased 
Rodin’s objection, the mixed model now faces the different objection that it 
generates contradictory conclusions.  One way of dissolving the prima facie 
contradiction is to appeal to circumstances where the right to national-defence can be 
justly overridden which is – as we have already seen – exactly what Rodin thinks we 
should do.  Since, on the mixed model, the end of both the right to national-defence 
and the right to humanitarian intervention is protection of rights, it is considerations 
of which action best protects rights that will point us to the circumstances under 
which the right to national-defence may justly be overridden.  In this case I would 
argue that state A’s right to national-defence is over-ruled by the need to protect the 
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basic rights of citizens – on the assumption that invasion will lead to less rights-
violations overall than not invading.   
Rodin’s second argument against the mixed model is the ‘argument from 
bloodless invasion’.  In this hypothetical case, state B invades state A but promises 
not to kill any A-citizens if they do not put up any resistance.  If the lives of A-
citizens are safe then it seems state A has no right to defend itself from invasion 
since it cannot justify its response on the grounds that it is defending the lives of its 
citizens.  Thus we cannot ground the right to national-defence in the right to defend 
the rights of citizens.152  I have two objections to make to this argument. 
First, it may be true that the state B soldiers will not kill any A-citizens but 
what else might they do?  Might they suspend their democratically elected 
government?  Might they set up a police state?  Might they start torturing people?  
Might they requisition their property?  It’s likely that they will do some of these 
things; after all, unless the invasion is part of a humanitarian intervention surely the 
point of it is to secure some economic and/or political gain and that would generally 
require them to take over the running of the state in the face of serious opposition.  
So even if they do not kill the A-citizens they will certainly violate their human 
rights.  Further, states have the right to national-defence because they have the right 
to defend the rights of their citizens – and not just their rights to life but all their 
rights.  To stop A-citizens’ human rights being violated it would reasonably be 
considered necessary to fight them and stop them invading.  Therefore, state A would 
still possess a right to national-defence even if they were promised a bloodless 
invasion. 
Second, one could argue that there is still a conditional threat to kill A-
citizens even if the aggressing state is not currently killing them and will not do so as 
long as they do not meet any resistance.  Hence state A has the right to defend its 
citizens from this conditional threat.  Rodin counters this objection by arguing that 
one cannot permissibly kill in response to a conditional threat of death because the 
necessity condition is not met – one can avoid being killed simply by doing with the 
threat-issuer wants.  To use Rodin’s example, if someone makes the conditional 
threat ‘give me a dollar or I’ll kill you’, you have to give her a dollar- it is not 
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morally permissible to kill her.  This is an instantiation of the ‘duty to retreat’, if the 
least harmful way of defending yourself is to run away or hand over a dollar then that 
is what you have a duty to do – using force instead would be unnecessary.153  
However, as I argued in section one, there is no duty of retreat where innocent people 
would be forced to give up something very valuable to them.  In the case of bloodless 
invasion the A-citizens are not being asked to give up a dollar but their country.  
Surely this is asking them to give up too much.  If so then the necessity condition is 
met and A does have the right to national-defence in the case of bloodless invasion.  
Hence, the mixed model stands: states have a right to national defence because states 
have the right to defend the rights of their citizens.   
There is a final issue to consider though, against whom is the right to self- or 
other-defence to be exercised?  As argued above, the right to self- or other-defence is 
only justified if the defensive harms are targeted at those who are liable to suffer 
them, i.e. at those who are morally responsible for the objectionable policy in virtue 
of which defensive action must be taken.  Therefore in this section I consider the 
issue of who is morally responsible for a target state’s objectionable policy.154    
In what follows it will be useful to have an example in mind.  Say state A 
invades a small island territory of state B.  The island, although very small, is of 
strategic importance and is inhabited by citizens of state B.  The invasion poses no 
imminent danger to the mainland of state B and it is the plausible intention of state A 
to be satisfied with the occupation of the island alone.  State B decides that a war 
would be difficult and possibly disproportionate and that instead it will use economic 
sanctions to coerce the citizens of state A into persuading their government to order 
troops be withdrawn from the island.  The question I want to consider is who can be 
held responsible for the ongoing occupation of state B’s island.  
One possibility is that all the citizens of state A share moral responsibility for 
the occupation.155  I believe this notion of shared responsibility is fairly common 
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even if it is not explicitly endorsed by many.  For instance, if in war one counts 
enemy civilian casualties as less morally troubling than one’s own civilian casualties 
– as many people seem to - then something like this notion of responsibility might be 
working in the background.156  Can such a notion of responsibility be justified?     
I will start by rejecting any view that claims individuals bear moral 
responsibility for the harms perpetrated by their state solely by virtue of their 
citizenship.  Such views are wildly implausible because, since citizenship is rarely 
freely chosen, such views attribute moral responsibility to individuals irrespective of 
their actions and irrespective of their characters.  On any plausible view linking 
citizenship to responsibility there must be some feature shared by all citizens of that 
state that renders them morally responsible for their state’s wrongdoing.  Thus those 
who wish to maintain the position that all citizens are responsible for their state’s 
wrongdoing must argue that there is some such feature shared by all citizens of the 
state by virtue of which they are all morally responsible. 
Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Karl Jaspers argued that, 
to some extent, all citizens of a state could be held responsible for that state’s 
wrongdoing including those who were not directly involved in the harms themselves.  
For Jaspers all Germans were ‘politically responsible’ for Hitler’s regime and thus its 
consequences.  The German state was their state and they were responsible for who 
they allowed to run it and the consequences thereof.  As he puts it: ‘ever since 
European nations have tried and beheaded their monarchs, the task of the people has 
been to keep their leaders in check’.157  Further, no citizen escapes political 
responsibility as ‘politically everyone acts in the modern state, at least by voting, or 
failing to vote, in elections.  The sense of political liability lets no man dodge’.158  
However, Jaspers takes care to distinguish this notion of political responsibility from 
criminal and moral responsibility.  Only political responsibility can be attributed to 
every citizen - criminal and moral responsibility cannot.  The political liability that 
Jaspers refers to (which derives from political responsibility) is the liability of all 
                                                                                                                                     
sum’; the extent of an individual’s responsibility for her group’s wrongdoing does not depend on the 
size of her group.  See Zimmerman, 1985a.  
156 To be clear I am not saying that this view of responsibility is the only reason one might find enemy 
civilian casualties morally less troubling than one’s own civilian casualties.  Obviously it is not. 
157 Jaspers, 55. 
158 Jaspers, 62. 
 108 
German citizens for the actions of their state.  For Jaspers this entails that German 
citizens were liable to pay reparations and to suffer living under the military rule 
imposed by the victors.  He is very clear, however, that political responsibility does 
not entail a liability to suffer criminal punishment.  His view on whether German 
citizens would have been liable to suffer defensive harms is unclear.   
Nevertheless, others do make the strong claim that citizens are morally 
responsible for the actions of their state by virtue of their political ties - in ways 
which do ground liability to suffer defensive harm.  For example, in their discussion 
of the ethics of economic sanctions, Drew Christiansen and Gerald Powers argue that 
civilian populations of target states are not always morally innocent.  They might, for 
example, have given their full support to an unjust regime which has aggressed 
against its neighbour.  They state: 
 
In these cases, the civilian population becomes a legitimate target of 
sanctions because it shares responsibility for the actions of its 
government and thus may be pressured to remove that government from 
power or, at least, to force it to change its policies’.159   
 
Christiansen and Powers use the example of Israel.  Sanctions on Israel would 
be permissible, they argue, because it is a democracy and thus the population must be 
supporting its government’s policies.   
What should we make of this?  The argument is most plausible where the 
state in question is a democracy since it is in democracies that citizens have the most 
control over their government and their government’s policies.  However, as I will 
show, this argument does not hold even for democracies.  Therefore, a forteriori it 
does not hold for non-democratic states.   
Individual citizens in a democracy have a limited amount of political power; 
they can influence their government’s policies by campaigning for or against those 
policies or, occasionally, by voting in referendums held on particular issues.  Over 
the long term individuals can vote for political parties known to support or oppose 
certain policies or even stand for office themselves and attempt to direct government 
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policy more directly.  Does that entail that everyone in a democracy shares 
responsibility for the actions taken by their government? 
To go back to the Island Occupation case, what should we say about those 
who use their political power to campaign against the occupation?  Those who, for 
example, demonstrate outside the parliament, who publicly declare that they will not 
vote for any party that supports the occupation, who write to their MP’s and 
newspapers, who start anti-occupation protest groups.  Such citizens are using the 
political power they have in order to end the occupation.  The occupation continues 
despite their efforts not because of them.  Such citizens do not share moral 
responsibility for the occupation.160 
Further, what about those citizens who either do not have any political power 
or who cannot exercise it.  These include children, those to ill to exercise political 
power and, at least in the UK, some prisoners.  These citizens either do not have any 
political power or cannot exercise it.  Thus they cannot be held morally responsible 
for their state’s objectionable policies on the grounds that they exercised – or failed 
to exercise – their political power in a way which allowed the state to pursue its 
wrongful policy.  
Further, in what I have said so far I have assumed throughout that individuals 
either know or should know that the occupation is unjust.  This is important because 
if individuals hold the reasonable belief that the occupation is just then they cannot 
be held morally responsible for it in the blameworthy sense – they have an excuse.  It 
is possible that some – or even most - citizens in a democracy could have this excuse, 
since even democratic governments lie to their people about threats posed by other 
states.  Of course, whether or not citizens do in fact have this excuse will depend on 
the case at hand.   
So, to conclude this section, even in a democracy there will be large numbers 
of people who cannot be held morally responsible for their government’s actions. 
Hence it cannot be shown that in a democracy all bear moral responsibility for a 
government’s objectionable policies.  A forteriori it is not the case that all individuals 
living within non-democratic states share moral responsibility for their government’s 
                                               
160 At least, they do not share moral responsibility by virtue of their citizenship.  They might share 
moral responsibility for other reasons e.g. making tax payments that contribute to funding the 
occupation. 
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objectionable policy.  This particular shared feature view fails.  However, there are 
other shared feature views worth considering.   
Joel Feinberg very briefly argues that individual members of a group which 
shares racist attitudes are morally responsible for racist violence perpetrated by their 
group even if they do not participate in the violence themselves.  In his example all 
the members of the White population of the postbellum American South are morally 
responsible for the lynching of Black people that occurred there.  It follows from 
Feinberg’s argument that they are thus liable to suffer defensive harms.161  
Feinberg’s argument is interesting but problematic. 
The first problem with this view is that even if racist attitudes are widespread 
within a community there is no reason to think they are shared by every single White 
person in that community.  Feinberg anticipates this objection and states that he 
assumes 99% of the White population of the American South share racist attitudes on 
account of their beliefs having been shaped by their upbringing within that society.  
Further, those who did not share such racist attitudes would be outcasts of White 
society - such being the nature of that society.  Hence responsibility ‘might be 
ascribed to all those whites who were not outcasts, taking respectability and material 
comfort as evidence that a given person did not qualify for an exemption’.162  
However, even if Feinberg is right in the case of the American South – and I take no 
stand on that – one cannot extrapolate this case to other groups - let alone states 
which rarely exhibit the kind of solidarity Feinberg attributes to the White American 
South.  States often comprise a mix of nationalities, ethnicities and races and are 
unlikely to all share any particular attitudes – racist or otherwise.163 
                                               
161 Feinberg, 1970, 247-248.  More recently, Larry May argues along very similar lines that individual 
members of a community share moral responsibility for harms they do not directly participate in if 
they share the attitudes of those who do participate.  Using the example of racist attitudes, May argues 
that individuals who hold racist attitudes help to create a climate in which racist violence is more 
likely to take place.  Thus, even if those individuals do not take part in the racist violence themselves, 
they bear some moral responsibility for it when it happens.  However, May reaches a weaker 
conclusion than Feinberg.  May argues it is not appropriate to blame or punish individuals who hold 
such attitudes – the appropriate response to their faulty attitudes is self-imposed shame, remorse, 
regret or moral taint.  I do not discuss May’s views here because May’s weaker conclusion cannot 
justify the imposition of economic sanctions on the grounds of self-defence or just punishment. May, 
16. 
162 Feinberg, 1970, 248. 
163 Note that Feinberg does not suggest extending his view to states. 
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The second problem is that some citizens might have an excuse for their 
racist attitudes.  Children, especially, do not yet have the capacity to independently 
reflect on the attitudes that they hold. Thus they must be excused moral 
responsibility for the attitudes they hold and the harms that flow from them.164 
To summarise, then, neither Jasper’s ‘political responsibility’ nor Feinberg’s 
‘shared attitudes’ views of shared responsibility succeed in grounding a liability of 
each individual member of the group to defensive harm.  Attempts to assign moral 
responsibility to individuals based on their citizenship fail.  That leaves the 
possibility of attributing moral responsibility to individuals based on their own 




What is required to attribute moral responsibility to an individual for a harm?  
Recall that Feinberg argues that an agent is morally responsible for a harm in the 
blameworthy sense if and only if: 
 
1. he was at fault in acting or omitting to act and the faultiness of 
his act or omission consisted, at least in part, in the creation of 
either a certainty or an unreasonable risk of harm (fault 
condition);  
2. his faulty act (or omission) caused the harm (causal condition); 
and 
3. the resultant harm was within the scope of the risk (or certainty) 
in virtue of which the act is properly characterised as faulty.  
(That is the harm risked in (1) must be the same sort of harm as 
actually caused in (2)) (causal relevance condition).165 
 
For example, a drunk driver who obliviously drives through a red light and 
kills a pedestrian crossing the road is morally responsible for that death; while 
driving drunk she created an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians (fault 
condition), her driving drunk actually caused harm to a pedestrian (causal condition) 
and finally the harm she caused – hitting the pedestrian – is one of the harms she 
                                               
164 Note that Feinberg does not claim that children are morally responsible for their racist attitudes.  It 
does not seem to be a view he is likely to hold.  However, by stating that all members of a community 
share moral responsibility for racist attacks because they hold racist attitudes, this view is implied. 
165 Feinberg, 1970, 195-199.   
 112 
risked by driving drunk (causal relevance condition).  Note that the causal relevance 
condition is necessary to rule out counterintuitive results.  For instance suppose the 
pedestrian is suicidal and runs out into the road intending to be hit by the driver and 
the driver could not have stopped even if she had been sober.  The driver was at fault 
in driving drunk (fault condition) and caused the pedestrian’s death (causal 
condition) but it was not because of her drunkenness that the pedestrian was killed 
and therefore the causal relevance condition is not met.  Hence she is not morally 
responsible for the pedestrian’s death.   
As discussed above, I assume that moral responsibility for a harm in 
Feinberg’s sense renders one liable to suffer defensive harm.  I now turn to consider 





Many argue that an action is causal if, in the circumstances, it was necessary 
to the outcome.  In other words, but for this particular action the particular outcome 
would not have arisen.  In law this counterfactual condition is known as the ‘but-for’ 
condition and is the standard test of causality.  In philosophy the counterfactual 
theory of causation owes most to David Lewis.166  On Lewis’ original theory one 
event causes another if they are linked through a chain of events where each link in 
the chain is causally dependent on the one before.  The causal chain from the 
previous example looks something like this: 
 
 
Figure 1.  Causal chain of events for drink driving example. 
 
                                               







Driver fails to 
spot red light 
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The driver’s drinking is a cause of the pedestrian’s death: but for the driver’s 
drinking she wouldn’t have missed the red light; but for her missing the red light she 
wouldn’t have run over the pedestrian; but for her running over the pedestrian he 
wouldn’t have died.167 
Of course the counterfactual test is not the only test of causation available.  
Another well-known test of causation is the ‘NESS’ test – which is in fact the test 
used by Feinberg.168   According to the NESS test an action is a cause of an outcome 
if, in the circumstances, it is a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions sufficient for the outcome (NESS).  The NESS test is also sometimes 
used in the law – especially where the counterfactual test gives counterintuitive 
results. 
It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to adjudicate between these 
two tests of causation.  Therefore in what follows I will make reference to both.  
Before I go on however it will be useful to make one clarification.  Feinberg makes a 
distinction between something’s being a cause (which we might also understand as 
something’s making a causal contribution) and something’s being the cause.  
Whether something is a cause is (more or less) a matter of fact and can be 
determined under the but-for or NESS tests.169  In legal terminology a cause in this 
sense is known as a cause-in-fact.  In the earlier example of the drunk driver the 
driver’s drinking was a cause of the pedestrian’s death.  Likewise the pedestrian’s 
crossing of the road at that particular point in time was a cause of the pedestrian’s 
death.  Both the driver and the pedestrian made causal contributions to the 
pedestrian’s death. 
However, if we are looking for the cause of the pedestrian’s death we would 
not single out the pedestrian’s crossing of the road, we would pick out the driver’s 
drunk driving.  The action typically designated as the cause is one that is ‘especially 
interesting to us, given our various practical purposes and cognitive concerns’.170  
                                               
167 The law uses a simpler counterfactual test - it does not apply the counterfactual test of necessity to 
every link in the causal chain – it merely asks the question: but for the driver driving drunk would the 
pedestrian have died? 
168 Feinberg, 1970, 202.   
169 It is not entirely a matter of fact since the decision to use either the but-for or NESS test is a matter 
of judgment.  Furthermore, others have argued that both tests build in normative criteria.  See Malone, 
1956-7. 
170 Feinberg, 1970, 202. 
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Feinberg is explicit that on his tri-conditional analysis the causal condition refers to a 
cause-in-fact.  In what follows therefore when I discuss an individual’s actions being 
a cause of the harm or, equivalently, making a causal contribution to that harm, I 
mean that the individual’s actions are a cause-in-fact and meet the causal condition 
on Feinberg’s tri-conditional analysis.   
Having now determined how we should identify causal contributions I now 
turn to consider the Island Occupation case. 
There are many different ways in which a citizen might causally contribute to 
the objectionable policies of their state.  Take the Island Occupation case, citizens 
who contribute causally to the occupation include the political and military 
leadership of the state, the individual soldiers who are part of the occupying force, 
the civilians who provide what the occupying forces need to sustain the occupation, 
e.g. weapons, ammunition, uniforms, food etc., journalists and ‘opinion makers’ who 
write in favour of the occupation, everyone who pays tax (since, let’s say, the 
occupation is funded through tax revenues), everyone who expresses xenophobic 
attitudes towards state A and who thus contributes to a climate where opposition to 
the occupation will be slim and, additionally, everyone who exercises their political 
power in favour of the occupation or who fails to exercise it in opposition.  This is 
not meant to be an exhaustive list of the ways in which citizens might causally 
contribute to an objectionable policy; nevertheless it is sufficient to illustrate the 
extent of the average citizen’s potential involvement.  In the Island Occupation case 
it is reasonable to believe that the vast majority of adult citizens will causally 
contribute something to the occupation – through the payment of tax if nothing else.  
However, one might reject the view that the vast majority of adult citizens causally 
contribute to the occupation by invoking the problem of overdetermination.   
On the counterfactual test of causation it is not true to say of any one 
individual citizen that but for their contribution there would be no occupation.  If one 
citizen refused to contribute, e.g. by refusing to serve on the occupation force or by 
refusing to pay tax, the occupation would not come to an end.  Thus, on a 
counterfactual theory of causation, no individuals make necessary contributions to 
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the occupation and hence no individuals are causally responsible for it.171  The NESS 
test faces the same problem in this kind of situation.  This is the problem of 
overdetermination. 
It is easy to see that if we take the problem of overdetermination seriously, 
we end up with absurd conclusions.  For example, say soldier X is one of a hundred 
soldiers involved in a massacre that kills the entire population of a village.  For his 
part soldier X kills ten people.  If he hadn't killed the ten people, one of the other 
ninety nine soldiers would have killed the same ten people since the aim of the 
soldiers was to kill everyone in the village.  It is not true to say of solider X that but-
for his contribution those ten people would not have died.  Therefore, on the 
counterfactual theory of causation we have been employing, he is neither causally 
nor morally responsible for their deaths.  This is clearly absurd.  Moreover, it is not 
only soldier X that can make this claim for it seems that each one of the one hundred 
soldiers could justifiably have said that they made no causal contribution on the same 
grounds.  In which case none of the soldiers are causally or morally responsible for 
any deaths even though an entire village has been massacred.172  Again this 
conclusion is clearly absurd.  I would suggest that these completely counter-intuitive 
conclusions indicate a flaw in the counterfactual theory of causation rather than 
anything more and the problem of overdetermination should not be invoked to deny 
the causal or moral responsibility of those who make causal contributions to an 
overdetermined effect.  
One way around the overdetermination problem would be to employ David 
Lewis’ revised account of causation.  It is far too much to go into all the details here 
but, very roughly, the idea behind Lewis’ revised view is to take into account not just 
whether an even occurs but whether, when and how an event occurs.173  On this 
revised theory any given soldier’s participation is necessary to the occupation 
                                               
171 There may be rare individuals for whom this is not true.  For instance, a dictator may occupy state 
B’s island out of some private grudge such that if that dictator had not ordered the invasion of the 
island the occupation would not have occurred (an alternative government would have no reason to 
invade).  However, in this case the contribution made by everyone else is counterfactually not 
necessary to the outcome and hence –  if we take the problem of overdetermination seriously - no-one 
but the dictator causally contributes to the occupation.  This likewise seems absurd.   
172 See also Thompson, 49. 
173 Lewis, 2000. 
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because if that soldier had not participated, the occupation would not have occurred 
(or be occurring ) exactly as it was (is).174   
Of course even if making a causal contribution is a necessary condition for 
moral responsibility it is obviously not sufficient.  To go back to the example of the 
pedestrian – her crossing of the road at a particular time made a causal contribution 
to her death but she is in no way morally responsible for it.  A further necessary 
condition is that the agent responsible must be at fault and it is this condition I 




Recall that for Feinberg the other two necessary conditions for moral 
responsibility are that the agent: 
 
was at fault in acting or omitting to act and the faultiness of his act or omission 
consisted, at least in part, in the creation of either a certainty or an unreasonable 




the resultant harm was within the scope of the risk (or certainty) in virtue of 
which the act is properly characterised as faulty.  (That is the harm risked in (1) 
must be the same sort of harm as actually caused in (2)) (causal relevance 
condition).175 
 
Therefore for an agent to be morally responsible for a harm the agent must 
have acted/omitted to act in a way that created a certainty or an unreasonable risk of 
that particular type of harm occurring.  Feinberg argues that there are different levels 
of culpability for agents judged to be ‘at fault’ for a harm.  Drawing on the legal 
distinctions made for mens rea he distinguishes between i) intentional wrongdoing – 
                                               
174 Note that Lewis does not suggest using his revised theory to overcome the problem of 
overdetermination.  Lewis argues that our intuitions in overdetermination cases are not reliable and so 
intuitions about such cases should not be used to test theories of causation.  Hence, he never applies 
his revised account to overdetermination cases.  Lewis, 2000, 182.  Note that the problem of 
overdetermination in such cases has led other theorists to argue that making an individual causal 
difference is not necessary for the attribution of moral responsibility for collective wrongdoing to an 
individual.  See especially Kutz, 2000, chp. 4.  
175 Feinberg, 1970, 195-199. 
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which exists ‘if either one acts with a wrongful conscious objective or one 
knowingly produces a forbidden result even incidentally as a kind of side-effect of 
his effort to achieve his objective’; ii) recklessness – which exists where an actor 
knowingly runs an unreasonable risk of producing a forbidden result; and iii) 
negligence – which is the unintentional creation of an unreasonable risk – often by 
failing to pay sufficient attention to what one is doing.176  The extent to which an 
agent is at fault (their degree of culpability) corresponds to whether or not their harm 
has come about through intentional wrongdoing, recklessness or negligence.177  An 
agent who brings about harm intentionally is more at fault than an agent who brings 
about the same harm recklessly who is, in turn, more at fault than an agent who 
brings about this harm negligently.  In the individual case determining whether an 
agent is at fault is relatively straightforward.  In the earlier example the drunk driver 
was at fault because by driving drunk she knowingly created an unreasonable risk of 
harm.  Her action was reckless.   
In the Island Occupation case one is at fault if one intentionally contributes to 
the unjust occupation or is reckless or negligent with respect to the risk one might 
thus contribute.  Here intentionally contributing to the occupation can be understood 
widely as contributing either with the intent to contribute to the unjust occupation or 
contributing simply with the knowledge that one is making a contribution to the 
unjust occupation.   
Further, one can be reckless or negligent if, for example, one does not take 
the trouble to find out where the weapons one is manufacturing are being sent or if 
one does not realise one’s taxes are going towards the occupation.  
In all such cases one will be at fault for one’s actions unless one is excused 
for some reason.  One may be excused on any of the following grounds: 
Mistake: Individuals who contribute to the occupation might genuinely 
believe that the occupation is just.  Exposure to propaganda or outright lies from the 
government might make this likely.  Of course, individuals have a duty to do what 
they can to find out the truth but this is often harder than it seems especially if their 
                                               
176 Feinberg, 1970, 193-4. 
177 It is worth mentioning that agents may act intentionally, recklessly or negligently but still be 
excused moral responsibility on the grounds that they were coerced, deceived or suffering some kind 
of mental impairment such that their action was not free, voluntary or informed.   
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state controls communications.  Lack of education may also prevent people from 
working out what’s really going on.  If an individual has made a decent effort to 
establish the facts of the matter and nevertheless truly believes that the occupation is 
just then they have the excuse of mistake. 
Duress:  Another excuse is that of coercion or duress.  Soldiers and civilians 
alike might be conscripted to take part in the occupation and imprisoned or even 
executed if they refuse.  Similarly, tax payments are usually coerced under threat of 
legal penalty.  The excuse of duress is usually only granted if the threat is more than 
a reasonable person would be expected to withstand in the circumstances.  If one 
considers the threat of imprisonment for non-payment of tax more than a reasonable 
person could expect to withstand then no individual can be morally responsible for 
contributing to the occupation solely on the grounds that she is a taxpayer. 
Lack of capacity: Young children, for example, are not full moral agents and, 
even if they do play a small part in assisting the occupation they are not morally 
responsible for it. 
Whether these excusing conditions actually apply will vary from case to case 
and will obviously depend on the type of state being targeted.  An authoritarian state 
or a state with high levels of poverty and illiteracy is more likely to be willing and 
able to deceive and coerce its citizens than a rich, highly educated, democratic state.  
Thus we can expect more citizens to be excused in the former case than the latter. 
Finally, there is the possibility that one might offer a lesser evil justification 
(rather than an excuse) for one’s conduct.  I discuss the lesser evil justification in 
chapter seven but this justification for contributing to the occupation basically takes 
the form that the contribution was necessary to avert some greater evil.  For example, 
one might admit that one took overall responsibility for co-ordinating procurement 
for the occupation forces but claim that one did this job deliberately badly in order to 
undermine the occupation (though not badly enough to be replaced).178  Thus, 
although one contributed to the occupation one also acted to undermine it at the same 
time.  Similarly, one could admit that one paid taxes one knew supported the 
occupation but claim this was necessary to allow one to remain free and carry out 
                                               
178 For this suggestion see Raikka, 1997. 
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political protest.  In some instances it is possible that the lesser evil justification will 
hold.  
So, to conclude, the vast majority of adult citizens will causally contribute to 
the occupation; however, the above analysis shows that many will not be at fault – 
they will have an excuse or, in rare circumstances, a lesser evil justification.  Thus 
there will be many citizens in a target state who are innocent.  On the other hand 
there will of course be many individuals who both make a causal contribution and 
are at fault for their contribution.  Thus they are morally responsible for contributing 
to the harm of the occupation.  This will include every individual who is capable of 
moral agency and who causally contributes to the unjust occupation without an 
excuse or lesser evil justification – even if their causal contributions are very small 
(e.g. they contribute by voting/paying tax).   
Before I finish, however, there is one more point to consider.  Some might 
concede that these individuals are morally responsible for contributing to the 
occupation but object that the causal contributions they make are too small to render 
them liable to suffer serious defensive harms.  Proponents of this view argue that 
liability to defensive harm requires not just any causal contribution but a causal 
contribution that passes some threshold of significance.   
As Cécile Fabre argues: 
 
To the extent that the collective venture in which they are direct 
participants is wrongful…, their own individual contribution to it is 
wrongful….However, it does not follow that they are liable to being 
killed.  To claim otherwise implies that the costs which people are 
liable to suffering for their actions are determined solely by the 
significance of their individual contributions when considered 
collectively…[but] liability derives from what they do as individuals 
and not from their membership in a group engaged in war…[one] 
cannot regard mere wrongful participation in a wrongful venture as a 
sufficient condition for liability to direct attack.  Rather, a contribution 
must, on its own individual terms, meet a threshold of causal 
significance in order for its author to be liable.  Tightening screws on 
tank engines, testing the sweat-absorbing capacities of the clothes 
which soldiers will wear in the desert…do not…pass the threshold.  
Nor, for that matter, does designing a tiny piece of equipment which 
goes into a gun…By contrast, taking overall responsibility for 
negotiating and drafting sales contracts between one’s factory and the 
army might; so might driving a truckload of munitions or protective 
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clothing to an armoury division, and so on…[Individuals] who make 
very small, marginal contributions are not liable to being killed, 
although they might be liable to incurring lesser harms.179 
 
Here Fabre is making her point in the context of war rather than economic 
sanctions.  Nevertheless, the point translates to the context of economic sanctions: 
perhaps individuals who make causal contributions that fall below some threshold 
are not liable to suffer the severe harms inflicted by comprehensive sanctions but are 
liable to suffer the less severe harms inflicted by partial sanctions (e.g. sanctions that 
target particular commodities rather than all trade) or perhaps, if those individuals are 
to be subject to targeted sanctions, those targeted sanctions should be of a milder 
variety.  In what follows I consider Fabre’s argument and how it might apply to the 
case of economic sanctions.   
First, it is worth pointing out that as a matter of fact, we do often talk of one 
individual making a greater contribution to something than another – even where 
both contributions were necessary to the end effect.  This way of understanding 
causation is highly intuitive. Let us accept for the sake of argument that it makes 
sense to talk of there being degrees of causation in this way.180  Given that, is Fabre 
right to claim that those who make causal contributions which fall below some 
threshold are not liable to suffer lethal defensive harms but only, perhaps, lesser 
defensive harms?   
One way of understanding Fabre’s claim is to understand it a manifestation of 
the proportionality condition for self-defence.  The proportionality condition requires 
that the harm caused by your defensive action must be proportionate to the benefits 
achieved by it.  In the case of a soldier in a war the proportionality condition is easy 
to meet: one soldier kills another to save his own life.  In the case of a civilian whose 
goal is to assist soldiers in their killing - but who does not take part in any killing 
themselves – things are more tricky.     
Let us take Fabre’s case of the sweat testers, what is the amount of harm to be 
averted in the case of the sweat-testers?  One might think that the harm to be averted 
is the harm of an unjust war and all the death and destruction that necessarily entails.  
                                               
179 Fabre, 61. 
180 For arguments that it makes sense to talk of degrees of causation in this way see Braham and van 
Hees, 71 and Lewis, 2000, 97.  For an alternative view see Zimmerman, 1985a. 
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Or that the harm to be averted is all the additional killing that the soldier wearing the 
sweat-tested uniform does that he would not do if he had a less effective uniform.  If 
so then killing the sweat-tester would be proportionate.  However, the sweat-tester 
considered as an individual doesn’t threaten these additional deaths – it is the 
collective of which she is part that threatens this harm.  Thus Fabre makes the point 
that thinking the killing of the sweat-tester is morally permissible ‘implies that the 
costs which people are liable to suffering for their actions are determined solely by 
the significance of their individual contributions when considered collectively…[but] 
liability derives from what they do as individuals and not from their membership in a 
group engaged in war.’181  Is she right to think this though?  I am not sure that she is.   
Let us borrow an example from Derek Parfit.182  Imagine a thousand torturers 
have a thousand victims.  Each of the thousand torturers presses a button which turns 
a switch one thousandth of a degree which inflicts an imperceptible amount of pain 
on each victim.  Then each torturer move onto the next victim.  Each torturer presses 
a thousand different buttons such that by the time the torturers have finished their 
work every victim is in agony since every victim’s switch has, by that time, been 
turned up to its maximum.  It is true to say that every single torturer inflicts only an 
imperceptible amount of pain on each victim; yet a thousand victims are horribly 
tortured because of the way the torturers act collectively.  Assume that all the 
torturers are well aware of how each other acts, all take part voluntarily with the 
intent to cause terrible suffering and so on. 
Now imagine one victim has the chance to escape but in order for her to do so 
it is necessary to kill one of the torturers; may she do so?  Intuitively, it seems certain 
that she may.  If this is so then this must be because the liability of the torturer to 
defensive harms derives from the harm that the torturer’s group inflicts as a 
collective.  Fabre, however, denies that the liability to suffer defensive harms can 
derive from the harms that one’s group inflicts as a collective and therefore must 
deny that the victim may kill the torturer.  However, this claim is wildly counter-
intuitive and give us reason to reject Fabre’s argument. 
Of course it could be objected that my argument has equally counter-intuitive 
implications.  It would seem to suggest that the tax-payers, for example, are liable to 
                                               
181 Fabre, 25. 
182 Parfit, 80. 
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suffer lethal defensive harms if they contribute to the collective unjust occupation.  
However, this conclusion does not necessarily follow.  First, tax payers would only 
be morally responsible (as opposed to merely causally responsible) if they were also 
at fault in their payment of tax.  They must pay their tax voluntarily and in the full 
knowledge that it is contributing to the unjust occupation which they must also know 
is unjust and, further, they must have no lesser evil justification for doing so.   If 
those conditions are met then, yes, tax payers are liable to suffer lethal defensive 
harms if and when it is necessary to kill them.  
Having said all of that; although there will be many guilty individuals in any 
target state, there will be many innocent individuals too.  Children, those individuals 
who do not contribute in any way to the unjust occupation, those individuals who 
contribute but are excused on the grounds of duress, mistake or impaired capacity 
and finally, those individuals with a lesser evil justification.   
 
3. Justifying Economic Sanctions on the Grounds of Self- or Other-
Defence 
 
From the above discussion we can conclude that economic sanctions are justified on 
the grounds of other defence if the following necessary conditions are met: 
 
The Unjust Attack Condition:  The initial attack on the rights of 
individuals by the target is unjust.   
 
The Necessity Condition: The economic sanctions are reasonably 
believed to be necessary.  In other words it is reasonable to believe 
that there is no other, less harmful, way for the sender to defend the 
rights of the attacked individuals.   
 
The Proportionality Condition: The harm caused by the economic 
sanctions is proportionate to the good to be achieved, i.e. is 
proportionate to the good of restoring the threatened rights.  As 
discussed earlier, the moral asymmetry between aggressor and victim 
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means that the proportionality requirement does not demand perfect 
equivalence.  The harms inflicted by the sender may slightly exceed 
the value of the rights being defended.   
 
The Liability Condition: The defensive harm must be targeted only at 
those liable to suffer the defensive harm.  In other words, the harms 
inflicted in cases of self-defence are only permissible if they are 
targeted at those who bear some moral responsibility for the unjust 
attack on the rights of individuals. 
 
Given this, what type of economic sanctions might it be morally permissible 
to use in other-defence and in what circumstances?  Let us first consider collective 
economic sanctions before moving onto targeted economic sanctions.   
As discussed in chapter one, collective sanctions can operate via an indirect 
or direct mechanism.  Indirect collective sanctions, recall, aim to pressure citizens of 
the target state into forcing their government to change the objectionable policy.  
Such sanctions attach costs to any continued support of or acquiescence to the target 
government’s objectionable policy.  Thus every citizen affected by the sanctions is 
forced to reassess their position on the matter: on balance do the net benefits of 
continuing to support/acquiesce to the objectionable policy outweigh the net benefits 
of withdrawing their support or actively protesting against it?  The sender of the 
sanctions hopes the answer to this question is ‘no’ and that so many people will 
protest that the government will be forced to change its policy to avoid the risk of 
losing power.  In the case of direct collective sanctions the aim of the sanctions is to 
inflict harms on the military and/or leadership by destroying the economy to such an 
extent that military projects become unfeasible.  Unfortunately for citizens of the 
target state – some of whom will be innocent – the target government will tend to 
allocate dwindling resources as a matter of priority towards itself and its military 
projects.  Therefore innocent people will suffer the (possibly severe) effects of 
shortages long before the target government does.   
In the case of both direct and indirect collective sanctions the defensive 
harms fall on all citizens and, as I argued above, some of these citizens will be 
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morally innocent, i.e. not liable to suffer these defensive harms.  Therefore, prima 
facie, it would appear that the liability condition is not met for these types of 
sanctions. 
However, that conclusion would be too quick.  It is true that in cases of 
collective sanctions innocent people are harmed, just as innocent people are harmed 
in war.  However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between intentionally 
harming innocent people as a means of changing objectionable policies and harming 
innocent people as an unintended but foreseeable side-effect of changing 
objectionable policies.  It is only in the former case that the liability condition is not 
met.  This distinction can be drawn, as it is for the case of war, by invoking the 
doctrine of double effect.   
The doctrine of double effect acknowledges that one action (e.g. collective 
sanctioning) can have two effects – the intended effect (in our case this is changing 
the objectionable policy) and a foreseen but unintended side effect (in our case this is 
harming innocent people).  According to the doctrine of double effect it is morally 
permissible to bring about a harmful side effect as a foreseen but unintended 
consequence of intentionally pursuing some good end so long as the harm of the side 
effect is not disproportionate to the intended good end.  Hence harming innocent 
individuals might be permissible if it is a foreseen but unintended consequence of 
pursuing the good end of changing the objectionable policy (which is presumably a 
wrongful policy) – so long as the harms inflicted are proportionate to the goods to be 
achieved from ending the objectionable policy.  
In order to ascertain whether the doctrine of double effect can justify 
collective economic sanctions, we first need to ascertain whether the harms falling on 
innocent people is intended by the senders or whether it is merely a foreseen but 
unintended side-effect.   
Following Warren Quinn I will say that intended harms are harms which 
‘come to the victims, at least in part, from the agent’s deliberately involving them in 
something in order to further his purpose precisely by way of their being so 
involved.’183  Thus, in order to work out who the harms of sanctions are intended for, 
we need to consider the mechanism by which sanctions work. 
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Indirect collective economic sanctions work by coercing those individuals 
who support or at least acquiesce to the objectionable policy into withdrawing their 
support for the policy or actively protesting against it.  Since this is how sanctions 
are expected to ‘further the purposes’ of the sender we should say that the intended 
targets of the sanctions are those individuals who support or at least acquiesce to the 
objectionable policy and who have the capacity to change their views on this and act 
accordingly, i.e. withdraw their support/protest.  Certainly, applying the 
counterfactual test of intention, if the sanctions did not harm any of these individuals 
there would be no point in imposing them.184  Since, as I argued earlier, some of 
these people will be innocent, indirect sanctions are intended to harm innocent 
people. 
What about individuals within the target state who oppose the objectionable 
policy?  Are they intended targets too?  Undeniably, opposition groups often suffer 
during a period of collective sanctioning; in fact, it is a frequent criticism of 
collective sanctions that they can backfire by depriving opposition groups of the 
resources they need for effective campaigning.  However, sanctions are not intended 
to harm opposition groups – harming opposition groups does not further the purposes 
of the sender.  The harms falling on oppositions groups are foreseeable side-effects. 
What about individuals who are not in a position to influence the target 
government at all: young children and the very ill?  Are collective sanctions intended 
to harm them?  There is no doubt that harming young children and the very ill will 
further the purposes of the sender. Although young children and the very ill are 
unable to exercise political power, harming the children and sick relatives of those 
who support/acquiesce to government policy and who are capable of exerting 
political influence would put significant pressure on them.  Worries about whether 
you can continue to afford your child’s education or your sick relative’s medical 
treatment might consume you much more than concerns about your own economic 
well-being.  Applying the counterfactual test again, if the sender would not impose 
sanctions but for the fact that the children and very ill people would be harmed by 
them, then the harm in such a case is inflicted intentionally and cannot be justified by 
the doctrine of double effect. 
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To summarise so far, the intended targets of indirect collective economic 
sanctions are those who support or at least acquiesce to the objectionable policy and, 
in some cases, their children and sick relatives.  Thus the doctrine of double effect 
cannot justify the harms which indirect collective sanctions inflict on innocent 
people.  To be sure, some innocents are harmed as a foreseeable side-effect but 
others are clearly intended targets.  Thus, indirect collective sanctions, by their very 
nature, can never be justified on the grounds of self-defence or the defence of others 
– in any circumstances.  The liability condition is not met.  What of direct collective 
sanctions? 
The objective of direct collective sanctions, recall, is to inflict harms on the 
military and/or leadership by destroying the economy to such an extent that military 
projects become unfeasible.  Unfortunately for citizens of the target state – some of 
whom will be innocent – the target government will tend to allocate dwindling 
resources as a matter of priority towards itself and its military projects.   
However, none of this entails that the innocent people living within the target 
state are the intended targets of direct collective sanctions.  Rather, it is the 
leadership and military who are the intended targets.  If for some reason the innocent 
citizens of the target state were unharmed by the sanctions – perhaps, say, the target 
government recognised a duty of care towards its citizens and did not actually 
redistribute resources away from them – the sender would still impose the sanctions.  
Indeed it would be better for the sender if the target did not redistribute resources 
away from innocent citizens as the sanctions would reduce the target’s military 
capacity at a faster rate.  Hence the harms falling on innocent citizens from direct 
collective sanctions are a foreseeable but unintended side effect.  Of course this does 
not mean that the harms are permissible under the doctrine of double effect since the 
doctrine of double effect further requires that the harms of direct sanctions are not 
disproportionate to the goods we expect to achieve.  Direct collective sanctions, in 
the memorable words of Joy Gordon, are like a ‘siege write large’; they have to work 
their way through the general population before they can harm their targets: the 
military and/or leadership.185  Given this, direct collective sanctions are likely to be 
disproportionate.  However, there may be rare instances in which the harms are not 
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disproportionate and in these rare instances it would appear that the doctrine of 
double effect is satisfied. 
Understandably, just war theorists such as Michael Walzer are uneasy about 
such a conclusion.  Writing in the context of war, Walzer argues that it cannot be 
sufficient for moral permissibility that civilians are not the intended targets of attack 
– even with a proportionality constraint.  In war soldiers rarely intend to harm 
civilians since there is rarely anything to gain by it – civilians are no threat to them.  
The risk in war is that soldiers aim at enemy soldiers with no consideration of how 
many nearby civilians are thereby harmed.  Thus Walzer argues that the doctrine of 
double effect needs to be corrected for the context of war.  Walzer notes that the 
standard doctrine of double effects assumes that the good and evil effects flow from 
the same intention – the intention to harm the enemy.  He argues the doctrine of 
double effect needs to be revised to take into account a double intention – the 
intention to harm the enemy soldiers and the intention to reduce foreseeable civilian 
casualties as much as possible.  For Walzer if harm to civilians is to be permissible 
under the doctrine of double effect then those inflicting the harm must act with this 
double intention: the intention to inflict harm on the enemy and the intention to 
reduce foreseeable civilian casualties as much as possible.186  
Walzer then goes onto discuss the status of blockades during war.  Since the 
case of blockades is so similar to the case of direct collective sanctions it is worth 
considering what he has to say in some detail.  Here Walzer is referring to the British 
blockade of Germany during the First World War which, it is claimed by the British, 
was aimed at reducing Germany’s military capacity by destroying its economy and 
denying it crucial resources.  Historians estimate that the blockade cost the lives of 
half a million German civilians; though none died of starvation, mass malnutrition 
reduced their ability to fight diseases such as typhus and influenza.187  Walzer 
argues: 
 
When the British took aim at the enemy army…they were aiming 
through the civilian population…It may be that the British did not 
intend to kill them; killing them wasn’t…a means to the end set by the 
Cabinet.  But if the success of the British strategy did not depend upon 
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civilian deaths, it nevertheless required that nothing at all be done to 
avoid those deaths.  Civilians had to be hit before soldiers could be hit, 
and this kind of attack is morally unacceptable.  A soldier must take 
careful aim at his military target and away from non-military targets… 
He can risk incidental deaths, but he cannot kill civilians simply 
because he finds them between himself and his enemies.188  
 
Here Walzer clearly lays out the mechanism by which direct economic 
sanctions work: ‘civilians had to be hit before soldiers could be hit’.  This is 
unacceptable on his corrected doctrine of double effect since, although there is the 
intention to inflict harm on the enemy army, there is no intention to reduce civilian 
suffering as much as possible. 
Interestingly, Walzer does allow one exception where blockades might be 
permissible.  This is where the blockading state ensures that the civilians are well 
provisioned for so that they do not suffer.  Such a blockade would be consistent with 
the intention to reduce civilian suffering as much as possible.  This entails that direct 
economic sanctions might be permissible if something were done to ease civilian 
suffering such as a genuine attempt to provide humanitarian aid.  Of course if it was 
clear in a particular case that the humanitarian aid was failing to provide adequately 
for the civilians then the corrected doctrine would no longer permit the sanctions and 
they would have to be withdrawn.  This would be the case even if the humanitarian 
aid were diverted by the target government by its own purposes.  As argued in 
chapter three, target measures like these are not sufficient to shift the blame for 
civilian suffering from the sender to the target.   
To summarise then, collective sanctions cannot meet the liability condition 
except in rare instances of direct sanctions where humanitarian aid is supplied and is 
effective in reducing the suffering of innocent people.   
Targeted sanctions – at least when they are aimed correctly, i.e. when they 
correctly identify those who are morally responsible for the objectionable policy – 
will meet the liability condition.  They are also much less harmful and affect many 
fewer individuals and thus are much more likely than collective sanctions to satisfy 
the proportionality condition.  Whether they meet the necessity condition will 
obviously depend on the circumstances.  Again, less harmful means must either have 
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been attempted and failed or be expected to fail if attempted for the necessity 
condition to be met.  In any case targeted economic sanctions are far more likely to 
be justified on the grounds of other-defence than are collective economic sanctions. 
Finally, it should be noted that economic sanctions designed to prevent a 
future but non-imminent threat from being realised may (so long as the four 
conditions are met) be justified on the grounds of other-defence.  As I argued in 





Economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds of other-defence when 
the following necessary conditions are met: the unjust attack condition, the necessity 
condition, the proportionality condition and the liability condition.   
Indirect collective sanctions, by their very nature, cannot ever be morally 
justified on the grounds of other-defence as they cannot ever satisfy the liability 
condition.  Direct collective sanctions will satisfy the liability condition in those 
(probably rare) cases where the innocent members of the population are successfully 
provided for.  In such instances direct collective sanctions will be justified on the 
grounds of other-defence if the other necessary conditions are met.    
Targeted sanctions, by contrast, will more easily be able to meet the 
necessary conditions for justified other-defence.  Whether they in fact do in 
particular circumstances would require an analysis of those particular circumstances.  
I now turn to consider another context in which the right to other-defence is relevant; 
that of humanitarian intervention. 
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Chapter 6: Economic Sanctions and Humanitarian Intervention 
 
There is considerable debate about the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention: when, if ever, is it morally permissible (or required) to intervene in 
another state to end human rights violations perpetrated by a government against its 
own citizens?  To date the debate has focussed almost exclusively on military 
intervention and the use of other means of intervention – such as economic sanctions 
– has largely been neglected.  This is despite the fact that economic sanctions are 
actually used much more frequently than military force in cases of humanitarian 
intervention.  In this chapter, then, I consider the legitimacy of using economic 
sanctions in cases of humanitarian intervention. 
I should start by explaining exactly what I mean by ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ since a sizeable minority of theorists would not accept that economic 
sanctions are a form of intervention at all.  Some theorists, for example, define 
‘intervention’ as necessarily involving the use or threat of force.  One widely cited 
definition is that of Percy H. Winfield who stipulates that intervention ‘occurs where 
one state interferes by force or threat of force in the affairs of another state’.189  
Obviously, under this definition, economic sanctions cannot be a means of 
intervention – humanitarian or otherwise.  More commonly, ‘intervention’ is defined 
more broadly as some type of ‘coercive interference’.  For example, Simon Caney, 
drawing on Hedley Bull, defines intervention as ‘coercive action by an outside party 
or parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an 
independent community’.190  Now it seems that definitions like Caney’s can 
encompass at least some types of economic sanctions: basically, the coercive ones.  
Caney himself explicitly allows that coercive economic sanctions are a type of 
intervention.191  However, this definition would exclude economic sanctions 
applying pressure falling short of coercion. 
I will adopt a wider definition of intervention.  For my purposes intervention 
is: 
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Any action undertaken by an external party or parties to influence the 
internal affairs of another state. 
 
Humanitarian intervention is: 
 
Any action undertaken by an external party or parties to influence the 
internal affairs of another state in order to reduce or end human rights 
violations occurring in that state. 
   
Obviously, coercive economic sanctions are interventionary on this 
definition.  Additionally, however, economic sanctions which aim to improve the 
human rights situation in a state by applying pressure falling short of coercion are a 
means of humanitarian intervention.  Further, direct sanctions such as arms 
embargoes or bans on ‘items intended for internal repression’ aimed at improving the 
human rights situation would qualify as a means of humanitarian intervention.  One 
clear example of what I would consider to be economic sanctions as humanitarian 
intervention would be the sanctions imposed on Apartheid-era South Africa which 
are widely considered to have played a major role in bringing down that system.192   
Again, my definition of humanitarian intervention is wider than most offered 
in the literature, but it has the considerable advantage of allowing us to consider 
which means of attempting to influence a state’s internal policies are morally 
permissible and which are not.  A narrow definition does not allow this so easily.  
Indeed, Charles Beitz views attempts to formulate narrow definitions of intervention 
with suspicion, arguing that theorists adopting narrow definitions tend to start with 
the assumption that intervention is always wrong and then work backwards to define 
intervention in a way that supports this assumption.  As he puts it ‘the controversy 
about the definition of intervention masks a question of substantive political ethics – 
what forms of influence in a state’s internal affairs are impermissible, and why?’193  
Clearly, since my focus is on a particular form of influence – economic sanctions (in 
all their variety) – this is the question I need to address and therefore I need a 
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definition of ‘intervention’ that allows me to do this.  Having established a definition 
of humanitarian intervention, I now turn to consider its moral permissibility. 
The argument of this chapter proceeds as follows.  In the first section I set out 
a positive argument for the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention using 
economic sanctions.  In the second section I consider the most prominent argument 
against humanitarian intervention: Walzer’s argument for a state’s right to self-
determination.  Walzer makes his argument in the context of military intervention so 
I endeavour to show how it may be transferred to the case of economic sanctions.  I 
then argue first, that Walzer’s argument – even if it were sound - only rules out 
coercive economic sanctions; and second, that Walzer’s argument is not sound.  
Thus, it fails to rule out the use of economic sanctions as a means of humanitarian 
intervention.  In the third section I consider the prominent rule-consequentialist 
arguments against humanitarian intervention.  First the argument that a rule 
permitting humanitarian intervention would be abused and so a rule prohibiting 
intervention would have the best consequences.  Second the argument that 
humanitarian interventions often fail to achieve their goals.  Thus, again, a rule 
prohibiting intervention would have the best consequences.  I show that even if these 
arguments are sound in the context of military intervention they apply quite 
differently to the context of economic sanctions.  Thus, they fail to rule out the use of 
economic sanctions as humanitarian intervention. 
It is true that there are more arguments against humanitarian intervention than 
the three that appear in this chapter.  However, I cannot hope to cover them all here.  
I believe the three arguments I have presented to be the most prominent arguments 
against humanitarian intervention in the literature and in public discourse and I hope 
that by showing they do not hold for the case of economic sanctions, my positive 
case of the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention by means of economic 
sanctions is thereby strengthened.   
 
The Case for Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Those who favour humanitarian intervention argue either for the strong claim 
that there is a duty to intervene or for the weaker claim that there is a right to 
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intervene.  In this chapter I argue for the weaker claim (though without denying the 
stronger claim).   
As David Rodin correctly points out, the right to humanitarian intervention 
can be derived quite simply from the right to national defence that I set out in chapter 
five.   For Rodin, of course, this is a reason to reject this particular understanding of 
the right to national defence but, as I argued in chapter five, this is a mistake.  So to 
recap, I argued in chapter five that states hold the right to national-defence because 
they have the right to defend the rights of their citizens to life, bodily integrity and so 
on.  Rodin argued that if this is true we can easily derive a right to humanitarian 
intervention as follows: 
 
1. If state A has a right to defend the rights of A-citizens from state B’s 
unjust attack then state C also has a right to defend the rights of A-
citizens from state B’s unjust attack.  
2. If state C has a right to defend the rights of A-citizens when they are 
being unjustly attacked by state B, state C has a right to defend the 
rights of A-citizens when they are being unjustly attacked by state A 
itself.  In other words state C has a right to humanitarian intervention 
in state A. 
 
In other words states – or more broadly any senders – have a right to 
humanitarian intervention because any sender has the right to protect the rights of 
any citizen.194 
I now turn to consider some objections.  Although there are many well-
known objections to humanitarian intervention they are almost exclusively aimed at 
military intervention.  In what follows therefore I examine how, if at all, these 
objections might apply to humanitarian intervention using economic sanctions.  The 
first objection that I consider is Walzer’s objection from the right to self-
determination.  A political community’s right to self-determination, according to 
Walzer, entails that states have a right to non-intervention that rules out humanitarian 
intervention in all but the most egregious cases of human rights violations.  I then 
turn to consider rule-consequentialist arguments against humanitarian intervention 
that appeal to the negative consequences of institutionalising a practice of 
humanitarian intervention. 
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Walzer’s Objection from the Right to Self-Determination  
 
Michael Walzer argues that states have a right to non-intervention even when 
they commit human rights violations because the political community underlying the 
state has the right to self-determination. 
The right to self-determination in Walzer’s sense is best understood as the 
right of a political community to work out by themselves under which political 
institutions they will live without the help or hindrance of outsiders.  It is a right to a 
process whereby political institutions are created, maintained or destroyed under the 
influence of only internal social, political or military forces.   
Walzer offers two main supporting arguments for the right to self-
determination.  The first draws heavily on J.S Mill’s argument that intervention 
aimed at creating free institutions simply does not work.  As Mill puts it ‘if [the 
people] have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic 
oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by hands other than their own, will 
have nothing real, nothing permanent’.195  Further Mill argues that the ‘love of 
liberty’ that would be needed to sustain popular institutions has the best chance of 
developing ‘during an arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts’.196  
Therefore, if we value the freedom of political communities we should not intervene; 
rather the best thing to do is to allow political communities to fight for their own 
freedom.  The right to self-determination follows.197   
Walzer’s second argument has become known as his ‘communal integrity 
thesis’.  According to this thesis the political community’s right to self-determination 
derives from the rights of individuals to ‘live as members of a historic community 
and express their inherited culture through political forms worked out amongst 
themselves’.198  The right to self-determination protects this process of working out 
culturally-relevant political forms though it has no implications for its end result.  
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Even an authoritarian regime, Walzer argues, might ‘come, as it were, naturally, 
reflecting a widely shared world view or way of life’ and the political community 
living under this authoritarian regime would be self-determining on Walzer’s 
account.199   
Of course Walzer realises that it is not the case that all presently existing 
political communities have political institutions which allow them to ‘express their 
inherited culture’.  Not all authoritarian regimes, to say the least, reflect the widely 
shared world-view of their citizens.  As Walzer puts it, not all governments ‘fit’ their 
political communities.  In such cases one would expect that the communal integrity 
thesis would not support a state’s right to non-intervention.  Nevertheless Walzer 
argues there is always a ‘morally necessary presumption’ that there is a ‘fit’ between 
government and political community and therefore that all states have the right to 
non-intervention.  The presumption is morally necessary, Walzer argues, because 
foreigners lack the detailed understanding of the inner workings of other political 
communities and are not in a position to accurately judge the ‘fit’ between 
government and political community.  Thus far Walzer’s argument allows a right of 
non-intervention for every state.  However, he does allow for three exceptions where 
the right to non-intervention does not hold.   
First, where there is more than one political community within a state and one 
political community is involved in a struggle for secession.  Second, where a foreign 
power has already intervened in a state’s civil war, counter-intervention to aid the 
other side is permissible – so long as it only balances out the initial foreign 
intervention.  Walzer, again following Mill, argues that in both cases the intervention 
does not undermine the self-determination of the relevant political communities but 
rather supports it.  In the first case the seceding political community is not self-
determining but under the rule of a ‘foreign power’ and the intervention seeks to 
remove that foreign power.  In the second case counter-intervention which only 
balances out the original intervention allows the fate of the civil war to turn on the 
internal balance of forces and so the war’s outcome will be the result of a process of 
self-determination.200  
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Walzer’s third exception permits humanitarian intervention carried out in 
response to human rights violations so severe they ‘shock the conscience of 
mankind: massacre, enslavement and the mass expulsion of people from a 
territory’.201  Walzer offers two explanations for this.  First, the lack of ‘fit’ between 
the government and people in such circumstances is so ‘radically apparent’ that even 
foreigners can see it; the ‘presumption of fit’ can be rebutted and the state no longer 
has a right of non-intervention.  Second, it is likely that where such human rights 
violations occur the political community has been destroyed.  Therefore, there is no 
political community with respect to which the right of self-determination can be said 
to apply.202 
Walzer of course worked out his argument in the context of military 
intervention so before I can consider it further it is necessary to first work out how, if 
at all, his argument would apply to the case of economic sanctions.  Walzer does not 
address this issue directly except for in one short footnote where he writes: 
 
I was concerned in Just and Unjust Wars only with military 
intervention, but the arguments I constructed do rule out any external 
determination of domestic constitutional arrangements…I don’t, 
however, mean to rule out every effort by one state to influence 
another or every use of diplomatic and economic pressure.  Drawing a 
line is sure to be difficult, but the precise location of the line is not at 
issue here, for all my critics…are ready for ‘the actual use of 
violence’ in other people’s countries.203 
 
Since Walzer sets aside any ‘line-drawing’, it will be necessary to make my 
own attempt.  The line to be drawn here, as far as I understand it from Walzer’s 
footnote, is between economic sanctions which exert sufficient pressure to count as 
effectively ‘determining’ domestic constitutional arrangements and those which do 
not; between economic sanctions that effectively make a people’s decisions for them 
and those which leave them the space to make their own decisions.  One way to draw 
the line would be to consider the domestic analogy.  Individuals come under all sorts 
of pressures to make certain choices in their daily lives but we still recognise the 
difference between autonomous and forced choices.  It is when pressure becomes 
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coercive that an individual’s autonomy is undermined and their choices are forced.  
Similarly one could argue that it is when economic sanctions are coercive that they 
violate Walzer’s right to self-determination.  Drawing the line on the basis of 
coercion seems to fit Walzer’s theory.   
However, it does not settle the matter to say that Walzer’s self-determination 
objection applies to economic sanctions that are coercive since we need to know 
when economic sanctions are coercive.  I argued for a theory of coercion in chapter 
two but it will be useful to recap it very briefly here. 
The paradigm case of coercion is the highwayman’s threat ‘your money or 
your life!’  Threats like this are instances of coercion because they leave their victim 
with no acceptable alternative but to do what the coercer wants them to do.  On my 
understanding of ‘no acceptable alternative’ this is a subjective consideration – it is 
whether or not the victim considers the alternative of non-compliance acceptable that 
is important.  When applying this theory of coercion to economic sanctions it is 
important to realise that the various types of economic sanctions cannot simply be 
categorised as ‘coercive’ or ‘non-coercive’ in isolation.  Rather they will be 
‘coercive’ or not only relative to a given context.  The two important features in any 
context will be: first, what the alternative to compliance is and second, whether the 
target perceives that alternative as unacceptable or not.  Consequently therefore, it is 
not possible to state that some types of economic sanction are always coercive and 
others never are.  It will always depend on the context in which they are applied.   
Of course, direct economic sanctions that straightforwardly compel a target 
government to cease violating human rights, (e.g. an arms embargo) would also fall 
on the ‘determining’ side of the line.  Such measures would also be ruled out by 
Walzer’s argument. 
So to summarise, Walzer’s argument for the right to self-determination does 
rule out the use of economic sanctions in instances where they would coerce or 
compel – at least where the human rights violations fall short of ‘shocking the 
conscience of mankind’.  But is Walzer’s argument sound? 
 138 
Walzer’s argument has encountered a battery of criticism since it was first 
published and continues to be seriously debated.204  In what follows I consider his 
two arguments in turn: first the Millian argument and then the communal integrity 
thesis. 
First, the crucial premise in the Millian argument – that free institutions will 
only last if the political culture already exists to support them – is purely an 
empirical conjecture and one for which neither Mill nor Walzer offers any evidence.  
Though it seems fairly plausible, it is likewise fairly plausible that the establishment 
of free institutions might create a political culture that could support them over the 
long term.205  If the latter were true then Mill’s argument would in fact support 
intervention rather than non-intervention.  In the absence of empirical evidence 
Mill’s non-interventionist conclusion is not well supported.  
Second, one must consider the scope of a Millian right to self-determination.  
Walzer intends his argument for the right to self-determination to rule out all 
intervention with only his three exceptions noted above.  Mill’s argument however 
only rules out intervention aimed at creating free institutions, it does not rule out 
intervention with any other objective.  It does not rule out, for example, intervention 
to ensure people’s basic material needs are met.  It thus fails to support a generalised 
non-intervention principle.206  As Charles Beitz points out however, the scope of the 
Millian argument could be widened, and thus saved as an account of a generalised 
non-intervention principle, by recasting the Millian argument in terms of social 
justice rather than free institutions.  On this version of the argument, the crucial 
Millian premise would be restated to say that institutions for the promotion of social 
justice will only persist if the political culture already exists to support them.  Beitz’s 
point here though is that the restated premise also relies on an empirical conjecture, 
one for which even more evidence would be required.207  I would add that the 
problem here is even more serious than Beitz realises.  Mill’s argument, even if it is 
recast in Beitz’s terms, addresses intervention aimed at establishing or significantly 
altering political institutions as a whole.   It does not rule out intervention aimed at 
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changing one policy, law or decision.  Thus, even if all the empirical evidence could 
be supplied for the premise, Mill’s argument would still fail to support the 
generalised principle of non-intervention for which Walzer is aiming. 
Walzer’s second argument, the communal integrity thesis, might offer better 
support for a generalised non-intervention principle and it is this I consider next.  
Interestingly, the right to self-determination supported by the communal integrity 
argument seems to be a very different right to self-determination than that supported 
by the earlier Millian argument.  In the Millian argument the right to self-
determination is the right to succeed or fail in establishing free institutions whereas 
in the communal integrity argument it is the right to ‘express inherited culture’ in 
ways that might, for example, lead to authoritarian political institutions.  Even if we 
re-state the Millian argument such that the right to self-determination is the right to 
succeed or fail in establishing institutions that express inherited culture, the two 
rights are still at odds with each other since the Millian argument recognises the right 
to self-determination as entailing the right to fail in establishing institutions which 
express inherited culture and the communal integrity argument does not.  In what 
follows therefore I treat the communal integrity argument as a standalone argument 
for the right of non-intervention.  
The first point worth making about the communal integrity argument is that 
many writers have objected to Walzer’s ‘presumption of fit’.  Why is this a morally 
necessary presumption to make in all cases bar the worst violations of human rights?  
First, it seems that evidence of ‘fit’ is available to foreigners.  Foreigners can travel 
to the country and see it for themselves, they can discuss the situation with academic 
experts and expatriates, and they can read its newspapers, study its culture and so on.  
Second, why is lack of fit only radically apparent in the case of gross violations of 
human rights like massacre and enslavement?  Surely evidence of widespread 
‘ordinary oppression’ such as the torture and imprisonment of political opposition is 
enough to make a lack of fit radically apparent? 208  In attempting to further explain 
his position on this Walzer explains the presumption of fit as entailing a respect for 
pluralism in political values.209  But a respect for pluralism in political values surely 
would require foreigners to take steps to seriously assess the level of ‘fit’ within a 
                                               
208 Luban, 394-5; Beitz, 1980, 386. 
209 Walzer, 1980, 216. 
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society.  Walzer clearly believes this to be an impossible task but, as we have seen, 
this just seems to be an implausible assumption.   
Perhaps one reason Walzer takes this direction is that he is writing in the 
context of military intervention and his caution is an understandable reluctance to 
authorise military force where there is a risk that the situation has been 
misunderstood.  In that case there is a kind of tacit rule-consequentialist argument for 
a generalised principle of non-intervention operating here: generally the best 
consequences are achieved by following a principle of refraining from military 
intervention except in the very worst cases of human rights violations.  However, 
even if this were true, it would not hold for economic sanctions.  The harms caused 
by economic sanctions may be, depending on the type of sanction, much less weighty 
than the harms caused by military intervention.  Therefore, a rule consequentialist 
argument might reverse the presumption of fit in the case of economic sanctions.   
The second point to make is that the communal integrity argument, like the 
Millian argument, restricts the scope of the right to self determination because it only 
rules out intervention that would interfere with a community’s ability to create and 
sustain culturally relevant political institutions.  Intervention which did not seek to 
alter political institutions but perhaps was aimed more narrowly at just one policy 
would not violate the right to self-determination in Walzer’s sense.  Walzer’s 
argument then does not support a generalised principle of non-intervention. 
Finally, the most obvious difficulty in applying Walzer’s view of self-
determination to this problem of a state’s right of non-intervention is that his theory 
supports a right of self-determination for political communities yet states are almost 
always comprised of multiple political communities.  Indeed, Walzer himself 
concedes this possibility when he makes his exception for secession.  Even if his 
argument shows there is no right to intervene in the political processes of political 
communities, it does not show that there is no right to intervene in the political 
processes of states.  For if states contain more than one political community then 
they cannot be the place within which political communities work out their political 
form, the political form will be worked out at best as a compromise between the 
various political communities and at worst simply by the dominating political 
community. 
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Rule-Consequentialist Arguments against Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Proponents of the various rule-consequentialist objections to humanitarian 
intervention argue that in the long run the best consequences will be achieved if there 
is general acceptance and observance of the non-intervention principle even if, in 
rare instances, a particular act of intervention would in fact have the best 
consequences.  They concede that the non-intervention principle results in the 
significant negative consequence that human rights abuses will often occur 
unchecked.  However, they argue that the negative consequences of a rule permitting 
intervention would be even worse. 210  The two most significant rule-consequentialist 
arguments are as follows. 
First, any rule permitting humanitarian intervention would be abused.  States 
would pursue their national interest by intervening whenever it suited them, cloaking 
their actions in the respectability of ‘humanitarian intervention’.  Thus a rule 
permitting humanitarian intervention would pose a threat to the global order by 
making it easier for states to go to war.  
Second, humanitarian intervention often fails to achieve its goals.  Restoring 
human rights often requires more than simply defeating an oppressor.  It might, for 
example, be necessary to assist in building up new political and economic institutions 
or to establish the rule of law.  This is a difficult task for anyone but it is particularly 
difficult for outsiders working in a culture and region that they do not necessarily 
understand very well.211  Thus a rule permitting intervention would result in more 
military interventions – which are inevitably destructive – without achieving any 
comparable benefits in terms of reducing human rights violations. 
These arguments are made in the context of military intervention so before I 
can consider them further it will be necessary to work out how, if at all, they apply to 
the case of economic sanctions.  Is it right to say that in the long run the best 
consequences will be achieved if there is general acceptance and observance of a 
                                               
210 For good overviews of the rule-consequentialist arguments against a rule permitting humanitarian 
intervention see Mason and Wheeler, 1996 and Welsh, 2003. 
211 Mason and Wheeler, 103. 
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non-intervention principle that prohibits economic sanctions?212  Or might a rule that 
permits intervention using economic sanctions - if not military intervention - have 
better long run consequences?  Let us consider the arguments in order. 
First, would a rule permitting intervention using economic sanctions be 
abused by states pursuing their national interest?  It is difficult to see what the point 
of abusing such a rule would be.  If state A wants to harm state B’s economy or 
improve its own by banning all trade between itself and state B it can simply do so – 
perfectly legally – and without even being expected to give an explanation.  As long 
as it does not violate World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules there is no problem.  
Even if a state did violate WTO trade rules it is unlikely any threat of punishment 
from the WTO would deter an economically powerful actor (and most of those 
imposing economic sanctions are economically powerful actors).  In any case an 
open admission from state A that it is imposing economic sanctions on state B for 
self-interested economic reasons is far less controversial than claiming it is imposing 
the sanctions for humanitarian reasons.  Therefore, there is no motivation to abuse 
this rule. 
Second, the objection that intervention often fails to achieve its goals is, at 
first sight, actually more powerful when applied to the case of economic sanctions.  
This is for two reasons.  First, any necessary ‘institution building’ for the long-term 
protection of human rights cannot really be done from the outside using economic 
sanctions.  It needs to be done from inside the country.  Of course the protection of 
human rights in a given case does not always require ‘institution building’ so this 
point will not always hold, yet it often will.  Second, according to conventional 
wisdom ‘sanctions never work’.  Is the conventional wisdom right?  The most 
comprehensive study of economic sanctions conducted to date concluded that 
economic sanctions achieved their goal in one third of cases.213  This conclusion 
however has been the subject of dispute by those who claim that sanctions are much 
less effective (though not that they never work).214  It appears then that the 
conventional wisdom – that sanctions never work – is mistaken; sanctions do 
                                               
212 Although the status of economic sanctions in international law is generally ambiguous, the non-
intervention principle is thought to apply to economic sanctions as well as military intervention 
(though this is quite obviously widely ignored in practice). 
213 Hufbauer et al., 159. 
214 See Pape, 1997; Elliot, 1998; Pape, 1998. 
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sometimes work though to date they have, at most, only been effective in one third of 
cases.  Unfortunately, the data relating to economic sanctions as humanitarian 
intervention has not been separately analysed so it is not possible to tell whether the 
success rate is higher or lower for economic sanctions with humanitarian intervention 
as a goal.  Therefore, I will assume that the success rate for these sanctions is also 
one third.  Neither of these two points bode well for the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions as humanitarian intervention.  They suggest that at least two thirds of 
attempts will fail and probably a lot more.  However, we should not forget that 
economic sanctions are most often much less harmful than military interventions.  
The negative consequences of the non-intervention principle are that human rights 
violations occur unchecked, the negative consequences of a rule permitting 
intervention using economic sanctions are that at least two thirds of the human rights 
violations will still occur (since the sanctions will be ineffective in preventing them) 
plus harm will be caused by the economic sanctions themselves.  This harm might be 
very small, e.g. where the economic sanctions take the form of asset freezes for top 
government officials or it might be more significant, e.g. in the case of a 
comprehensive embargo.  It is therefore quite difficult to say which rule will have the 
best consequences.  Therefore we need to either a) distinguish between the different 
sanction types based on their level of expected harm and come up with different rules 
on intervention for each or b) institutionalise a rule permitting economic sanctions as 
humanitarian intervention which includes safeguards such that sanctions are not 
imposed in situations where all the warning signs are that they will be ineffective.  A 
blanket non-intervention principle, however, seems unjustified. 
So, in summary it is still possible to construct rule-consequentialist arguments 
against humanitarian intervention with economic sanctions though such arguments 
are much less powerful and, if rules are institutionalised carefully, the arguments lose 




Humanitarian intervention by means of economic sanctions is morally 
permissible because senders have the right to defend the human rights of any citizen.  
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The most prominent arguments against humanitarian intervention using military 
means apply either not at all or with significantly less force to the case of economic 
sanctions and are easily overcome.  Before I turn to the next chapter, however, I have 
a few final words on the subject of humanitarian intervention. 
First there is the matter of moral constraints on humanitarian intervention.  Of 
course, the use of economic sanctions as a means of humanitarian intervention is 
subject to the same constraints discussed in the previous chapter; namely, the 
economic sanctions must be a response to human rights violations, necessary, 
proportionate and aimed at those morally responsible for the human rights violations.  
I have discussed these constraints in some detail in the previous chapter so I will not 
repeat myself here.  Suffice it to say that targeted economic sanctions are much more 
likely to meet these conditions than collective economic sanctions (and indirect 
collective sanctions will never meet them). 
Second, it is worth remembering that humanitarian intervention, although it 
may be justified as a type of other-defence, has some distinguishing features.  Most 
importantly, humanitarian intervention is intended to assist those individuals 
suffering human rights violations.  However the economic sanctions, even if they are 
targeted at those morally responsible, may have side effects that harm the very 
people they are trying to help – as occurred in the case of South Africa.  The South 
African sanctions were intended to harm the White population but nevertheless 
harmed the Black population.  Arguably, the Black population – or at least a large 
proportion of them – consented to suffer such harms.  However, if they had not so 
consented then it would have been wrong to impose the economic sanctions.  Those 
who will suffer are best placed to determine whether the objective of the economic 
sanctions is worth their suffering.   
So far in this thesis we have established that targeted economic sanctions and 
(at least where the needs of the innocent population are met) direct collective 
economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds of other-defence.  As yet we have 
no justification for the use of indirect collective sanctions or direct collective 
sanctions in instances where the innocent population’s needs cannot or will not be 
met.  In the next chapter I turn to consider the question of whether or not collective 
economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are the lesser evil. 
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Chapter 7: Economic Sanctions and the Lesser Evil Justification   
 
In the preceding two chapters I showed that it is possible to justify targeted 
economic sanctions on the grounds of other-defence (being the defence of a sender’s 
own citizens or, as in the case of humanitarian intervention, of other citizens) – at 
least where certain conditions are met.  However, I also showed that it was not 
possible to justify indirect collective economic sanctions on these grounds and, 
further, that direct collective economic sanctions could only rarely be justified on 
these grounds.  Naturally, that leads us to ask the question: are there any other 
grounds that might justify collective economic sanctions?  One possibility we have 
not yet considered is that collective economic sanctions could be justified as a ‘lesser 
evil’.  Lesser evil arguments claim that it may be justifiable to harm innocents – even 
to intentionally kill innocents – if it is necessary to prevent some much greater evil.  
In such cases it is said that the individual’s rights have been permissibly ‘infringed’ 
rather than violated and that although the individual has been wronged, all things 
considered, the act is not wrongful; it is morally justified.215   
Walzer gives a very well known example of what is, arguably, a lesser evil 
justification.  Walzer argues that in cases of ‘supreme emergency’ during war it may 
be permissible to intentionally kill innocent civilians if that is a necessary means of 
preventing some great evil.  Thus, for Walzer, the terror-bombing of German cities 
during the Second World War, which resulted in an estimated 300,000 civilian 
deaths and 780,000 civilians injured, was justified because it was necessary to avoid 
the triumph of Nazism.216  
Another very well known - if not notorious - example of a lesser evil 
argument is that of the ticking time bomb terrorist.  In this case we are to imagine we 
are counter-terrorist agents who have captured a terrorist who has planted a bomb 
somewhere in a major city.  The bomb is on a timer and will explode in the next few 
hours unless we can get there first and defuse it.  The terrorist is refusing to reveal 
                                               
215 Thomson, 1977, 47.  For this use of the lesser evil justification in just war theory see McMahan, 
2009; Rodin, 2011.   
216 Walzer, 2006, 255-263.  Walzer’s argument is a little ambiguous and so, arguably, he may not be 
putting forward a lesser evil justification for the terror bombing of Nazi Germany or, at least, his 
lesser evil justification may be of a different kind to the one I outline above.  For useful discussions of 
Walzer’s supreme emergency exception and its relation to the lesser evil justification see Primoratz, 
2011 and Kaufman, 2007. 
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the location of the bomb.  However, it is stipulated that if we torture the terrorist he 
will reveal its location, we can defuse the bomb and thousands of lives will be saved.  
Many have argued that in circumstance like this the torture of the terrorist would be 
justified as the lesser evil.217 
In this chapter I want to assess the plausibility of justifying collective 
economic sanctions on the grounds that they may sometimes be the lesser evil.  
I start in section one by fleshing out a particular understanding of the lesser 
evil justification.  In section two I then apply this understanding to the case of 
collective economic sanctions and argue that they can be justified as the lesser evil in 
certain circumstances.  I conclude by offering some ‘rules of thumb’ to help guide 
decisions about whether collective economic sanctions will be the lesser evil in 
particular situations. 
 
The Lesser Evil Justification 
 
For whatever reason, the lesser evil justification has not been subject to a 
great deal of scrutiny by philosophers; certainly, the self-defence justification has 
attracted much more attention.   Therefore in this section I attempt to formulate a 
plausible version of the lesser evil justification which I can then apply to the case of 
economic sanctions.   
Many formulations of the lesser evil justification run along the following 
lines: 
 
                                               
217 For versions of this argument see, e.g. Shue, 1978; Dershowitz, 2002.  Note that Shue thinks that 
the circumstances outlined in the ticking time bomb case will never actually present themselves in the 
real world.  The ticking time bomb argument, with slightly different presentation, can also be traced to 
Walzer.  See Walzer, 1973, 167.  However, Walzer does not apply the ‘lesser evil argument’ in this 
case but instead advances his ‘dirty hands’ argument.  The dirty hands argument, though superficially 
similar to the lesser evil argument, differs from the lesser evil argument in several ways.  The most 
important difference is that, in the case of the lesser evil argument, the lesser evil act of torture is 
morally justified and not morally wrong.  By contrast, the dirty hands argument is dilemmatic in form, 
and the lesser evil act of torture is both right and wrong at the same time.  Walzer comments that the 
politician who gets his hands dirty and tortures should be praised for the good he has done and 
punished for the evil.  Walzer, 1973, 179.   
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An act which overrides a moral right is morally justified if the act is necessary 
to avert a greater evil.218 
 
There are some important features of this formulation that it is worth 




The terminology ‘lesser evil’ might suggest to some that the justification 
applies to particularly horrific acts of wrongdoing.  However, the term ‘evil’, as it is 
used in the lesser evil justification, simply means ‘wrong’.  The lesser evil 
justification may easily be turned to fairly trivial moral issues, e.g. one might have a 




Note that I intend the term ‘overriding rights’ to be neutral between infringing 
and violating rights.  If it is morally justified to override a right then that right is 
infringed.  If it is not morally justified to override a right then that right is violated.  
Of course the idea that rights can be infringed without being violated commits us to 
the view that at least some rights are not absolute; that at least some rights may be 
permissibly overridden.  In fact in this chapter I will assume that there are no absolute 
rights at all.  This assumption is highly controversial; however, I do not defend my 
view here as it takes me far beyond the scope of my thesis.   
 
                                               
218 This formulation is often implied rather than explicitly stated.  For such formulations see Rodin, 
2011; McMahan, 2009; Alexander, 2005.  The requirement that the act be necessary to avert a greater 
evil is sufficient for justifying the overriding of rights.  It is not necessary for justifying the overriding 
of rights however because there may be other types of circumstances that justify the overriding of 
rights.  For example, in chapter five I argued that when faced with an innocent attacker who had not 
forfeited her right to life, you would be justified in killing her if it were necessary to save your life on 




Crucial to the justification is that the act is a necessary means of averting the 
greater evil.  This means that there must be no other, less evil, means of averting the 
greater evil.  To put it another way, the ‘lesser evil’ act must actually be the least evil 
act of all possible alternative acts (including the ‘act’ of doing nothing and allowing 
the greater evil to materialise).219  For example, in the case of the ticking time bomb, 
the torture of the terrorist would not be justified if it were possible to use some 
tracking device to locate the bomb.  Similarly, Walzer claims that although the terror 
bombing of German cities was justified when it first began, after the United States 
and Russia joined the war against Germany, it was no longer necessary and hence 
was no longer justified.220  To make this clearer it will be useful to re-state the 
justification as follows: 
 
An act which overrides a moral right is morally justified if the act is a 
lesser evil than any other alternative act available to the agent. 
 
The question which then arises is how do we determine the lesser evil?  How 
do we weigh up such things?  To go back to our example, how do we determine that 





To be clear from the outset, the proportionality requirement is not a 
requirement for a simple utilitarian weighting; we are not required to simply weigh 
up the harms and benefits of the various alternative acts available to the agent.  If this 
was all that was required then torture would likely be justified to save just one life.221  
This is clearly not a position that proponents of the lesser evil justification for torture 
                                               
219 Alexander, 618.  
220 Walzer, 261. 
221 On the assumption that torture is less harmful than killing. 
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hold; in the ticking time bomb scenarios it is usually hundreds or thousands of lives 
at stake. 
When it comes to determining the lesser evil, what we are actually weighing 
up is the wrong of committing an act which overrides moral rights against the wrong 
of allowing harmful consequences to materialise when it is in our power to prevent 
them (and against the wrong of any other acts available to the agent).  Of course the 
next question is: how do we do this?   
It is widely accepted that some rights are more stringent than others (e.g. it is 
widely accepted that the right to not be tortured is more stringent than the right to 
property), and thus it is also widely accepted that it is more wrong to override some 
rights than others.  David Rodin argues that the more stringent rights are the rights 
that protect us from non-compensable harms such as being killed, raped or physically 
harmed in some way that we cannot recover from.222  Rights that protect us from 
compensable harms are less stringent.  The overriding of property rights, for 
example, can be compensated for: property can be returned or replaced.  Other things 
being equal, the more stringent the overridden right, the greater the harm that must 
be averted if the overriding of the right is to be morally justified. 
It is also widely accepted that some ways of overriding rights are more wrong 
than others.  For instance, it is widely accepted that, other things being equal, 
intentionally overriding rights for some good end is more wrong than unintentionally 
but foreseeably overriding rights for the same end.  Hence, other things being equal, 
if intentionally overriding rights is to be justified, it requires that a greater harm be 
averted than would be required if one was unintentionally but foreseeably overriding 
rights.     
To give another example, many would consider that, other things being equal, 
killing someone to use her as a means to the end of averting the greater evil is more 
wrong than killing someone whose death is not such a means.   
Further, many would consider that, other things being equal, killing or 
actively harming someone to avert a greater evil is more wrong than allowing 
someone to die or be harmed for the same end.   
                                               
222 Rodin, 2011, 76-77.  Victims of such crimes could be financially compensated of course but I take 
Rodin’s point to be that the harm inflicted cannot be reversed. 
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To give a final example; other things being equal, many would consider 
harming an innocent person to be more wrong than harming a guilty person for some 
good end.  Thus in the notorious ticking time bomb case, many people think it would 
be justified to torture the terrorist if the only alternative is allowing the deaths of 
hundreds of people.  However, many people would outright reject the view that it 
would be justified to torture the terrorist’s five year old child in this case in order to 
make the terrorist reveal the information.  Some would say it could never be 
justified.  Others would say it could be justified but demand the stakes be higher: 
millions of lives must be at risk. 223 
At this point it is worth going back to Walzer’s case of terror bombing.  
Terror bombing involves intentionally killing hundreds of thousands of innocent 
people and also uses them as a means to an end (of demoralising the enemy).  
Deontologically speaking, it is one of the worst things you could do.  It is so wrong 
that it is almost unthinkable that anything could justify it.  The greater evil in 
Walzer’s case was, of course, the risk that Nazism would triumph which, as he puts 
it, was:   
 
[the] ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a 
practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who 
might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally 
beyond calculation, immeasurably awful.  We see it – and I don’t use 
the phrase lightly – as evil objectified in the world, and in a form so 
potent and apparent that there could never have been anything to do but 
fight against it.224 
 
Indeed, the harms otherwise allowed would have to be something of this 
magnitude in order to justify the grave wrong of terror bombing.   
 
                                               
223 For a detailed and thorough discussion of the role of proportionality in the lesser evil justification 
see Rodin, 2011. 




A few writers, such as Walzer, claim that the imminence of the greater evil 
which is to be averted is a necessary condition for the lesser evil justification.225 
However, as I argued in chapter five with respect to self-defence, imminence is 
relevant only to the extent that it is a fairly reliable indicator that self-defence is 
necessary.  There will be cases where self-defence is necessary in the absence of 
imminent attack.  I believe the same holds true for the lesser evil justification: there 
will be cases where the lesser evil act is necessary to avert a non-imminent greater 
evil.  Since I have already discussed this point at some length in chapter five, I will 
not repeat myself here.  Suffice it to say imminence is not a necessary condition for 




Unfortunately, we will often be forced to make lesser evil decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty.  How should we factor uncertainty into our lesser evil 
reasoning?  In what follows I use the ticking time bomb case as an example. 
In the kind of cases I am considering there are two major areas of uncertainty.  
First is the issue of probability of success.  How probable is it that the means we 
select (e.g. torture) will actually succeed in averting the greater evil?  The torture 
might not work if the terrorist is very committed to his cause.  Or it might work but 
we might get to the bomb too late or cut the wrong wire when we attempt to defuse 
it.   
Second is the issue of necessity.  How sure are we that the means we select 
are necessary?  How sure are we, for example, that torture is necessary?  The bomb 
might be faulty and not explode or the terrorist might have a sudden change of heart.  
Or there could be other means we could use that are less evil. 
How do we deal with uncertainty in the lesser evil calculation?  I take each 
issue in turn. 
 
                                               
225 Walzer, 252.   
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1. Probability of Success 
 
If the torture is 100% certain to work then we are weighing up the wrong of 
torture, let’s say ‘X’, against the wrong of allowing thousands of deaths to occur 
when it is in our power to prevent them, let’s say ‘Y’.   
If the torture is less than 100% certain to work then the calculation is 
different.  The wrongness of torture is the same but the consequences of torturing are 
now uncertain.  Let us say that the probability of the torture approach working is 
only 80%.  In this case we must weigh up the wrongness of torture, X, against the 
80% probability that if we do not torture we commit the wrong of allowing 
thousands of people to die.  How can we do this?  A straightforward weighting by 
probability would give us the result that we must weigh up X against 0.8Y.  On this 
approach, other things equal, the lower the probability of our evil means working, the 
greater the number of lives to be saved must be if our evil means are to be justified.  
Additionally, other things equal, the lower the probability of our evil means working, 
the less evil the means must be if they are to be justified.  This sounds roughly right.  
Of course there is no requirement to use this straightforward weighting of 
probabilities when calculating the lesser evil under conditions of uncertainty.  We 
could stipulate a different way of including probabilities.  For instance we could 
insist that for evil means to be justified they must cross some threshold probability of 
success.  However, I think it would be a mistake to take this approach.  We have to 
allow for the possibility that when the rights we are overriding are not that stringent 
(e.g. property rights), and the great evil that we are averting is extremely serious, that 
it might be justified to use means that have only a low probability of success.  It 
should further be noted that a threshold approach would probably rule out all use of 
collective economic sanctions as the lesser evil.  As discussed in chapter two, best 
estimates of the success rate of economic sanctions is only 34%.  Any threshold 
probability is likely to be set much higher.  I now turn to consider the uncertainty 





The other uncertainty surrounds the question of whether or not our evil means 
are actually necessary.  If there is a 30% chance that the bomb is faulty and will 
never explode, how do we factor this into our lesser evil calculation?  Again, I think 
the answer is a straightforward weighting by probability.  In this case we are 
weighing up the wrongness of torture, X, against the 70% probability that if we do 
not torture we commit the wrong of allowing the deaths of hundreds of people.  That 
is, we weigh up X against 0.7Y.  On this approach, other things equal, the greater the 
probability that the evil means are not necessary, the less likely it is that the evil 
means will be justified as the lesser evil.  Again, this sounds right. 
So far, however, we have only considered cases where the evil means are 
unnecessary because doing nothing might also avert the greater evil.  In addition to 
this there will be cases where the evil means in question are unnecessary because it is 
possible lesser evil means or even good means might also avert the greater evil.  We 
can, for example, imagine a case where torture has a 100% probability of success but 
some kind of tracking device also has a 10% probability of success.  Which is the 
lesser evil in this case?  Presumably using the bomb-tracking device is not 
intrinsically wrongful – it overrides no rights.  However, with an estimated 10% 
probability of success, it is almost the same as doing nothing.  If we use the bomb-
tracking device there is a 90% probability that we commit the wrong of allowing 
hundreds of people to die.  Thus, in such a case we must weigh up the wrongness of 
torture, X, against the wrong we commit by doing nothing and allowing hundreds of 
people to die, Y and also against the 90% probability that if we use the bomb-
tracking devise we commit the wrong of allowing hundreds of people to die, 0.9Y.  
(Of course this assumes there is not time to try the tracking device first).  Although 
use of the tracking device overrides no rights, it is not the least evil alternative, since 
its use is likely to allow the deaths of hundreds of people. 
Before I go onto the next section there is one final complication that I want to 
consider.  As we have seen, in the real world, lesser evils reasoning takes place under 
conditions of uncertainty.  Further, the lesser evil justification is concerned with 
justifying often very serious wrongs such as torture.  In order for such acts to be 
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justified, the epistemic basis for them must be secure.  Our estimated probabilities for 
each possible outcome must be carefully calculated and based on the best available 
evidence.  It is very rare that we would know for certain, e.g. that the probability of a 
bomb’s being faulty was x% but we can make more or less reasonable estimates of 
this being the case.226  Therefore, we should re-formulate the lesser evil justification 
as follows: 
 
An act which overrides a moral right is morally justified if it is 
reasonably believed that the act is a lesser evil than any other 
alternative act available to the agent. 
 
I now turn to consider whether collective economic sanctions can be justified 
on the grounds that they are the lesser evil. 
 
Collective Economic Sanctions and the Lesser Evil Justification 
 
Indirect collective economic sanctions involve the intentional infliction of 
harm on innocent people as a mere means to the end of changing the target’s 
objectionable policy.  As I put it in chapter two, the aim of the sanctions is to force 
such people to become unwilling agents of the sender; to effectively conscript them 
to the sender’s cause.  Such sanctions violate stringent deontological constraints 
because they involve intentionally inflicting harm on innocent people and, further, 
using those people as a means to an end.  Innocent individuals have rights against 
suffering such harms and against being used as a means to an end.  If these rights are 
to be overridden, that requires justification. 
Direct collective economic sanctions do not use innocent people as a mere 
means to an end; the harm that falls on innocent people is a foreseen but unintended 
side-effect.  It is unfortunate (to say the least) that the only way of denying resources 
to the military and/or leadership of the target state has the side-effect of denying 
resources to the entire population and, further, that the ordinary population will 
                                               
226 There could be cases where it was known with certainty that the probability of the bomb being 
faulty was 30%.  Imagine a case where you know ten bombs have been smuggled into the country by 
boat but one of your undercover counter-terrorist agents managed to sabotage three of them en-route. 
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suffer shortages long before the military or leadership.  However, innocent people 
have a right not to be harmed in such a way – even as a side-effect.227   Therefore 
direct collective sanctions also override moral rights, and require justification. 
So both types of collective economic sanctions override moral rights and 
hence stand in need of moral justification.  Might they be justified as the lesser evil? 
In order to help us answer this question, let us consider a hypothetical case of 
collective economic sanctions.  Imagine that a target state with a recent history of 
initiating aggressive war is undertaking a rapid process of militarization in violation 
of peace treaties it has signed; there is a concern that the target intends to attack a 
neighbouring state at some point in the near future.  If this happens, hundreds of 
thousands of people are likely to die; many more will be injured or be made 
homeless.  The target state is a dictatorship which ruthlessly crushes all opposition.  
The UN Security Council is considering whether or not to impose collective 
economic sanctions.  Indirect collective sanctions could be imposed to inflict 
suffering on the entire population in the hopes that the population would demand its 
government ends this programme of militarization.  Likewise, direct collective 
sanctions could be imposed that prevent the import of various military and non-
military goods into the target state with the intention of destroying the economic and 
military capacity of the target state so that it does not have the resources to continue 
its militarization.  Would the UN be justified in using collective economic sanctions 
(indirect or direct) to force the state to abandon its programme of militarization?   
Following the formulation of the lesser evil justification given above, 
collective economic sanctions will be justified in this case if it is reasonably 
believed that the collective sanctions are a lesser evil than any other alternative 
act available to the agent.  Might this be the case? 
For the sake of argument, let us start by making three highly unlikely and 
generous assumptions: (1) that the collective economic sanctions are 100% certain to 
                                               
227 In chapter five, following Walzer, I argued that direct economic sanctions could not be justified 
under the doctrine of double effect because no effort was taken to discriminate between those who 
were liable to suffer economic sanctions and those who were not.  However, even if the doctrine of 
double effect was applicable to the case of direct economic sanctions, it remains true that innocent 
individuals have a right not to be harmed as a side-effect.  I see the doctrine of double effect as a type 
of lesser evil argument.  If harmful side-effects are justified under the doctrine of double effect then 
the rights of the innocent people harmed are justifiably infringed.  McMahan (2009) and Rodin (2011) 
also view the doctrine of double effect in this way. 
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end the militarization and hence stop the planned attack, (2) that our only available 
alternatives are to impose collective economic sanctions or to do nothing, and (3) 
that if we do nothing the militarization will continue and the attack will take place.  
These assumptions are generous in the sense that they are the assumptions under 
which collective sanctions are most likely to be the lesser evil.  Let us consider 
indirect collective sanctions before moving onto direct collective sanctions. 
 
Indirect Collective Sanctions 
 
In the case of indirect collective sanctions we need to weigh up: 
 
a. the wrong of intentionally inflicting harm on millions of innocent 
people (the vast majority of the target state population being 
innocent) and the wrong of using those people as means to an end; 
against  
b. the wrong of allowing hundreds of thousands of innocent people to be 
killed and many more to be injured or made homeless when it is in 
our power to prevent it.   
 
I don’t think it is that obvious which is the lesser evil.  It is obviously a 
terrible thing to allow the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people when 
it is in our power to prevent it but, equally, it is a terrible thing to intentionally inflict 
harm on millions of people and use those people as a means to an end.   
However, we should remember that indirect collective sanctions can be more 
or less severe, can inflict greater or lesser harms, and can threaten different types of 
rights. 
Bearing this is mind; I think that whether the indirect sanctions are the lesser 
evil will depend on how stringent the rights that they threaten are.  As discussed 
above, other things equal, the more stringent the overridden right, the greater the 
harm that must be averted if the overriding of the right is to be morally justified. 
Indirect sanctions that are designed to kill innocent people (i.e. which 
threaten the right to life) would not be justified as the lesser evil in this case.  The 
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wrong of lethal collective indirect sanctions is comparable to the wrong of terror 
bombing and that, as we saw, required the threat of Nazi victory to be justified.  
However, at the other end of the scale are indirect collective sanctions that inflict 
only minor economic harms, e.g. a recession where life becomes a bit tougher for the 
general population but no-one starves or suffers severely.  Such sanctions do not 
threaten the right to life or the right to subsistence, but lesser rights.  It seems like in 
such a case, indirect collective economic sanctions might be justified as the lesser 
evil.228   
 
Direct Collective Sanctions 
 
Other things equal, we might expect to find it slightly easier to justify direct 
sanctions than indirect sanctions.  This is because, as discussed above, other things 
being equal, intentionally overriding rights for some good end (as in indirect 
sanctions) is more wrong than unintentionally but foreseeably overriding rights for 
the same end (as in direct sanctions).     
However, other things are rarely equal.  By their very nature, direct collective 
sanctions must inflict a great deal of harm on innocent people if they are to be 
effective.  In the case of direct collective sanctions the aim of the sanctions is to 
inflict harms on the military and/or leadership by destroying the economy to such an 
extent that military projects become unfeasible.  As discussed in chapter two, as the 
economy grinds to a halt, the target government will tend to allocate dwindling 
resources as a matter of priority towards itself and its military projects.  Therefore 
innocent people will suffer the (possibly severe) effects of shortages and economic 
turmoil long before the target government does.  Innocent people have to be hit by 
the sanctions, and hit hard, before the target government/military can be hit. 
Indirect collective sanctions might sometimes work by causing only small 
economic harms but it is not possible for direct collective sanctions – which, recall, 
are aimed at destroying an entire economy – to work by causing only small economic 
harms.   
                                               
228 Even if the economic sanctions are justified as the lesser evil, I think there would remain a duty on 
the part of the sender to compensate the innocent people who have suffered their effects afterwards.   
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Could direct collective sanctions nevertheless be justified as the lesser evil?  I 
think this is will be very rare because direct collective sanctions necessarily target 
stringent rights, i.e. rights to subsistence and possibly even the right to life.  I cannot 
rule it out altogether; perhaps we can imagine an extreme case where direct 
economic sanctions are required to prevent a nuclear war.  However, in the vast 
majority of circumstances we could not justify direct economic sanctions as the 
lesser evil.  Of course if we cannot justify direct collective sanctions on the generous 
assumptions I made at the outset, we will not be able to justify them on the basis of 
less generous assumptions.  Hence in what follows I consider only indirect collective 
sanctions. 
 
Less Generous Assumptions 
 
In the discussion above I made three very generous assumptions; namely, (1) 
that the collective economic sanctions were 100% certain to end the militarization 
and hence stop the planned attack, (2) that our only available alternatives were to 
impose collective economic sanctions or to do nothing, and (3) that if we did nothing 
the militarization would continue and the attack would take place.  I concluded that 
even with these generous assumptions, direct collective sanctions were extremely 
unlikely to ever be justified as the lesser evil; hence I set them aside.  However, I 
now want to consider whether indirect collective sanctions could be justified as the 
lesser evil once we make more realistic assumptions.   
I want to start by considering the success rates of economic sanctions.  
Above, I assumed that the economic sanctions were 100% certain to succeed.  
However, it is very important to note here that economic sanctions fail more often 
than they succeed.  The most reliable estimate states their average probability of 
success at only 34%.229  Of course, 34% is an average success rate for all economic 
sanctions imposed in the recent past.  It could be that in a particular instance the 
probability of success is rated much more highly.  Each situation would need to be 
assessed on its own merits.  In what follows though, I will use the figure of 34%.  A 
success rate of 34% means that we should weigh the wrong of imposing the 
                                               
229 Hufbuaer et al., 154. 
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sanctions, let’s say ‘X’, against the 34% probability that if we do not sanction we 
commit the wrong of allowing hundreds of thousands of people to die when it was in 
our power to prevent it, let’s say, 0.34Y.  It is quite possible that economic sanctions 
that would be justified as the lesser evil if they had a 100% estimated probability of 
success, would not be justified as the lesser evil with a 34% estimated probability of 
success; other things equal, the lower the probability of success, the less likely it is 
the economic sanctions will be justified as the lesser evil.  However, I do not think 
we can rule out the possibility that economic sanctions with an estimated success 
rate as low as 34% could be justified as the lesser evil.  In particular, collective 
sanctions that cause fairly minor economic harms might be justified as the lesser evil 
even with fairly low probabilities of success.  It is for this reason that I argued earlier 
against the use of threshold probabilities of success in the lesser evil justification.   
Above, I also made the generous assumption that collective economic 
sanctions and doing nothing were the only alternatives available to us.  I now want to 
consider the existence of other alternatives.  Aside from collective economic 
sanctions, our alternatives might include targeted economic sanctions (e.g. a ban on 
the import of military goods), diplomatic sanctions, negotiations, military action 
such as bombing the military installations, and, of course, doing nothing and 
allowing the attack to take place.   
I should start by pointing out that if negotiation, diplomatic sanctions or 
a ban on the import of military goods stand a reasonable chance of ending the 
militarization programme then collective economic sanctions will not be the 
lesser evil.  Negotiation is not wrongful at all and, if diplomatic or targeted 
sanctions are wrongful, they are significantly less wrongful than collective 
economic sanctions.   
However, if their probability of success is small then using them is not 
much better than doing nothing and hence collective economic sanctions could 
possibly be the lesser evil.  In what follows, then, I will assume that 
negotiation, diplomatic and targeted economic sanctions have at best only a 
small probability of success.       
That leaves us with the military alternative: would collective economic 
sanctions be a lesser evil than bombing the military installations? 
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In order to ascertain whether indirect collective economic sanctions are a 
lesser evil than limited military action of this type, we need to weigh up the 
wrongness of collective economic sanctions, X, against the wrongness of bombing 
the military installations, let’s say, Z.  Indirect collective sanctions are wrong 
because they involve the intentional infliction of harm on innocent people and, 
moreover, they treat them as a mere means to an end.  The bombing campaign will 
be aimed at military installations, not at innocent people.  However, innocent people 
living or working near the military installations may be killed as a foreseeable but 
unintentional side-effect of the bombing.230  Other things equal, it is much worse to 
kill people intentionally as a means to an end than to kill them as an unintended but 
foreseeable side-effect.  Hence, if the economic sanctions were so severe that they 
threatened the lives of innocent people then, in all likelihood, it will be the bombing 
campaign that is the lesser evil.  However, things may not be equal.  In particular, the 
collective sanctions may not be so severe that they kill. If the economic sanctions 
threaten only less stringent rights then it may well be the case that collective 
sanctions are the lesser evil.  Further this may be the case even though it is likely that 
millions of innocent people will suffer economic sanctions while a much smaller 
number will be killed in the bombing campaign.  This is because killing violates 
much more stringent rights than inflicting lesser economic harms does.  
One final complication remains though.  The bombing campaign is far more 
likely to succeed in ending the militarization than the economic sanctions are.  Let us 
say there is a 99% probability that the bombing campaign will end the militarization, 
compared to a 34% probability that the economic sanctions will end the 
militarization.  If this is so then it may be that economic sanctions are not the lesser 
evil, for in using the economic sanctions there is a 66% probability that we are 
allowing hundreds of thousands of people to die when it is in our power to prevent it.   
Finally, I made the generous assumption above that if we did nothing, the 
militarization would continue and the attack would take place.  Of course we cannot 
know this for sure.  The target state might change their mind about the militarization 
or, having militarized; change their mind about the attack.  If we cannot be certain 
                                               
230 Obviously, the bombing campaign is an act of war.  For the sake of simplicity I set aside 
considerations of whether or not such a campaign would be just under just war theory.   
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that the attack will take place, this affects the lesser evil status of the collective 
economic sanctions. 
For example, if the probability of the attack taking place is 50%, we must 
weigh up the wrong of the collective economic sanctions, X, against the 50% 
probability that by not imposing the economic sanctions we commit the wrong of 
allowing hundreds of thousands of people to die, 0.5Y. 
The lower the probability that the attack will actually take place, the less 
likely it is that the economic sanctions will be justified as the lesser evil.  
Nevertheless, even if an attack is quite unlikely to take place, we cannot rule out 
absolutely the possibility that collective economic sanctions might still be justified as 
the lesser evil.  If the consequences of the attack are sufficiently terrible and/or the 
collective economic sanctions threaten less stringent rights, the collective economic 




Direct collective sanctions, as we have seen, will only be justified as the 
lesser evil in the most extreme circumstances (e.g. to prevent a nuclear war).  Hence, 
in the discussion above, I set these aside and concentrated on the issue of indirect 
collective sanctions.  Taking into account the above discussion, it is clear to see that 
working out whether indirect collective economic sanctions are the ‘lesser evil’ in 
any given case will be a very difficult undertaking.  With that in mind I suggest some 
‘rules of thumb’ that might guide any decision to impose indirect collective 
economic sanctions.   
Indirect collective economic sanctions are likely to be justified on the 
grounds that they are the lesser evil if it is reasonable to believe that: 
 
 There is a significant probability that the target’s objectionable policy, if allowed 
to continue, would have truly terrible consequences.   
 The economic sanctions have a reasonable probability of succeeding. 
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 Other non-violent means (e.g. diplomatic sanctions, targeted economic sanctions 
and so on) have either been tried and have failed or it is reasonably believed that 
they will have a negligible chance of succeeding if imposed.   
 The economic sanctions are not so severe that they will kill people, e.g. through 
starvation.  (Generally, the less harm done by the sanctions the more likely they 
are to be justified on the grounds that they are the lesser evil). 
 Military action either does not have a significantly higher probability of success 
or would kill a large number of innocent people.  
 
At this point we might recall the ‘better than war better than nothing’ 
argument discussed in chapter three.  In chapter three I assessed that argument 
assuming it had a consequentialist basis and found it wanting.  We could, however, 
understand the ‘better than war better than nothing’ argument as a lesser evil 
argument.  As a lesser evil argument it would have much greater plausibility 
although it would, of course, need to be altered to take into account more 
considerations than simply the relative harms of the three options. 
I now turn to consider another ground for justifying economic sanctions: as a 
kind of punishment. 
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Chapter 8: Economic Sanctions and International Punishment 
 
In the preceding three chapters I showed that it is possible to justify (some 
types of) economic sanctions on the grounds of other defence (being the defence of a 
sender’s own citizens or, in the case of humanitarian intervention, of other citizens) 
and on the grounds of lesser evil.  However, these may not be the only grounds for 
justifying economic sanctions.  As we saw in chapter one, Margaret Doxey argues 
that economic sanctions can be used to punish targets retrospectively for behaviour 
which has violated international laws or international moral norms.  As she puts it, 
economic sanctions used in this way are ‘a kind of fine for international 
misbehaviour’.231  Historically, punishment of wrongdoing was thought to be a 
justification for war.  In this chapter I ask whether it might also provide a 
justification for economic sanctions.   
I start in section one by considering the question of whether economic 
sanctions can be a kind of international punishment.  Having answered this question 
in the affirmative I move on to consider in section two whether economic sanctions 
can be justified on the grounds that they are just punishment. 
 
1.  Economic Sanctions as International Punishment 
 
Can economic sanctions be a kind of punishment?  If so, what kind of 
punishment are they?  Doxey stated that economic sanctions can be used as a ‘kind 
of fine’ - and we do indeed perceive fines to be paradigmatic examples of 
punishment (alongside imprisonment or community service).  However, in actuality, 
there are many important and obvious disanalogies between the case of economic 
sanctions and the case of fines.  Given this I think it is worth addressing directly the 
question of whether economic sanctions can be a kind of punishment. 
                                               
231 Doxey, 92.  Note that some theorists have a wider understanding of punitive sanctions.  For 
example, Anthony Lang defines punitive economic sanctions as ‘the halting of normal economic 
activity with agents in response to a violation of a generally accepted rule or norm of international 
society’.  Lang, 81.  Lang’s understanding of punitive economic sanctions is wider than mine because 
it is not limited to retrospective punishment but includes other law-enforcement activities e.g. 
economic sanctions intended to bring an end to ongoing violations of international norms.    
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  One of the most well-known and influential definitions of punishment is that 
given by H.L.A Hart who defines the ‘standard or central case’ of punishment as 
follows: 
i. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. 
ii. It must be for an offence against legal rules. 
iii. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence. 
iv. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender. 
v. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal 
system against which the offence is committed.232 
However, Hart cautions that there are many ‘sub-standard or secondary’ cases of 
punishment which, while they definitely merit the term ‘punishment’, will not meet 
the above definition.  Hart gives the following examples of secondary cases (while 
conceding there could be many more): 
a. Punishments for breaches of legal rules imposed or administered otherwise 
than by officials (decentralized sanctions). 
 
b. Punishments for breaches of non-legal rules or orders (punishments in a 
family or school). 
 
c. Vicarious or collective punishment of some member of a social group for 
actions done by others without the former's authorization, encouragement, 
control, or permission. 
 
d. Punishment of persons (otherwise than under (c)) who neither are in fact nor 
supposed to be offenders. 233 
 
My purpose in this section is not to ‘prove’ that economic sanctions are a 
kind of punishment by showing that they can meet Hart’s five conditions for central 
cases of punishment.  This would be pointless since it is quite obvious (as I will 
show) that if economic sanctions are a kind of punishment then they are a secondary 
or sub-standard case.  Instead I want to use Hart’s five conditions and his examples 
of secondary or sub-standard cases as a kind of framework for explicating the 
punitive aspects of economic sanctions.  To this end I will take as my starting point 
Hart’s five conditions for central cases of punishment. 
                                               
232 Hart, 2008, 5-6. 
233 Hart, 2008, 5-6. 
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First, do economic sanctions involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant?  It seems obvious that they can do but it is worth setting out 
here briefly what form those consequences might take.  The most obvious 
unpleasantness caused by economic sanctions is economic harm. 
Collective economic sanctions (those that aim at the entire state) target harm 
at an entire economy.  Their effects can vary from devastating to negligible 
depending on the make up of the sanctions regime and the nature of the economy on 
which they are imposed.  As discussed in chapter two, the sanctions imposed on Iraq 
between 1990 and 2003 are an example of the former.  However, Iraq was an unusual 
case; the majority of sanctions regimes do not cause such severe harms.  But even if 
they do not plunge a state into economic and humanitarian turmoil, the effects of 
economic sanctions may still be significant.  They may prevent or reduce economic 
growth, keep unemployment and poverty rates high and push up prices.  They also 
might make it difficult or impossible for citizens of the target state to access 
sanctioned goods or services that they may regard as highly desirable (if not actually 
essential). 
Still more collective sanctions regimes have only a very small impact.  If the 
sanctions are imposed by a state which is only a minor trading partner of the target 
for example then the target state might fairly easily obtain alternative trading 
partners.  The target state might incur some costs in doing this but these are not likely 
to be that significant in the context of an entire economy.  Still, I think it would be 
fair to say even in this case that the sanctions have had unpleasant consequences. 
A final possibility is that the economic sanctions do not result in any 
economic harm.  For example, a state might sanction a target with which it has 
virtually no trade.  In most cases this will be in order to express its disapproval and 
condemnation of the target’s actions.  Could such sanctions be punishments?  I think 
this depends on whether or not we accept that international expressions of 
disapproval and condemnation are sufficiently unpleasant to be considered a 
punishment.  I believe that they could be.  Many state leaders and officials would 
find it excruciatingly embarrassing to be sanctioned in such a way.  On the other 
hand, some would not.  For example, the Finnish government is more likely to be 
embarrassed by sanctions imposed as a consequence of alleged human rights 
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violations than is North Korea.  However, the fact that some targets would not be 
embarrassed does not mean that symbolic sanctions like these are not punishments – 
the most hardened criminals are, one would expect, the least embarrassed by 
symbolic punishments - and just because they do not feel their condemnatory force 
doe not mean that others do not.   
Targeted economic sanctions target their harm more selectively; for example, 
it is possible to freeze the financial assets of individuals suspected of involvement in 
terrorism.  This is obviously an unpleasant consequence for those involved.  In the 
first instance they lose access to their cash and investments but in addition to this 
being placed on the UN’s ‘Consolidated List’ of sanctioned individuals carries a 
huge social stigma that can be seriously damaging for those concerned – especially 
business people who rely on their reputation (and their cashflow) to do business.234 
A more interesting question arises with respect to targeted sanctions like arms 
embargoes, nuclear sanctions or bans on ‘items intended for internal repression’.  
Can such economic sanctions be a kind of punishment?  The key thing to remember 
here is that it is those against whom the sanctions are targeted that we should expect 
to experience unpleasant consequences – after all, it is they who are being punished.  
Thus an arms embargo might offer some improvement to the general population but 
it will definitely be experienced by the army or security services as unpleasant.  The 
same goes for ‘items intended for internal repression’.  Similarly, those working on 
the production of a nuclear bomb will find nuclear sanctions to be unpleasant. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the unpleasant consequences 
economic sanctions can have but it is at least illustrative of the most obvious ways 
economic sanctions can inflict such consequences.  I now turn to consider Hart’s 
second condition. 
Hart’s second condition is that the penalty must be imposed for the violation 
of some legal rule.  Economic sanctions imposed due to violations of international 
law would meet this condition.  However, we might want to impose economic 
sanctions for violations of international moral norms that nevertheless are not 
violations of international law.  (It is true the most of the worst violations of 
international moral norms are also violations of international law but there is not a 
                                               
234 Lang, 2008,100. 
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perfect equivalence).  For Hart, punishments imposed for the violation of a non-legal 
rule are secondary or sub-standard cases but, nevertheless, still merit the title of 
‘punishment’.   
Of course it is a matter of debate what international law there is and what 
international moral norms there are.  This might make it difficult to determine 
whether or not there has been a violation and, hence, whether or not there is a case of 
punishment.  However, this is no so different from the domestic case.  Even in the 
domestic case there is dispute over interpretation of the law and even more dispute 
about the nature of morality and its requirements.  It is probably best to interpret this 
condition as entailing that the authority imposing the penalty imposes it because they 
reasonably believe that there has been a violation of a rule. 
Hart’s third condition is that the economic sanctions are imposed only on 
those who have actually or supposedly offended and only for their offence.  Targeted 
economic sanctions can be designed so that harm is inflicted only on those who are 
morally responsible for the behaviour which is being punished.  Hence targeted 
economic sanctions could meet this condition.  However, collective economic 
sanctions, which target harm at innocent people, would not meet it. 
However, Hart allows for two secondary or sub-standard cases of punishment 
where this condition does not hold. 
 
c) Vicarious or collective punishment of some member of a social group for 
actions done by others without the former's authorization, encouragement, 
control, or permission. 
 
d) Punishment of persons (otherwise than under (c)) who neither are in fact nor 
supposed to be offenders. 235 
 
Collective economic sanctions could fall into either one of these categories.  
Hence collective economic sanctions will be a secondary or a sub-standard case of 
punishment. 
Hart’s fourth condition is that the penalty must be intentionally administered 
by human beings other than the offender.  Punishment cannot be self-imposed.  
Economic sanctions easily meet this fourth condition. 
                                               
235 Hart, 2008, 5-6. 
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The fifth condition is quite interesting.  Hart’s fifth condition is that 
punishment ‘must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal 
system against which the offence is committed’.  Indeed the requirement that 
punishment must necessarily be inflicted by some kind of authority is central to 
many definitions of punishment.  The authority in question need not be legitimate; an 
illegitimate state that incarcerated convicted murderers would still be said to be 
punishing them.236  What is required is not legitimate authority but merely de facto 
authority (i.e. the power to compel obedience whether that power is legitimate or 
not).  In the absence of at least some kind of authority many would argue that we do 
not have a case of punishment but rather some kind of revenge or vigilantism.  Thus 
if you steal from me and are convicted in a court of law and sentenced to time in 
prison you are punished.  If you steal from me and I beat you up then you are not 
punished; you merely suffer my revenge.  Is the authority condition met in the case 
of economic sanctions? 
In the case of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations it seems 
like it is.  The United Nations Security Council certainly does claim the authority to 
interpret international law and to enforce it – at least where it judges there is a threat 
to peace and security.  The United Nations Security Council has the de facto 
authority to require that all UN member states impose sanctions on those states or 
individuals it deems a threat to peace and security.  Therefore UN sanctions could 
qualify as ‘punishment’ assuming the other conditions are met.  But what of 
sanctions imposed by states? 
A fundamental principle of international law is that all sovereign states are 
equal in the international system; none has any kind of authority over any other.  It 
follows that when states impose sanctions the authority condition is not met.  
However, before we give up on the idea that state-sponsored sanctions do not merit 
the term ‘punishment’, we should recall one of Hart’s secondary or sub-standard 
cases:   
 
a. Punishments for breaches of legal rules imposed or administered 
otherwise than by officials (decentralized sanctions). 
 
                                               
236 See Flew, 294 and Benn, 326: authority may be ‘real or supposed’. 
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Thus decentralised economic sanctions (i.e. economic sanctions imposed by states) 
still merit the title of ‘punishment’ according to Hart. 
Having set out the punitive potential of economic sanctions, I now turn to 
address the question of whether economic sanctions can be morally justified on the 
grounds that they are just punishment. 
Before I do this, however, for the sake of clarity it is worth pointing out some 
of the ways in which economic sanctions might be indirectly involved in punishment.  
For example, economic sanctions might be designed as a way of receiving war 
reparations.  The only case I am aware of – and it may well be the only one – is the 
way the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq were designed in order to receive 
reparations for the Kuwaiti people and others harmed by the illegal invasion of 
Kuwait.  As part of the Oil for Food Programme in the late 1990s, Iraq was permitted 
to sell a fixed quantity of oil and payments from the oil sales were controlled by the 
UN which allocated a certain amount to go towards reparations for the damage 
sustained by Kuwait and others during the invasion and the remainder to an approved 
list of humanitarian items required by the Iraqi people.  This is not the use of 
economic sanctions as punishment; rather it is the use of economic sanctions to 
secure some other punishment – in this case, war reparations.  Similarly, economic 
sanctions have been imposed in order to coerce states into giving up those suspected 
of terrorism or war crimes for trial in either foreign or international courts, e.g. Libya 
was sanctioned in order to force it to give up the Lockerbie bombers for trial.  Again, 
the punishment here is not the economic sanctions themselves but the incarceration 
of those convicted.  The economic sanctions are merely the means used to secure that 
punishment.  To be clear then, in this chapter when I talk of economic sanctions 
being a kind of punishment it is not this indirect use of economic sanctions that I 
have in mind.  Rather I am referring to the direct use of economic sanctions as 
punishment discussed above.   
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2.  Can Economic Sanctions be Morally Justified on the Grounds of 
Just Punishment? 
 
As discussed in the last section, economic sanctions can have very unpleasant 
consequences; when targeted at entire states they can – to greater and lesser extents - 
cause economic turmoil, restrict economic growth, increase unemployment and the 
number of people living in poverty as well as denying people access to essential (or 
at least desirable) goods and services; when directed at individuals their effects are 
much more limited although still not insignificant – individuals may lose access to 
their cash and investments and may have to deal with serious cashflow and 
reputational issues.  A practice of inflicting harms like this obviously requires moral 
justification and that is what I turn to consider now.  
Unfortunately, it is far beyond the scope of this chapter to develop a full 
theory of international punishment - or even a theory of economic sanctions as 
international punishment - but within the scope restrictions of this thesis I believe 
there are still some useful points which can be made.   
Hart argued that any theory of just punishment had to provide the following: 
 
i. The ‘General Justifying Aim’ of punishment: the grounds on which a practice 
of punishment can be justified. 
ii. An account of who is liable to be punished. 
iii. An account of what the appropriate amount of punishment is.237 
 
I would also add: 
 
iv. An account of who has the legitimate authority to punish. 
 
(Hart is writing in the context of domestic punishment and seems to take it 
for granted that a state has the legitimate authority to punish its own citizens.  
However, even if Hart is correct about the domestic case, the situation with respect to 
authority to punish is far from clear in the international case.  Thus I explicitly want 
                                               
237 Hart, 2008, 1-26. 
 171 
to consider the question of who has the legitimate authority to punish in the 
international case). 
In what follows I consider each of the criteria in relation to the practice of using 
economic sanctions as international punishment.   
 
i. General Justifying Aim of a System of Punishment 
 
The two most common justifications for a practice of punishment are 
deterrence and retribution.   
Proponents of the deterrent justification hold the empirical proposition that if 
penalties are attached to crimes then the ever-present threat of suffering those 
penalties will deter would-be criminals from breaking the law.  Many (but by no 
means all) proponents of deterrence theories then draw on some version of 
consequentialism to argue that punishment to deter crime is justified.  The argument 
goes that the consequences of a practice of punishment (the benefits gained from low 
crime offset by the harms of punishment) are better than the consequences of not 
punishing (the harms of high crime offset only by the fact that the harms of 
punishment are not inflicted).   
Proponents of retributive justifications on the other hand hold that there is 
some moral value in making criminals ‘pay’ for their crimes independent of any 
consequences this might have.  There are many different retributive theories but 
probably the most well-known are ‘desert theories’ according to which it is morally 
justified (perhaps even morally required) that a criminal receives the punishment she 
has come to deserve simply by virtue of her wrongdoing.238 
There is plenty of literature debating the merits of both bases of justification 
and plenty of writers who take intermediate positions between the two.  I take no 
position on which is right and in what follows I consider both: can either a deterrent 
or a retributive theory of punishment justify a practice of using economic sanctions 
as punishment?  I take each theory in turn. 
 
                                               





The use of economic sanctions as a deterrent is justified if; first, the threat of 
economic sanctions being imposed in response to wrongdoing actually deters 
potential wrongdoers from committing crimes; and second, the consequences of a 
practice of sanctioning for deterrent purposes are better than the consequences of 
having no such practice.  I take each in turn. 
 
1.  Success as a Deterrent? 
 
Whether the threat of economic sanctions being imposed for wrongdoing 
would actually deter potential wrongdoers is difficult to say.  The three most 
important factors affecting the ability of sanctions to deter are: a) the value the 
putative wrongdoer places on the wrongdoing, b) the amount of harm the sanctions 
will impose on the putative wrongdoer for the wrongdoing and, in turn, the disvalue 
the putative wrongdoer places on that harm; and c) the likelihood that the economic 
sanctions will actually be imposed.  Other things equal, the higher the value the 
putative wrongdoer places on the wrongdoing, the more severe and more likely the 
sanctions will need to be if they are to deter.   
In designing sanctions with a deterrent purpose then we need to make sure the 
economic sanctions that are threatened are sufficiently severe and, further, that their 
harms will actually fall on the putative wrongdoer.  Collective economic sanctions – 
those targeted at an entire state – often fail to harm those who are actually 
responsible for the crime.  As discussed in chapter two, as resources become 
increasingly scarce as a result of the collective sanctions they will likely be allocated 
as a matter of priority to the army or leadership with the remainder going to everyone 
else.  The army and leadership are, of course, most likely to be the ones responsible 
for violating international law.  Since they are able to control the distribution of 
scarce goods and are likely to help themselves first they will not actually suffer the 
harm of the sanctions.  The problem for the deterrence theory here of course is that if 
wrongdoers can simply push the costs of the sanctions onto others then the costs of 
economic sanctions are unlikely to deter them.  For this reason, the threat of targeted 
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sanctions might well be a more effective deterrent than the threat of collective 
sanctions. 
Another factor we must take into account is how likely the target perceives 
the imposition of the sanctions to be.  If the putative wrongdoer believes it to be very 
unlikely that sanctions will be imposed in response to her wrongdoing then she is 
unlikely to be deterred, particularly if she values the wrongful course of action very 
highly.  Therefore, senders who wish to use economic sanctions to deter must 
develop a reputation for responding to all – or at least most - instances of 
wrongdoing with economic sanctions.  Their threats to sanction in response to 
wrongdoing must be credible.  In the case of the UN this need for credibility will 
require punishing all – or at least most – instances of wrongdoing.  In the case of an 
individual state which only wishes to deter threats against itself, this will require 
punishing all – or at least most – instances of wrongdoing committed against that 
state. 
 
2.  Best Consequences? 
 
The second point we must consider is whether the consequences of a practice 
of sanctioning for deterrent purposes (the benefits gained from low crime offset by 
the harms of punishment) are better than the consequences of having no such practice 
(the harms of high crime offset only by the fact that the harms of economic sanctions 
are not inflicted).  It is always difficult to predict consequences but we can make 
some general observations.   
The first thing to note is that a practice of sanctioning for deterrent purposes 
will only have the best consequences if it actually deters.  If economic sanctions have 
no deterrent effect then the consequences of imposing economic sanctions as 
punishment are not better than the consequences of having no system of punishment 
at all since, by punishing, we inflict harms for no benefit.  As discussed above, 
sanctions have to be carefully designed and regularly and reliably imposed if they are 
to be a successful deterrent.   
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Second, economic sanctions targeted narrowly at responsible individuals 
should be preferred over collective sanctions.  This is because they cause less harm 
overall and yet, as argued above, are likely to have the most deterrent effect. 




The practice of using economic sanctions as punishment is justified on 
retributive grounds if the economic sanctions are designed to inflict harm on those 
agents who deserve to suffer it on account of their past wrongdoing.   
Further, if they are to be justified, the economic sanctions must be targeted 
only at those agents who are to blame for the wrongdoing and, in addition, the 
severity of the economic sanctions should be proportionate to the extent of the 
wrongdoing, i.e. the agent should suffer no more or less than they deserve.  This 
requirement rules out the use of collective sanctions absolutely since they are a type 
of collective punishment which cannot help but punish innocent people.   Targeted 
sanctions, however, if they inflict an amount of harm proportionate to the scale of the 
wrongdoing, can be justified by the retributive theory. 
Having established the kind of economic sanctions that can be justified by the 
deterrent and retributive theories I now turn to give an account of who may be 
punished. 
 
ii.  Who May be Punished? 
 
Who or what should be punished for violations of international law?  The 
retributive theory demands that only the guilty be punished.  The deterrent theory 
makes no such demand.  If the best consequences can be obtained by punishing the 
innocent – as might happen if everyone believed the innocent to be guilty – then we 
should punish the innocent.  However, here I would have to follow Hart in allowing 
that there are principles of natural justice that must override the deterrence theory’s 
consequentialism in such cases.  It goes against a fundamental principle of natural 
justice to punish the innocent.    
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Having established that only the guilty may be punished, that leaves us with 
three questions to address in this section.  First, what kind of agents can we hold 
morally responsible for violations of international law?  Second, in practical terms, 
how can we determine the guilt or innocence of the agents we propose to sanction?  
Third, what do our answers to these two questions imply for economic sanctions?  I 
consider each question in turn. 
 
What kind of Agents can bear Moral Responsibility for Violations of 
International Law? 
 
First, then, what kind of agents can be held responsible for violations of 
international law?  It seems obvious that individuals can be held responsible for 
violations of international law.  Their moral responsibility for violations can be 
ascertained by applying Feinberg’s tri-conditional analysis to their actions as 
outlined in chapter five.   
However, Toni Erskine makes the controversial argument that states 
themselves – considered as connected sets of political institutions – can be moral 
agents and thus are suitable objects of punishment.  I want to consider Erskine’s 
fairly radical argument in more detail.   
Erskine argues that a state – considered as an institution or a set of connected 
institutions – can be a moral agent suitable for blame and punishment.239   Erskine 
argues that, in very general terms ‘moral agency requires a capacity for both moral 
deliberation and moral action’.  In other words moral agency requires that ‘one must 
be able to understand and reflect upon moral requirements…[and] act in such a way 
as to conform to these requirements’.240  Most individuals possess these capacities 
but so, Erskine argues, do some institutions.  In particular, she argues that institutions 
are moral agents if they possess five characteristics: 
 
First, a group must have an identity that is more than the sum of 
identities of its constitutive parts; it must have what might be called a 
‘‘corporate’’ identity. Second, to be a moral agent a group requires a 
                                               
239 See Erskine, 2003 and Erskine, 2010.  Erskine draws on the work of Peter French.  See French, 
1979.  For more recent work on collective moral agency see Pettit & List, 2011. 
240 Erskine, 21. 
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decision-making structure. This not only enables the group to deliberate 
but also provides a means of arriving at a goal or policy that is more 
than simply the aggregate of individual aims and intentions. A third 
requisite feature is an executive function linked to this decision-making 
structure, which allows it to translate decisions into actions and ensures 
that policies can be implemented. Decision-making procedures and 
structures for carrying out the resulting resolutions come together to 
ensure that a group has a capacity for purposive action. Fourth, the 
group must have an identity over time. Finally, to be a moral agent a 
group must have a conception of itself as a unit—that is, it cannot be 
merely externally defined.241 
 
Such groups, for Erskine, have a capacity for both moral deliberation and 
moral action.  Erskine argues that many states and international organisations such as 
the United Nations would meet these requirements and therefore would be moral 
agents suitable for blame and punishment.242 
Erskine is at pains to point out that attributing moral responsibility to the state 
does not diminish or absolve individual citizens of their own moral responsibility; 
rather in most cases there will be an overlapping of state and individual 
responsibilities where individuals are fully morally responsible for the contribution 
they have made to the wrongdoing committed by the state while at the same time the 
state is also fully morally responsible for its wrongdoing.   
One upshot of this view is that if the state is a moral agent and fully 
responsible for wrongdoing then the state (as distinct from its individual citizens) is 
liable to suffer punishment.  Indeed Erskine does think it is theoretically possible to 
punish states without simultaneously punishing citizens.  (Punishing a state without 
also punishing its citizens is meant to be analogous to fining a company for 
wrongdoing without also fining its employees).  However, Erskine argues that there 
are two practical problems with punishing states; the first she calls the problem of 
‘misdirected harm’, the second the problem of ‘overspill’.  ‘Misdirected harm’ is 
harm that is targeted at individual citizens of the state rather than at the state itself.  
Since the state itself – considered as an institution – is the object of punishment, 
harm is misdirected if it is targeted at any individuals.  ‘Overspill’ is harm that is 
                                               
241 Erskine, 2010, 265. 
242 Some weak states or collapsed states would fail to meet the conditions for moral agency.  Other 
states might meet the conditions for moral agency but be unable to exercise their agency due to 
interventions from more powerful states restricting both internal and external sovereignty.  See 
Erskine, 2003, 29-34. 
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correctly targeted at the state but, since many citizens rely on the state’s effective 
functioning for everyday life, the harm imposed on the state ‘overspills’ onto 
individuals.  If misdirected harm is equivalent to the harm suffered by a child locked 
up alongside her criminal mother; overspill is equivalent to the harm suffered by a 
child denied the care of her mother while her mother is locked up.  Misdirected harm 
is always problematic because it involves punishing the innocent.  However, Erskine 
argues that overspill is morally permitted in cases where the harms are proportionate 
to the aims to be achieved.  She does not specifically invoke the doctrine of double 
effect in this regard but it seems to be the kind of thing she has in mind.   
Erskine’s view is very interesting though I doubt that it is correct.243  
Nevertheless I will not argue for that conclusion here.  What I will argue instead is 
that even if Erskine is correct and states are moral agents suitable for blame and 
punishment, their punishment by means of economic sanctions would not be morally 
justified. 
Erskine is not primarily concerned with economic sanctions as a means of 
punishment; however, she does briefly consider the possibility.  In a footnote she 
writes: 
 
The case of economic sanctions is a challenging one.  Do they 
represent an acceptable means of punishing the state?  Much would 
depend on whether, in a detailed analysis of such a case, the frequently 
criticized suffering of ordinary citizens caused by sanctions were 
shown to constitute misdirected harm or an instance of overspill. My 
guess is that conventional [i.e. collective] sanctions would constitute 
the former, and that so-called smart [i.e. targeted] sanctions are more 
acceptable to the extent that they avoid this problem and might only 
result in overspill.244  
 
I concur that collective sanctions would be a case of misdirected harm; they 
are, quite clearly, a means of collective punishment.  However, I am less sure that 
targeted sanctions result only in overspill.   
First of all we should consider exactly what we mean by targeted sanctions in 
the context of state punishment.  Quite frequently we have discussed targeted 
sanctions in the context of sanctions imposed on top government officials for 
                                               
243 For criticism of the view that groups can be independent moral agents see e.g. May, 1987. 
244 Erskine, 2010, 285 n.46. 
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instance.  However, these are not the targeted sanctions Erskine has in mind since 
such sanctions are not targeted at the state as an institution but at individuals.  Recall 
that for Erskine all harm targeted at individuals is misdirected harm.  The question 
then is whether there are any economic sanctions that can be said to intentionally 
target the state without at the same time intentionally targeting any individuals.  
What kind of sanctions would do this? 
We could, I suppose, freeze a state’s financial assets.  States do invest funds 
in foreign markets.  These assets belong to the state as opposed to any one individual.  
Erskine also suggests that we might target a state’s infrastructure.245  We could place 
restrictions on materials intended for state road-building or bridge-building projects 
for instance.  Such sanctions are not so far-fetched; in the 1980s the U.S. imposed 
economic sanctions designed to prevent the building of an oil pipeline between 
Western Europe and the U.S.S.R.246  We could also refuse to grant a state the loans 
that it needs to finance state projects.  We could also prevent the state from importing 
goods and services necessary for it to perform its various functions.  For example, if 
we were to sanction to the UK then we could refuse to allow the NHS (which is a 
state organisation) to import vital medicines and equipment.   
The problem with these sanctions is that they are either targeted at state assets 
or they are targeted at state projects that are intended to benefit citizens.  Targeting a 
state’s assets is problematic because, arguably, state assets are not owned by the state 
at all but ultimately by all the state’s citizens.  Thus, in attacking state assets you 
attack all of a state’s citizens.   
Similarly, attacking state infrastructure projects or state functions simply is 
attacking citizens.  Citizens are not related to their state in the way that employees 
are related to their company.  Citizens set up and maintain state institutions in order 
to manage their interactions with each other and to ensure (at least some of their) 
needs are met.  The ‘state’ is just a name given to the way a group of citizens have 
decided to organise themselves and the policies and procedures they have put in 
place to do this.  Thus an attack on the state as an institution is an attack on a state’s 
citizens in the way that an attack on a company (through fines etc.) would not be an 
attack on employees.  Thus targeted economic sanctions on a state will result in 
                                               
245 Erskine, 2010, 279. 
246 Nossal, 1989. 
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misdirected harm; not merely overspill.  Hence, even if it is true that the state is a 
moral agent suitable for blame and punishment, the imposition of either collective or 
targeted economic sanctions is morally unjustified. 
Having thus determined that there is no morally justified way of punishing a 
state with economic sanctions, I now turn to consider the punishment of individuals. 
  
How do we determine guilt? 
 
Although it is often blatantly obvious that international crimes are being 
committed (the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
widespread violations of human rights are often quite obvious) it is often less 
obvious who exactly is morally responsible for them.  The problem is that in the 
absence of set procedures for ascertaining guilt or innocence there is no reason to 
think we can be confident in the decisions to punish made by senders.   
Where economic sanctions are imposed, the accused entity or individual is 
either another state or is located in another state.  There is some literal distance 
between the sanctioning entity and their targets and consequently evidence of guilt 
might be hard to come by.  Even if evidence is plentiful and easily accessible it 
should be open for challenge.  During the Nuremburg trials at the end of the Second 
World War the Allies were physically occupying Germany and had access to all 
kinds of records that helped prove the complicity of individuals in Nazi crimes and 
even then some individuals who were accused and put on trial were acquitted.   
Thus a practice of using economic sanctions as international punishment 
requires a set of procedures to ensure that those sanctioned are actually guilty.  There 
needs to be some kind of due process that requires evidence of guilt and gives the 
accused some chance to defend themselves.  
 
What are the Implications for Economic Sanctions? 
 
Only guilty individuals may be punished.  Therefore, if economic sanctions 
are to be morally justified, they must target the guilty and not the innocent.  Targeted 
sanctions are capable of targeting only guilty individuals.  Collective sanctions on the 
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other hand raise the spectre of collective punishment.  In imposing collective 
sanctions, the innocent are punished alongside the guilty, with no effort taken to 
discriminate between them.  Further, as discussed above, it is likely that the those 
most responsible for the wrongdoing will have the power to shift the costs of such 
collective sanctions onto others.  So in addition to punishing the innocent, collective 
sanctions may well have the effect of allowing the guilty to escape punishment 
altogether.  Only punishment by means of targeted economic sanctions has the 
potential to be justified on the grounds of just punishment. 
 
iii.  Extent of Punishment 
 
Even if it is established that it is just to punish an offender, the question 
remains as to what amount of punishment is just.  In the first instance the ‘general 
justifying aim’ of punishment suggests what amount of punishment might be 
appropriate. 
For a deterrence theorist the purpose of punishment is to deter and so the 
amount of punishment that is appropriate will vary from crime to crime depending on 
the proclivities of those in society to engage in that kind of crime and how easily 
they may be dissuaded from doing so.  For a retributivist, on the other hand, the 
appropriate amount of punishment depends on what is deserved – it is therefore 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime.   The two theories might coincide in 
some cases on the amount of punishment – for example where a strong deterrent is 
necessary for a serious crime – but may also come apart, e.g. where only a weak 
deterrent is necessary for a serious crime. 
Hart argues that although the general justifying aim of punishment suggests 
an appropriate amount of punishment it is not sufficient to determine it.  This is 
because there are limits to what we may do to individuals in order to pursue justice 
and these limits must also be taken into account when determining the appropriate 
punishment.  Hart holds, for example, that the principle of proportionality in 
punishment is one such limit.  Similarly the requirement to treat like cases alike is 
another: it is not fair to punish A more harshly than B for the same crime, other 
things being equal.  These requirements do not naturally fall out of the general 
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justifying aim of punishment (at least not out of the deterrent justification) but, Hart 
argues, are rather independent requirements of natural justice.247  I now want to 
consider what this means for economic sanctions. 
If we want to treat like cases alike and/or inflict punishment that is 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime then economic sanctions as a means of 
punishment face some difficulties.  Economic sanctions are not a standardised 
punishment.  The consequences of economic sanctions are difficult to predict and 
difficult to control.  They might cause a lot more harm or a lot less harm than 
anticipated.  It will be very difficult to set in advance how long sanctions should be 
applied to cause the right amount of harm.  Further, if the harm is too great it might 
not be very easy or quick to reverse it.  This then makes it difficult to treat like cases 
alike or to achieve proportionality in punishment.   
Of course the same can be said for more familiar modes of punishment such 
as incarceration.  Two individuals may be handed the same prison sentence at the 
same prison but one may suffer much more during her imprisonment than another.  
This could be due to various factors such as how the other prisoners and staff treat 
her, whether the prison is near her home and can be easily visited by friends and 
relatives and so on.  Likewise a £1,000 fine is almost nothing to a very rich person 
but might be devastating to a poor one.   
It is probably impossible to devise punishments tailored to the individual to 
cause exactly the ‘right amount’ of suffering since there will be too many factors 
outside the control of the one handing down the punishment.  Unless we are prepared 
to abandon punishment altogether we must accept this limitation.  Nevertheless, in 
the case of economic sanctions there are surely some types of sanctions that are 
easier to control, monitor and, if necessary, reverse than others.  For example, asset 
freezes can be imposed for a set period of time but some funds released quickly if the 
restricted cashflow is causing too much harm.  If economic sanctions were to be used 
as a kind of international punishment it would undoubtedly be necessary to conduct a 
great deal of research into the types of economic sanctions best suited to this task but 
there is no reason to think a priori that suitable types of economic sanctions could 
not be found.     
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iv.  Authority to Punish 
 
Earlier I discussed whether economic sanctions could count as a type of 
international punishment since they were not imposed by an authority.  Now the 
question of whether or not economic sanctions are punishment (on the grounds that 
they are not penalties imposed by an authority) is different to the question of whether 
or not economic sanctions as international punishment are just (on the grounds that 
they are not penalties imposed by an authority).  It is quite obvious that even if we 
allow that penalties imposed by agents other than an authority are punishments, the 
fact that such punishments are not imposed by an authority might speak against the 
justice of using such punishments.  It is this issue that I now address. 
Actually, many argue that punishment is just only if it is imposed by a 
legitimate authority where an individual or entity has legitimate authority if she or it 
is morally justified in exercising that authority.   
There are many different accounts of what is required for an authority to be 
legitimate but common to all is the requirement that a legitimate authority must be 
impartial between those it has authority over, i.e. it must have no reason to favour 
the interests of one party over the interests of any other.  There are many other 
conditions that must be met for an authority to be considered legitimate but it is this 
condition – that the authority be impartial – that is most conspicuously absent in the 
international case.  States are generally not impartial in this way when it comes to 
international punishment.  There is clearly a risk that states will act out of self-
interest - perhaps claiming that violations of international law have occurred when 
they have not in order to justify inflicting harms on other states or, alternatively, 
ignoring the fact that violations of international law have occurred when it suits 
them.  The United Nations, dominated as it is by the interests of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, faces the same problem – albeit to a lesser extent.   
Thus, if it is correct that the impartiality of the punishing agent is a necessary 
condition for just punishment, neither individual states nor the United Nations punish 
justly.  But is it correct?  I want to start by considering why we think punishment is 
unjust when it is imposed by an agent who is partial.   
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If punishment is imposed by a partial agent then there is a risk that the agent 
will judge in her own favour or the favour of her friends – perhaps concluding that 
the law has been broken when it has not, finding an innocent person guilty or 
punishing in excess of what is deserved.  I agree that these are very real risks but 
they are risks and not certainties.  It is contingent whether a partial agent will judge 
incorrectly or punish excessively.  It is possible for a partial agent, acting in good 
faith, to judge correctly and punish proportionately – even if this conflicts with her 
own interests or that of her friends.  Further, even if the partial agent fails entirely in 
this respect, if we ask what is unjust about the punishment imposed we would reply 
that it was a case of punishing an innocent person or punishing excessively and it is 
those two factors which make the punishment unjust, not the fact that it was imposed 
by a partial agent.  Again, this is due to the fact that it is contingent whether a partial 
agent will judge incorrectly or punish excessively.  However, I think it is fair to 
assume that instances of partial agents punishing fairly will be rare.  Thus, a general 
practice of international punishment by partial agents could not be morally justified 
(even if one-off acts could) because it would likely result in significant numbers of 
innocents being punished and excessive punishment.  What are the implications of 
this? 
In his discussion on punitive war, David Rodin argues that if punitive war 
(and, by extension, international punishment more generally) is to be morally 
justified then a universal state with executive authority is required, as only such a 
universal state would be impartial between disputing states.248  With a universal state 
able and willing to enforce the law impartially, punishment of the innocent or 
excessive punishment should generally be avoided. 
Anthony Lang disagrees with Rodin’s conclusions and instead argues that a 
universal state is not required to make international punishment just.  Lang agrees 
with Rodin that impartiality is a key condition of just punishment but denies that 
impartiality requires a universal state.  Lang argues that we need to distinguish 
between three types of authority: legislative, judicial and executive.  It is sufficient 
for just punishment, he argues, that there is an impartial judicial authority; in which 
case we do not need a universal state in the full sense, i.e. with executive authority, 
                                               
248 Rodin, 2002, chp. 8. 
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rather we need a body that is capable of adjudicating disputes and determining 
punishments impartially; something Lang suggests that a reformed UN could be 
capable of.  Once the reformed UN had made its impartial judgement on punishment, 
individual states would be authorised by the UN to execute it.  For Lang, if 
judgments are reached impartially then it does not matter if those enforcing them are 
impartial or not.  Thus we only need an impartial judiciary, not an impartial 
executive authority and hence a universal state is not required.249   
The problem with Lang’s idea is that even if a more robust UN with an 
impartial judiciary was reliably and routinely making decisions about who should 
and should not be punished and how much, what reason is there to think that states, 
in their executive capacity, would carry these punishments out?  States are not 
impartial and may well find excuses or simply refuse to punish where it was not in 
their best interests to do so.  Further, if the UN had no executive authority, what 
would stop states punishing in the absence of UN authorisation?  Thus, even if 
sentencing was impartial, actual punishment would not be imposed impartially.  
Punishment of the innocent and excessive punishment would still occur as would a 




To conclude then, a practice of punishment requires an impartial executive 
authority to be morally justified.  Currently there is no such impartial executive 
authority and so, at this point in time, a practice of using economic sanctions as 
punishment could not be morally justified.  In order to justify a practice of 
international punishment using economic sanctions there would need to be some kind 
of universal state with executive authority that could judge and execute its judgments 
impartially.  Such an authority would also be able to ensure punishments were 
imposed reliably and routinely and so would also be able to create an effective 
deterrent and allow punishment to be imposed where it is deserved.   There may be 
good moral reasons not to create a universal state with executive authority of course 
– I take no stand on that – my conclusion is only that without one, a practice of 
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international punishment cannot be morally justified.  I now turn to consider a final 





Chapter 9: Economic Sanctions and ‘Clean Hands’ 
 
Conventionally, as we have seen, economic sanctions are conceptualised as 
being measures designed to change the objectionable/unlawful behaviour of targets 
(or perhaps to punish it).  However, Noam Zohar, drawing on Jewish theological 
tradition, argues in favour of an alternative way of thinking about economic 
sanctions - that of economic sanctions as a method of ‘preserving clean hands’.   
Under a ‘clean hands’ sanctioning policy the objective of the economic 
sanctions is not to change a target’s behaviour or to punish it but rather to avoid 
complicity in that behaviour.  Zohar argues, for example, that if one state sells 
weapons – or allows weapons to be sold by its citizens – to a second state where it 
knows or suspects those weapons will be used to commit human rights violations 
then it facilitates those violations and is thus morally responsibility for them as an 
accomplice.250  Hence states have a duty to impose arms embargoes (a type of 
economic sanction) on targets that they suspect would use those arms to commit 
human rights violations.251  Furthermore, clean hands sanctions are not restricted to 
arms embargoes; Zohar argues that embargoes would be required on all goods which 
would facilitate wrongdoing (his own example is the requirement to prevent oil 
exports to a state pursuing an aggressive war).252   
To be clear, Zohar is not claiming (or, for that matter, denying) that there are 
real world cases of economic sanctions imposed out of a desire to avoid complicity 
in wrongdoing; rather he is claiming that there could be – and that there should be.  
Whether in fact any real world cases of economic sanctions are ‘clean hands’ 
                                               
250 Note that there are other ways of understanding ‘complicity’.  For example some would consider 
using items produced through slave labour a kind of complicity in slavery – even if the slavery had 
long since ended.  They might refuse to use such items in order to ‘keep their hands clean’.  This is 
not the sense in which ‘complicity is being used here.  Here we are concerned with supplying goods 
and services which facilitate the wrongdoing. 
251 Zohar, 1993 , 8.  For a similar view advocating ‘clean hands’ sanctions see Nili, 2011.  Zohar’s 
(and Nili’s) views are similar to well-known views expressed by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar; the 
main difference being that the clean hands sanctions advocated by Zohar and Nili focus on avoiding 
complicity irrespective of outcomes, whereas both Pogge and Wenar make their suggestions with the 
intention of reducing human rights violations in the developing world.  See Pogge, 2005 and Wenar, 
2008. 
252 Zohar, 1993, 8. 
 187 
sanctions in Zohar’s sense is a separate question and one which falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.253  
Zohar’s idea is interesting because to date the moral analysis of economic 
sanctions has almost exclusively assumed the conventional conception of economic 
sanctions.  On the conventional conception, as we have seen, economic sanctions are 
assumed to be a prima facie wrong (for the reasons given in chapter two) and 
morally justified in any given case only if certain conditions are met.  However, 
under a clean hands conception of economic sanctions the imposition of sanctions is, 
by contrast, a moral duty - a duty derived from the duty not to be complicit in human 
rights violations or other wrongdoing.  Employing the clean hands conception of 
economic sanctions thus shifts the burden of moral justification from those who 
would impose sanctions to those who would not.  The clean hands conception 
therefore appears to be a valuable tool for those who would impose economic 
sanctions in response to international wrongdoing; but how plausible is it?   
In this paper I consider the plausibility of Zohar’s view on arms embargoes 
by locating it within the secular literature on complicity and moral responsibility and 
defending it from objections.  I further consider in more detail exactly how Zohar’s 
view might be extended to include not just arms embargoes but other types of 
economic sanctions.  I start in section one by setting out and defending a model of 
complicity and moral responsibility that is sympathetic to Zohar’s before turning in 
section two to consider how such a model would apply to the case of arms 
embargoes and then, in section three, to other types of economic sanctions.  I 
conclude that in circumstances where ongoing trade would render a state complicit 
in international wrongdoing the ‘clean hands’ conception of economic sanctions 
supplies plausible grounds for a moral duty on the part of those states to impose 
economic sanctions. 
 
                                               
253 The most obvious candidates for clean hands sanctions are unilateral arms embargoes and 
unilateral embargoes on ‘items to be intended for internal repression’ e.g. water cannons, riot shields, 
tear gas etc.  Since such embargoes are unilateral they cannot plausibly be intended to force an end to 
violence/internal repression since the target would simply acquire the requisite goods elsewhere.  It is 
therefore at least possible the such sanctions are imposed out of clean hands motivations. 
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Complicity and Moral Responsibility 
 
Recall that Feinberg argues that an agent is morally responsible for a harm if 
and only if: 
 
1. he was at fault in acting or omitting to act and the faultiness of his act 
or omission consisted, at least in part, in the creation of either a 
certainty or an unreasonable risk of harm (fault condition);  
 
2. his faulty act (or omission) caused the harm (causal condition); and 
 
3. the resultant harm was within the scope of the risk (or certainty) in 
virtue of which the act is properly characterised as faulty.  (That is the 
harm risked in (1) must be the same sort of harm as actually caused in 
(2)) (causal relevance condition).254 
 
Feinberg’s tri-conditional analysis applies fairly straightforwardly to the case 
of individual responsibility.  It is, however, much less straightforward to apply it to 
cases of shared responsibility where more than one agent is (at least partially) 
morally responsible for a harm.  There are many different ways in which we can 
come to share moral responsibility for a harm – one of which is through complicity.  
Following John Gardner we can understand complicity, roughly, as being 
participation in the wrongs of another.255  In legal terms one is guilty as an 
accomplice to a crime if one aids or abets another (the principal) to commit a crime.  
To aid a crime is to provide practical help, e.g. providing the gun for a murder, 
acting as a lookout for a burglary or driving the getaway car for a bank robbery.  To 
abet a crime is to encourage or procure it.  For example, inciting someone to 
violence or hiring a hit man to murder someone is abetting a crime.  In what follows 
I focus on what it is to aid a principal since it is Zohar’s contention that the supply of 
goods actually facilitates wrongdoing (as opposed to merely encouraging it).  In 
terms of moral responsibility the accomplice and principal are understood to share 
moral responsibility (not necessarily equally) for the resulting crime. 
The difficulties in applying Feinberg’s tri-conditional analysis to cases of 
complicity are fairly obvious.  For instance, suppose that A sells a gun to B who uses 
                                               
254 Feinberg, 1970, 195-199.   
255 Gardner, 2007a, 127. 
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the gun to murder C.  Is it A or B or both who cause C’s death?  Further, although B 
is clearly at fault in killing C, is A also at fault?  Does an assessment of A’s fault 
depend on whether A knew or suspected of B’s motives?  In what follows I explore 
possible answers to these questions. 
 
Complicity and Causality 
 
  We could use the ‘but-for’ test to determine whether or not an accomplice is 
morally responsible for contributing to the harms of the principal.  The but-for test, 
however, is well-known to give counterintuitive results in pre-emption cases (this is 
problematic for the clean hands approach as will become evident in section two).  
For example, say Suzy and Billy each have a stone and decide to throw their stones 
at a glass bottle in order to break it.  Suzy throws her stone first and breaks the 
bottle, thus pre-empting Billy who now does not throw his stone.  According to the 
counterfactual test it is not true that Suzy caused the bottle to break since it is not 
true that but for Suzy’s throwing of the stone the bottle would not have broken.  If 
Suzy had not thrown her stone Billy would have thrown his stone and the bottle 
would still have been broken.  This is clearly an unacceptable result since it is 
intuitively obvious that Suzy’s throwing of the stone caused the bottle to break.256 
David Lewis has offered a refinement of this counterfactual theory that is 
intended to overcome the problem of pre-emption.  It is far too much to go into all 
the details here but, very roughly, the idea is to take into account not just whether an 
even occurs but whether, when and how an event occurs.257  On this revised theory 
Suzy’s throwing of the stone is a cause of the bottle breaking because it is true that 
but for Suzy throwing the stone at speed, s and at a time, t, the bottle would not have 
broken in the way that it did and at time t1. 
Of course the counterfactual test is not the only test of causation available – 
there is also the NESS test.  The NESS test has the advantage of avoiding the 
                                               
256 Example taken from Hall, N, ‘Two Concepts of Causation’ in Eds. Collins, Hall & Pond, 
Causation and Counterfactuals, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004) quoted in Menzies, Peter, 
‘Counterfactual Theories of Causation’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 
Edition), Ed. Zalta, Edward N., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/causation-
counterfactual/ last accessed 4 December 2011. 
257 Lewis, 2000. 
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problem of pre-emption.  For example, one set of antecedent actual conditions 
sufficient for breaking the bottle includes Suzy’s throwing of the stone plus various 
background conditions (e.g. laws of gravity, fragility of the bottle and so on).  Suzy’s 
throwing of the stone is a necessary element of this sufficient set.  Therefore we can 
say that Suzy’s throwing of the stone is a cause of the bottle’s breaking.  On the 
other hand there is no set of actual conditions that includes Billy’s throw – since 
Billy never threw his stone – therefore Billy cannot be a cause of the bottle breaking.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to adjudicate between different theories of 
causation and therefore in what follows I make reference to both.  I now turn to 
consider the fault condition and the causal relevance condition. 
 
Complicity and Fault 
 
Recall that for Feinberg the other two necessary conditions for moral 
responsibility are that the agent: 
 
was at fault in acting or omitting to act and the faultiness of his act or omission 
consisted, at least in part, in the creation of either a certainty or an unreasonable 




the resultant harm was within the scope of the risk (or certainty) in virtue of 
which the act is properly characterised as faulty.  (That is the harm risked in (1) 
must be the same sort of harm as actually caused in (2)) (causal relevance 
condition).258 
 
In what follows I consider only the fault condition as I think the causal 
relevance condition is quite straightforward to apply to the case of complicity – as I 
show at the end of the section.   
In the individual case determining whether an agent is at fault is relatively 
straightforward.  How should we extend Feinberg’s analysis to the case of 
                                               
258 Feinberg, 1970, 195-199. 
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complicity?  What would it take for an agent to be at fault when aiding or 
encouraging another to bring about harm?   
The answer to this question is important because it often turns what would be 
otherwise perfectly legitimate activities into wrongful action.259  Take the selling of a 
ladder.  Ordinarily there is no wrong involved in selling ladders.  It is only if one 
sells a ladder intending or perhaps knowing or suspecting that it is to be used in a 
burglary that we consider the vendor acts wrongly.  In fact all kinds of activities 
performed by accomplices (though by no means all) are morally untroubling in and 
of themselves.  The sale of ladders is only one example.  The sale of kitchen knives, 
baseball bats and computers can also be perfectly legitimate and harmless activities 
in and of themselves though they are all items that can aid in crime.  The sale of guns 
might also be perfectly legitimate, e.g. where a gun is intended for self-defence or 
hunting.260   
In law complicity usually requires that accessories intend to bring about the 
harms in which they are complicit.  For example if A gives a gun to B intending B to 
use it to kill C then A is at fault for C’s death.  In some jurisdictions the requirement 
that the accessory intend the principal’s crime is interpreted widely such that it is 
sufficient that the accessory has knowledge that her assistance will help the principal 
commit a crime.  On the knowledge standard if A gives a gun to B knowing B will 
use it to kill C then A is at fault and morally responsible for contributing to C’s death 
– even if A does not desire C’s death.  On the wide interpretation the fact that A 
knew C would be killed if she gave the gun to B is sufficient to show that A intended 
C’s death.  Whether knowledge like this is sufficient for intention is an interesting 
philosophical question but not one I address here.  Here I will assume that 
knowledge itself, irrespective of whether it indicates intention, is sufficient for an 
agent to be at fault and thus morally responsible as an accomplice.  Such a position is 
consistent with most law and, I think, with common sense.   
The question I want to ask here is why draw the line at intent/knowledge?  It 
is sometimes suggested for instance that recklessness is sufficient for complicity – 
that a knife seller who by making a sale knowingly runs an unreasonable risk of 
                                               
259 See Simester, 591. 
260 Though guns are slightly different as their primary function is to cause harm: they are designed to 
kill people.   
 192 
causing someone’s death – as might occur if the seller strongly suspected the 
purchaser’s motives but lacked knowledge – is at fault and shares moral 
responsibility for the resulting death.  And what of negligence?  If a gun seller failed 
to realise that her customer did not have a firearms license and that customer 
murdered someone is the gun seller at fault?  Does she share moral responsibility for 
the death? 
Arguments made against holding people responsible for reckless or negligent 
complicity are made in a legal context and primarily relate to legal liability as 
opposed to moral responsibility but may be relevant to the moral situation and I turn 
to them now. 
First, Sanford Kadish argues there is an ‘ethic of individualism and self-
determination’ underlying the restriction to intent/knowledge in the law.  Morally we 
wish to hold people responsible for their own actions; there is something wrong with 
the idea of holding people morally responsible for the actions of others.261  As 
Simester sums it up: 
 
If my action is lawful and not [morally] wrong, someone else’s crime 
does not become my lookout – and should not be my moral or legal 
responsibility – simply because I foresee its possibility.  Something 
more is required.262 
 
Kadish argues we should not be responsible for another’s wrongs unless we 
‘make them our own’.263  By intending to participate or by participating with full 
knowledge the resulting crimes are an expression of our will and thus we make them 
our own.  But where our actions are merely reckless or negligent this is not the case.  
Note that this could be viewed as a further instance of invoking the doctrine of 
intervening agency discussed in chapter three.   
Again, I would object that we are not holding agents morally responsible for 
the actions of others at all, rather we are holding agents responsible for the 
contribution they make to the actions of others and, by extension, the contribution 
they make to their harms.264  Therefore this objection does not hold. 
                                               
261 Kadish, 1997, 390. 
262 Simester, 590. 
263 Kadish, 1997, 390. 
264 See Gardner, 2007a. 
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A second argument against holding people legally liable for reckless or 
negligent complicity is that the threat of criminal punishment would greatly restrict 
people’s freedom to engage in what would otherwise be perfectly legitimate 
activities, e.g. selling knives, computers, ladders and so on.  Many business people 
might stop selling such items out of fear of what their customers would do with 
them.  Thus, as Simester puts it, setting the mens rea standard for complicity at 
intent/knowledge is a ‘trade-off’ between protecting potential victims and preserving 
the liberties of everyone else.265  
This is a pragmatic rather than principled reason to restrict mens rea to 
intent/knowledge.  That this is so is obvious in the way that – for particularly 
dangerous goods – the law has no problem explicitly criminalising certain types of 
reckless or negligent sale.  For example it is illegal to sell guns to those without a 
firearms license, to sell knives to children or alcohol to already intoxicated persons.  
This reflects the law making a different ‘trade-off’ where goods involved are 
particularly dangerous. 
But how does all this apply to moral responsibility?  After all, if one is 
deemed morally responsible for recklessly or negligently aiding a principal to bring 
about some harm would that restrict one’s freedom?  Is the threat of being blamed by 
society sufficient to restrict one’s freedom?  Perhaps.  Mill certainly thought so.  But 
society’s moral blame is less of a threat to most than the threat of criminal 
punishment and therefore less likely to restrict freedom – or at least to restrict it so 
much.  But equally perhaps the pragmatic concern about restricting freedom does not 
translate very well from the legal to moral context.  I believe we already have moral 
intuitions in our society that lead us to blame people for their reckless or negligent 
complicity.  If those intuitions reflect society’s existing moral beliefs then 
articulating them in a philosophy thesis is not going to further restrict anyone’s 
freedom. 
Some might say that the corresponding objection is not that freedom is 
restricted by making recklessness or negligence sufficient for moral responsibility 
but that it makes morality overdemanding.  Morality would require us to investigate 
every purchaser to ensure that they would not use the goods to bring about 
                                               
265 Simester, 582-3. 
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unjustified harms or otherwise face the charge of negligence.266  However, I do not 
think that avoiding negligence would require such extensive investigations.  To be 
negligent is to fail to take the care that a reasonably prudent person would take; a 
reasonably prudent person faced with some suspicions might ask a few questions 
about what the customer wanted the goods for but they wouldn’t follow him home 
and spy on him or engage a private detective.  Obviously, it is a matter of judgment 
what a reasonably prudent person would do in the circumstances.  However, what is 
required of a reasonably prudent person is unlikely to be overdemanding since what 
it is reasonable to demand of people will be factored into the judgment of what a 
reasonably prudent person would do.    
A third objection against holding people legally liable for reckless or 
negligent complicity is that a mens rea of intent is required to ensure that the 
accomplice always has sufficient mens rea for the principal’s crime.  To use an 
example from Kadish, say X gives the code to his boss’ safe to a known burglar, Y 
so that Y can get some papers for him.267  A week later Y returns to the safe and 
takes X boss’ cash.  Y is guilty of burglary.  To be guilty of burglary requires that 
one acts with the intention of permanently depriving another of their property.  X is 
not guilty of burglary because X did not give the code to Y with the intention that Y 
take the cash.  X was merely reckless with respect to the risk that Y might take the 
cash.  Therefore X cannot be found guilty of burglary.  However, a reckless 
complicity standard would find him guilty of burglary and that does not make sense 
given the definition of burglary.   
This is a technical legal reason for requiring a mens rea of intent which does 
not, I believe, translate to the case of moral responsibility for harms.  After all it 
seems obvious that X does bear some moral responsibility for the loss of his boss’ 
cash even if we would not want to find him legally liable for the crime of burglary. 
                                               
266 One would be morally justified in assisting an agent to bring about morally justified harm e.g. one 
would be morally justified in selling an agent a gun which they use in self-defence – assuming one 
intended/had knowledge that the gun was purchased for defensive reasons.  However, one would not 
be morally justified in selling a gun to someone whose crime would be excused.  One would still be 
morally blameworthy for selling a gun to someone who had been coerced/deceived into committing a 
murder – presuming that one intended/knew about the murder and had not similarly been 
coerced/deceived.  Thus one can be morally responsible as an accomplice while the principal is 
excused moral responsibility.   
267 For Kadish’s example see Kadish, 346. 
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In conclusion there does not appear to be any good reason to restrict 
attribution of moral responsibility to agents with a mens rea of intent or knowledge.  
Therefore, I will assume that any level of culpability is sufficient for an agent to be 
morally responsible as an accomplice: intent, knowledge, recklessness or negligence. 
Given the preceding discussion we are now in a position to re-state 
Feinberg’s tri-conditional analysis for the case of complicity as follows: 
An agent who aids or abets a principal shares moral responsibility for the 
harms inflicted by the principal if and only if: 
 
1. he was at fault in aiding or abetting and the faultiness of his aiding 
and abetting consisted, at least in part, in the creation of either a 
certainty or an unreasonable risk of harm.  (In other words he aided 
or abetted with the intention to bring about the harm or in the 
knowledge that he would bring about harm or he recklessly or 
negligently created an unreasonable risk of that harm occurring). 
 
2. his act of aiding or abetting made a causal contribution to the harm 
inflicted by the principal (where an act makes a causal contribution 
if it is a cause-in-fact of the harm as determined under the revised 
counterfactual or NESS tests). 
 
3. The harm inflicted by the principal was within the scope of the risk 
(or certainty) in virtue of which the act of aiding and abetting is 
properly characterised as faulty (the harm the accomplice intended 
or risked the principal bringing about is in fact the harm that the 
principal brought about). 
 
In the next section I consider whether, according to this analysis, states that permit 
(or encourage) arms exports are complicit in any human rights violations that result 




2.    Arms Embargoes 
 
Before I begin a discussion on the duty to impose arms embargoes I should 
say that there are perfectly legitimate reasons to export arms to foreign states.  
Weapons have morally permissible uses such as national defence and policing and 
not all states can manufacture the weapons that they need for these purposes 
themselves.  Therefore a total ban on arms exports would not be reasonable.   
However, many states use weapons for illegitimate purposes such as pursuing 
aggressive war or committing human rights violations.  When such human rights 
violations occur Zohar claims that the states which permitted (or encouraged) the 
export of these weapons share moral responsibility for these violations.  Is that claim 
plausible? 
Here I use the analysis developed in the previous section to argue that in 
certain circumstances it is appropriate to hold states which permit (or encourage) 
arms exports morally responsible as accomplices for the human rights violations that 
result.  Further, given that states have a duty to avoid complicity in human rights 
violations I go on to argue that in the circumstances where exports would render 
them complicit, states have a derivative duty to impose arms embargoes.  Finally, I 
set out what such a duty would entail.  In what follows I take the UK’s arms export 




When can it be said that the UK makes a causal contribution to human rights 
violations committed with arms exported from the UK?  The following is a highly 





Figure 2. Causal chain of events for arms exported from the UK contributing to human rights 
violations 
 
The British government does not sell weapons.  In the UK, as in many other 
countries around the world, weapons are developed, manufactured and sold by 
private companies.  The British Ministry of Defence is a significant customer of 
these companies but they also sell a substantial amount to third party states.  
Nevertheless, the British government has full control over where these weapons are 
sold.  Every shipment of weapons out of the UK requires a license without which the 
arms will not be shipped.  No weapons may be exported from the UK without 
official permission.   
But this is not the only role the UK plays in arms transfers.  Additionally, 
government ministers actively market British weapons abroad.  Recently, for 
example, David Cameron attracted criticism for taking a delegation from British 
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Once the arms have been shipped to their destination there are (at least) four 
different ways in which the arms may be thought to causally contribute to human 
rights violations.   
First, obviously, the weapons can be used directly – for example in pursuit of 
an unjust war, to carry out a campaign of ethnic cleansing or to put down peaceful 
demonstrations. 
Second, the UK sometimes permits exports only upon receiving guarantees 
from the recipient state that the arms will not be used in particular ways.  For 
example during the Indonesian state’s violent repression in Aceh province, the UK 
permitted a significant amount of arms sales to Indonesia on receipt of a guarantee 
they would not be used in Aceh.  However, even if these weapons are not used 
directly to commit human rights violations there is a risk that the arrival of the new 
weapons ‘frees up’ older weapons to be used for this purpose.   
Third, it is possible that the threat alone posed by these weapons might allow 
their possessors to commit human rights violations.  Repressive, authoritarian 
governments usually have a well-armed military and internal security force which 
act as a deterrent to political opposition and allow human rights violations such as 
torture, illegal detention and denial of free speech to go on unchecked.  
Fourth, there is the possibility that by permitting (or encouraging) arms 
exports to states with poor human rights records, the UK risks being seen as offering 
tacit approval of their actions.  After all, one does not sell weapons to one’s enemies.  
Diplomatically, weapons sales usually indicate friendly relations.  Consequently, the 
state purchasing these arms might not take seriously any international pressure to 
improve its human rights record. 
However, since causation is much more difficult to show in respect of the 
latter two possibilities I will not consider them in what follows. 
In order to show that the UK makes a causal contribution to human rights 
violations it is necessary to show causal dependence between the UK’s actions and 
each step in the chain. I start with the UK’s licensing of arms exports before moving 





Is the government’s granting of a license a necessary link in the causal chain 
of events?  For this to be the case on the basic counterfactual test it would have to be 
true that but for the license there would be no arms shipment; but for the arms 
shipment the perpetrators would not have weapons and but for the perpetrators 
having weapons there would be no human rights violations.   
One objection to this analysis might take the form of the ‘arms dealers 
defence’: ‘if we didn’t do it, someone else would’.  In other words if the UK did not 
license its companies to export arms, some other state would.  Assuming this is true 
– which it almost certainly is – then according to the basic counterfactual test the UK 
does not causally contribute to human rights violations since it is not true that but for 
the UK’s licensing of these exports there would not be an arms shipment – there 
would still be an arms shipment – it’s just that it would be coming from another 
country.  Thus the human rights violations would still occur – using weapons 
imported from other states.   
Structurally, the ‘arms dealer’s defence’ raises the same problem as the case 
of Suzy, Billy and the glass bottle – on the basic counterfactual test Suzy didn’t 
cause the glass bottle to break because Billy would have broken it if she hadn’t.  
Therefore, anyone who argues that the British government makes no causal 
contribution (on the grounds of the arm’s dealer’s defence) must, to be consistent, 
also argue that Suzy makes no causal contribution to the breaking of the glass bottle.  
This seems absurd and therefore we must reject the arms dealers defence and 
conclude that the UK in this case does make a causal contribution.268  Note that this 
is also the result that would obtain under David Lewis’ revised counterfactual theory.  
On Lewis’ revised theory the British government’s granting of the license causally 
contributes to the human rights violations because but for the license being granted 
by the British government there would be no shipment of UK weapons; but for the 
shipment of UK weapons the perpetrators would not have this shipment of UK 
weapons; but for the perpetrators having the UK weapons they would not have 
                                               
268 The ‘arms dealer’s defence’ can also be applied to other links in the chain e.g. one could argue that 
if the perpetrators did not receive the weapons they could have found other weapons to commit the 
human rights violations.  The objection can be countered in the exact same way. 
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committed the human rights violations in the way that they did, i.e. with the UK 
weapons.  It is also worth pointing out that the UK government would make a causal 
contribution under the NESS test.269 
Earlier I mentioned that it is possible that arms can be exported with the 
guarantee that they are not used in particular ways, e.g. the guarantee that the UK 
received that its arms exports to Indonesia would not be used in Aceh.  However, 
even if such guarantees are given, and even if such guarantees are honoured, the risk 
exists that the delivery of new weapons ‘frees up’ other weapons that otherwise 
would not have been available and these are used to commit human rights violations.  
If this is the case then on the basic and revised counterfactual tests it is true to say 
that but for the delivery of the new weapons the older weapons could not have been 
used to commit human rights violations.  Therefore, even if such guarantees are 
honoured, the UK makes a causal contribution to those violations.  (Not that this will 
always be the case.  For example, a state may have additional suppliers who do not 
seek such guarantees - in which case they will not be reliant on the UK’s new 
weapons ‘freeing up’ the older ones.  Alternatively, the state may already have all 





Whether the marketing is a necessary link in the causal chain of events is 
more debatable - perhaps the targeted states would have purchased the weapons 
without them being actively marketed - perhaps not.  Even those responsible for 
making the purchase might not be sure what the answer is to this question.  
Therefore, I set the issue of marketing aside.   
To conclude then, the UK, through its licensing of arms exports, makes a 
causal contribution to human rights violations committed using those arms. 
                                               
269 The ‘arms dealer’s defence’ can be understood in a different way - as the consequentialist claim 
that whether one deals arms or not is a matter of moral indifference since, either way, the 
consequences – in terms of human suffering – will be the same.  For an interesting discussion of this 
version of the arms dealers defence see Glover, 1986. 
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Of course, showing that the UK makes a causal contribution to human rights 
violations is not sufficient to show that the UK is morally responsible for them.  To 




There are different ways in which the UK could be at fault in permitting arms 
exports that causally contribute to human rights violations.  Earlier I discussed the 
four different levels of culpability: intent, knowledge, recklessness and negligence 
and I argued that even if the law rightly required specific levels of culpability for 
certain crimes, there was no reason to restrict moral responsibility to specific levels.  
Therefore it follows that the UK is morally responsible as an accomplice for the 
human rights violations if it licenses the exports with any level of culpability.  But 
what would it entail for the UK to meet these varying levels of culpability?  To meet 
the ‘intent’ condition, the UK must license the exports with the intention that the 
weapons sold will be used in human rights violations; this must be the purpose for 
which the license is granted.  It would involve, for example, licensing arms sales to a 
state pursuing an aggressive war in an attempt to aid them in that war or licensing 
arms sales to a state pursuing a campaign of ethnic cleansing with the intention of 
aiding them in that endeavour.  This is a high level of culpability.  To meet the 
‘knowledge’ condition is much easier, the British government must license the sales 
with the knowledge that they will be used to commit human rights violations; under 
the ‘knowledge’ standard it does not have to be the purpose for which the license is 
granted – it is perfectly sufficient for the ‘knowledge’ standard to be met that all the 
UK wanted was that UK arms companies profit from the deal.  To meet the 
‘recklessness’ condition it is sufficient that by licensing arms exports the UK creates 
an unreasonable risk that human rights violations will occur.  Finally, to meet the 
‘negligence’ condition the UK must unintentionally license arms exports that create 
an unreasonable risk of human rights violations occurring.  That might occur if the 
British government did not properly consider the use to which the purchasing state 
might put the weapons.  Obviously, the British government is more at fault for 
intentionally aiding a state to commit human rights violations than for 
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unintentionally creating a risk of human rights violations by failing to do proper 
research.  However, whether the aiding is intentional or negligent, the UK is morally 
responsible for the results as an accomplice. 
 
The Duty to Impose Arms Embargoes 
 
If all people have human rights and if all states have a duty to avoid 
complicity in violating those rights then it follows from the above discussion that 
there is a derivative duty to impose arms embargoes wherever exports would create a 
certainty or an unreasonable risk of human rights violations occurring.  What exactly 
would such a duty entail? 
Obviously a state could not export arms with the intention or the knowledge 
that the arms would certainly be used to violate human rights.  That much is 
straightforward.  However, in many cases it will be unclear whether arms exports to 
a given state will causally contribute to human rights violations.  In this case there is 
a duty to impose an embargo on that state if exports would create an ‘unreasonable 
risk’ of human rights violations occurring.  But what constitutes an ‘unreasonable 
risk’? 
The risk of a harm is the product of the probability it will occur and the 
magnitude of that harm.  Thus, the risk of a very serious harm that has a low 
probability of occurring might be equivalent to the risk of a minor harm which has a 
very high probability of occurring.  Whether a given risk is reasonable depends on 
the benefits that are to be gained by risking the harm.  For example, a small but not 
insignificant risk of death is reasonable in the context of an operation to free 
someone from a miserable medical condition but is unreasonable in the context of a 
walk in the park.270 
The possible benefits to be gained from exporting arms to a state are the 
capacity of that state to use the arms for legitimate purposes (e.g. national defence or 
policing), the profits to be gained by private companies and more intangible 
diplomatic gains.  Any risk of harm must be weighed up in the context of these 
                                               
270 Feinberg, 1984, 187-193. 
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benefits.  Clearly, human rights violations are extremely serious harms and the 
probability of their occurrence is rarely insignificant. 
It is clearly a difficult judgment therefore whether in any given case there is 
an unreasonable risk of human rights violations occurring.  The exporting state will 
need to take into consideration various factors such as the political climate in the 
recipient state, its human rights record, any intelligence they have about why the 
weapons are desired and so on.  Additionally, there are some specific issues to 
consider.   
One is the issue of re-selling; the state the weapons are sold to might not be a 
high risk for committing human rights violations itself but might sell them on to a 
state that is.  States are expected to commit to not selling the weapons on but in 
practical terms cannot be held to account if they do.   
A further issue is that some weapons have a very long shelf-life.  Indeed, 
some weapons are still in wide circulation that were manufactured in the 1960s or 
even earlier.  At the time these were sold their sale might not have created an 
unreasonable risk of human rights violations occurring though they pose such a risk 
now.  One could argue that given the nature of weapons one can never be sure that 
they do not pose an unreasonable risk of human rights violations and therefore that a 
state can never export them.  I think a requirement for epistemic certainty takes 
things too far.  Given that there are legitimate uses for weapons we need to make the 
best assessment possible of conditions existing at the time.   
Finally, in order to avoid negligence, a state must ensure risk assessments are 
carried out for every arms export.   
Therefore, to summarise, there is a duty to impose arms embargoes wherever 
exports would create a certainty or unreasonable risk of human rights violations 
occurring.  Such a duty entails that exporting states conduct thorough risk 
assessments before any arms are exported and impose embargoes where there is a 






3. Other Cases of Economic Sanctions 
 
As I argued above, Zohar’s conception of ‘clean hands’ sanctions plausibly grounds 
a duty to impose arms embargoes; but can his account stretch to include embargoes 
of other goods or services?  In this section I consider whether the duty to avoid 
complicity in human rights violations could require embargoes on the supply of 
goods and services other than arms.  First, I consider which goods and services other 
than arms have the potential to causally contribute to human rights violations.  
Second, where human rights violations have taken place I consider what is required 
to hold the exporting state morally responsible for them as an accomplice.  Third, I 
consider what a duty to sanction would entail if extended to goods and services other 
than arms.  Finally, I consider the problems associated with extending a duty to 
sanction over a greater range of goods and services. 
 
What Kind of Trade has the Potential to Causally Contribute to Human 
Rights Violations?   
 
Some trade is more obviously problematic in this regard than others.  To use 
Zohar’s example, to sell oil to a state pursuing an aggressive war is obviously a 
problem.  Oil is necessary to provide the fuel for tanks, planes and ships without 
which there wouldn’t be a war.  Similarly, selling uranium to a state attempting to 
build a nuclear bomb or selling certain chemicals to a state known to have carried 
out poison gas attacks is problematic.  Both the uranium and the chemicals are 
necessary for the human rights violations.  If a state wishes to explode a nuclear 
bomb or carry out poison gas attacks then the uranium and the chemicals are 
necessary to carry out those respective plans. 
However, some goods are problematic in less obvious ways.  Consider the 
computer equipment necessary to maintain databases to spy on the population or the 
construction equipment necessary to build a prison for political opponents.  Even 
food is necessary for some wrongdoing; supplies of food would be essential for an 
army engaged in an aggressive war.  Services too could be a necessary component of 
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some human rights violations.  Consider, for example, contracts to provide specialist 
military or technical training. 
Basically, any type of good or service at all has the potential to causally 
contribute to human rights violations.  Therefore the clean hands conception of 




When does the UK causally contribute to human rights violations that have 
been brought about using goods and services exported from the UK?  Since I have 
discussed the detail of this issue already for the case of arms exports I will only be 
brief here.  Suffice it to say that by analogy with the case of arms exports there are 
(at least) two possible ways in which goods and services exported from the UK 
might causally contribute to human rights violations.   
The first is through direct use: if it is the oil which UK companies exported 
that is being used to fuel the tanks in the aggressive war or the food which UK 
companies exported that is being used to feed the soldiers in this war then the UK 
has causally contributed to this aggressive war by permitting the exports.  It is true 
that, unlike the case of arms, the UK government does not license every export.  
Nevertheless, it is within the UK’s power to embargo any export and if it omits to do 
so then it causally contributes to the wrongdoing.271   
The second way the exports might causally contribute is indirectly by 
‘freeing up’ other goods and services to be used in human rights violations that 
would otherwise not have been available.  For example, the oil the UK supplies to 
the state might be delivered on the condition that it only be used for civilian purposes 
but this might ‘free up’ other oil supplies for use in the war effort that would not 
have been available otherwise.  If the UK permits such exports then it causally 
contributes to the wrongdoing.  However, in many situations it will not be the case 
                                               
271 Some might argue that an omission cannot be a cause.  I believe that is wrong though I do not have 
the space to argue for my position here.  However, even if it were conceded that omissions were not 
causes it would have little impact on the final conclusion.  The fact remains that the UK companies 
(and hence UK citizens) are providing the goods and services that are causally contributing to human 
rights violations.  Hence it can be argued that the UK has a duty to prevent its citizens violating 
human rights and hence a duty to impose an embargo on the goods. 
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that the supply of some goods for legitimate purposes ‘frees up’ more of those goods 
for illegitimate uses - in which case the UK will not make a causal contribution.  For 
example, it is not always the case that the supply of oil to civilians frees up oil 
supplies for the war effort that would not have been available otherwise.  There are 
(at least) two reasons for this.   
First, the state might have the policy of directing its oil supplies to the war 
effort as a matter of priority.  Thus it is never the case that oil being supplied to 
civilians ‘frees up’ oil supplies to be used in the war because the oil would never 
have been earmarked for civilian use in the first place.   
Second, if the UK is the only oil supplier or all oil suppliers are making their 
oil deliveries conditional on civilian use then, assuming the state has no oil reserves 
and the civilian usage can be monitored, there is no oil to ‘free up’.  These issues 
would need to be taken into consideration if a state were considering making supply 
conditional on it being used for legitimate purposes.   
Of course establishing that the UK makes a causal contribution in these cases 
is not sufficient to show that the UK is morally responsible.  In order to show this we 
need to show that the UK was at fault in permitting the exports. 
 
ii.  Fault 
 
The UK is obviously at fault if it allows these exports with the intention or 
knowledge that they will be used to commit human rights violations.  When, though, 
can we say that the UK is reckless or negligent with respect to permitting such 
exports?  As discussed above it will be necessary to conduct some kind of risk 
assessment to ensure that the exports do not create an unreasonable risk of human 
rights violations occurring.  This will be considerably more difficult for some goods 
than others - just from an information collection point of view.  Although there are 
organisations monitoring globally the use to which arms, uranium and certain 
chemicals are put there is nothing similar for construction equipment, computer 
equipment or food.  In general, given the lack of available information, it will often 
be the case that a state genuinely does not know how the goods and services it 
exports are being used and, furthermore, has no realistic way of obtaining that 
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information.  Thus for many goods and services it is unlikely that a state could be 
charged with being reckless or negligent in their export since in the absence of 
information it could not be said that they knowingly created an unreasonable risk and 
neither could it be said that a reasonably prudent person would not have exported the 
goods (at least in the case of goods that are ordinarily harmless, e.g. construction 
equipment, food etc.). 
 
What are The Problems of Extending the Duty to Sanction to Other 
Goods? 
 
Zohar himself points out the problem that might arise from preventing 
exports of oil: oil has both military and civilian uses.  Terminating the supply of oil 
would avoid complicity in an aggressive war and save the lives of many innocent 
people in the aggressed-upon state.  However, what if the oil was necessary to heat 
homes during the winter and the civilian population would freeze to death without it?   
The duty to impose the oil embargo is derivative on the duty to not violate 
human rights.  If the oil embargo itself would lead to human rights violations by 
causing people to freeze to death then it seems that instead of there being a duty to 
embargo there is rather a duty to continue trading.  However, continuing to trade 
would render us complicit in the aggressive war and the deaths of many innocent 
people.  Hence, we are pulled in two directions: on the one hand we should avoid 
supplying the oil so as to avoid complicity in aggressive war and on the other hand 
we should continue supplying the oil so as to avoid directly harming (as principal) 
the civilians who cannot heat their homes in the winter.  It seems that one is forced 
to choose to either harm as principal or harm as accomplice.  Perhaps one could 
argue that it is worse to harm as a principal than as an accomplice and therefore one 
should continue to supply the oil.  However, I doubt that this would be a fruitful line 
of argument.  Perhaps the only reasonable thing to do would be to undertake 
whichever course of action – embargoing or continuing to supply – that was 
expected to cause the least harm, i.e. follow the course of action which harms the 
least number of people. 
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Such dilemmas will occur frequently when the goods or services supplied are 
capable of causally contributing to human rights violations but nonetheless have 
essential and legitimate uses.  Arms embargoes rarely face this dilemma since the 




In circumstances where ongoing trade would render a state complicit in 
international wrongdoing the ‘clean hands’ conception of economic sanctions 
supplies plausible grounds for a moral duty on the part of states to impose economic 
sanctions.  However, this duty is not absolute and may be over-ridden in the face of 
competing moral considerations. 
 
 
                                               
272 However, this is not always the case.  One could imagine a police force that cannot properly defend 
the civilian population because they are not armed.  Or a repressive state which is attacked in an 




In this thesis I considered whether economic sanctions could be justified on 
four different grounds: other-defence (of a sender’s own citizens and, in the case of 
humanitarian intervention, of other citizens), on the grounds of lesser evil, just 
punishment and clean hands.  Each justification provides its own framework for the 
ethical assessment of economic sanctions – its own set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions or ‘rules of thumb’ for justified cases of economic sanctions.  Hence this 
thesis does not conclude with one set of overarching principles for the ethical use of 
economic sanctions comparable to the just war principles. 
How, then, do the five frameworks presented here fit together?  I consider 
them to be mutually complementary.  Whether the framework is ‘right’ or not for a 
particular case of economic sanctions will depend on the context in which the 
economic sanction is being imposed.  Is the economic sanction to be used to defend 
the rights of a sender’s citizens or others (humanitarian intervention)?  If so, then the 
grounds for justification will be other defence or, if collective sanctions are to be 
used, the grounds of lesser evil.  If the economic sanctions are intended as 
punishment then the grounds of justification will be just punishment.  If the 
economic sanctions are intended to avoid complicity in evil then their ‘justification’ 
is to keep clean hands.   
Of course in actual cases of economic sanctions it will often be unclear what 
their objectives are or how exactly they are intended to work.  For example, are they 
intended to change an objectionable policy or are they really intended as retributive 
punishment?  Further, are the economic sanctions intended to work by coercing the 
ordinary population or are they intended to end the objectionable policy directly by 
damaging the economy to such an extent that a state does not have the funds to 
pursue ambitious military endeavours?  This issue obviously causes problems but it 
is, in the end, no different to the situation of war where the intentions of political 
leaders are also often opaque.  In such circumstances we can only assess the 
evidence available to us and draw the best conclusion we can about these matters.   
 To recap, then, I argued the following.  Economic sanctions can be justified 
on the grounds of other-defence when the following necessary and sufficient 
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conditions are met: the unjust attack condition, the necessity condition, the 
proportionality condition and the liability condition.  Indirect collective sanctions, by 
their very nature, cannot ever be morally justified on the grounds of other-defence as 
they cannot ever satisfy the liability condition.  Direct collective sanctions satisfy the 
liability condition if the innocent population is properly provided for and thus can 
meet the necessary conditions for morally justified self-defence.  Targeted sanctions, 
by contrast, (both direct and indirect) will more easily be able to meet the necessary 
conditions for justified self-defence.  Whether they in fact do in particular 
circumstances would require an analysis of those particular circumstances. 
Humanitarian intervention by means of economic sanctions is morally 
permissible because senders have the right to defend the human rights of any citizen 
so long as, as in the case of other-defence, the unjust attack condition, the necessity 
condition, the proportionality condition and the liability condition are all met.  Again 
then, the use of indirect collective sanctions are ruled out as a means of humanitarian 
intervention.  Further, I argued that the most prominent arguments against 
humanitarian intervention apply either not at all or with significantly less force to the 
case of economic sanctions and are easily overcome.   
For economic sanctions to be justified on the grounds of just punishment 
requires an executive authority that could judge and execute its judgments 
impartially.  Currently, there is no such impartial executive authority.  Hence, 
currently, a practice of international punishment by means of economic sanctions 
cannot be morally justified.   
Direct collective sanctions are extremely unlikely to be justified as the lesser 
evil.  However, indirect collective economic sanctions are likely to be justified on the 
grounds that they are the lesser evil if it is reasonable to believe that: 
 
 There is a significant probability that the target’s objectionable policy, if allowed 
to continue, would have truly terrible consequences.   
 The economic sanctions have a reasonable probability of succeeding. 
 Other non-violent means (e.g. diplomatic sanctions, targeted economic sanctions 
and so on) have either been tried and have failed or it is reasonably believed that 
they will have a negligible chance of succeeding if imposed.   
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 The economic sanctions are not so severe that they will kill people, e.g. through 
starvation.  (Generally, the less harm done by the sanctions the more likely they 
are to be justified on the grounds that they are the lesser evil). 
 Military action does not have a significantly higher probability of success or 
would kill a large number of innocent people.  
 
In circumstances where ongoing trade would render a state complicit in 
international wrongdoing the ‘clean hands’ conception of economic sanctions 
supplies plausible grounds for a moral duty on the part of states to impose economic 
sanctions.  However, this duty is not absolute and may be over-ridden in the face of 
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